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SUMMARY
Malware continues to be one of the primary tools employed by attackers.
It is used in attacks ranging from click fraud to nation state espionage. Malware
infects hosts over the network through drive-by downloads and social engineering.
These infected hosts communicate with remote command and control (C&C) servers
to perform tasks and exfiltrate data. Malware’s reliance on the network provides an
opportunity for the detection and annotation of malicious communication.
This thesis contains four primary contributions: First, we design and implement
a novel incident investigation system, named WebWitness. It automatically traces
back and labels the sequence of events (e.g., visited web pages) preceding malware
downloads to highlight how users reach attack pages on the web; providing a better
understanding of current attack trends and aiding in the development of more effective
defenses. Second, we conduct the first systematic study of modern web based social
engineering malware download attacks. From this study we develop a taxonomy
for classifying social engineering downloads and use it to measure attack properties.
From these measurements we show that is it possible to detect the majority of social
engineering downloads using features from the download path. Third, we design and
implement ExecScent, a novel system for mining new malware C&C domains from
live networks. ExecScent automatically learns C&C traffic models that can adapt to
the deployment network’s traffic. This adaptive approach allows us to greatly reduce
the false positives while maintaining a high number of true positives. Lastly, we
develop a new packet scheduling algorithm for deep packet inspection that maximizes
throughput by optimizing for cache affinity. By scheduling for cache affinity, we are




Malware continues to be a significant threat to Internet security despite all the re-
sources allocated to combat it [4, 5]. It is a critical component in many of the most
costly attacks on organizations such as information stealing and extortion. For in-
stance, Cryptolocker ransomware made an estimated 30 million dollars in less than
100 days for attackers [3]. A number of other attacks in recent years have leveraged
malware to have multimillion dollar paydays such as ZeroAccess [16] and Carberp [9].
In addition to monetary gains, malware is often employed in nation state cyber es-
pionage and in targeted attacks that are motived by economic, political or military
interests [10, 15]. With such high stakes, defending hosts and networks against mal-
ware continues to be a top priority.
The majority of malware infections begin with a remote malicious executable
download. Two common infection vectors are drive-by downloads and social engi-
neering [97]. Drive-by downloads exploit an unpatched vulnerability in the browser
or plug-in. The exploit gains control of the application by pointing its execution at
code (i.e., shellcode) controlled by the attacker. The shellcode then downloads and
executes the malware. Often, a drive-by download attack will go unnoticed by the
victim and they will be unaware of the compromise. Intrusion detection and preven-
tion systems (IDS/IPS) are often deployed to identify and stop software exploitation,
but often fail due to obfuscated exploit code and permutations in the exploitation
process.
Social engineering is also a common infection vector. However, the target of the
attack is the user, not software. The attacker uses persuasion [43] and deception [127]
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techniques to convince the the user to download and install malware. One benefit for
the attacker in using social engineering is that his attack can be successful even on
systems that have a limited attack surface and no known exploitable vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, social engineering attacks are less likely to be identified by modern
detection systems since their focus is on exploitation [14,101].
Blacklisting is a popular technique that is used to detect and block malicious
domains that are associated with exploitation, social engineering and malware down-
loads [6]. The primary issue with blacklists is that they are always out-of-date. For
example, in the case of drive-by downloads, the domains that are typically black-
listed are the ones associated with the exploit and malware executable. However,
these domains are typically only in use for a day or less. So by the time they are
blacklisted, the attackers are already using new domains to host their exploit kit and
malware [97].
Executable downloads are often examined at the network and host level using
detection systems that leverage antivirus (AV) and sandboxing. AV, like domain
blacklists, tend to lag behind the threat and not detect new malware on the day
it is downloaded. This is not due to the lack of code reuse because it is common
practice for malware [69, 75]. In fact, it is not uncommon for the source code of
successful malware to be sold or leaked on underground forums, and to be reused by
other attackers [55]. However, even though the code is old, it is easy for attackers to
create new (polymorphic) malware releases using packers and crypters to mutate the
executable for the purpose of bypassing AV [1]. Thus, little work is required of the
attacker to create new malware that appears to have never been observed.
Sandboxes provide a controlled environment to run executables. The outputs of
a sandbox are system and network traces. This information is used by analysts and
automated systems to identify malware. However, malware often uses anti-sandbox
technique such as virtual machine (VM) detection and timing measurements to detect
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the sandbox and proceed with a benign code path that has no suspicious behavior [50].
Once downloaded the malware is executed. The vast majority of modern malware,
especially botnets, have a network component. After execution the malware commu-
nicates over the network to a command and control (C&C) server for the purpose
of monetizing (e.g., information stealing) the infection. The most popular protocols
used by today’s malware are DNS and HTTP [115, 133]. DNS is used because it
provides a level of indirection between the malware client and the physical location
of the C&C server. This provides flexibility for the attacker allowing them to easily
move their hosting to new networks without the need to update the malware clients.
HTTP is a popular C&C protocol for two reasons. First, it is allowed out of most
networks. Many enterprises employ strict egress filtering only allowing DNS and
HTTP out of their networks. In fact, when there is strict egress filtering, typically
HTTP is only allowed out through an HTTP proxy and DNS through the local
recursive. All other outbound traffic is blocked at the firewall. Therefore, for malware
to communicate from these networks they must use HTTP or DNS. In addition, for
most networks, HTTP is by far the most common protocol used allowing C&C over
HTTP blends into the background traffic making it harder to identify as suspicious.
The most common techniques used to detect C&C communication are domain
blacklist and intrusion detection (IDS) signatures [14,101]. C&C blacklists, like mal-
ware download blacklists, are quickly out-of-date [30]. Also, identifying new C&C
domains normally requires domain extraction from sandbox execution or reverse en-
gineering the executable. Even if the malware runs in a sandbox, many will visit
benign domains in addition to the C&C domain making automatic blacklisting more
difficult. IDS signatures tend to be viable longer than blacklists, but are typically
manually created by analysts. In addition, strings in the protocol signature may be
commonly found in benign traffic on some deployment networks producing a lot of
false positives.
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Improving detection and annotation (e.g., cause of the download) of malware
begins by examining how the user came to download malware. There is a large body
of work on detecting drive-by downloads [44,46,83,92,113,132] and a few efforts have
examined social engineering attacks and techniques [31,111,125]. Yet, little attention
has been dedicated to investigating and categorizing the web browsing paths followed
by users before they reach the web pages from which the attack starts to unfold.
Focusing on what happened prior to a malicious download provides a better under-
standing of current attack trends and shows how users become victims. Web browsing
paths can be used to study the tactics and techniques of attackers. For instance, there
is a pressing need for a comprehensive study of social engineering malware downloads
to aid in the development of training programs that educate end users. Web browsing
paths provide a means for performing such a study. In addition, insights gained from
them can be leveraged to devise more effective defenses for both drive-by downloads
and social engineering attacks.
After the malware is downloaded and successfully executed, the host is infected.
Detecting infected hosts by observing their network activity is challenging because
domain names and IP addresses used for C&C change frequently to stay ahead of
blacklists. Also, there is nothing unique about the protocols used for C&C. However,
the fundamental structure of the communication (i.e., language) between the malware
and the C&C server remains constant for much longer periods of time [96]. Once
there are active clients the protocol structure (e.g., data types, encodings, lengths
and ordering) is much harder for the attacker to modify. In addition, code reuse is
common so different botnets that use the same malware family will often have similar
protocol structures. But, identifying network communication with protocol structure
similar to that of malware is not enough for detection. It must also be unique on the
deployment network (i.e., not commonly found in benign communication) for there
to be confidence in the match.
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Analyzing malware downloads and C&C protocol communication at the network
level requires deep packet inspection (DPI). DPI provides on-the-fly TCP flow recon-
struction allowing for the analysis of high level protocols such as HTTP [56]. The
analysis performed by DPI is processor intensive and performing DPI on large com-
plex networks at multi-gigabit speeds is challenging [95]. Yet, it is these networks that
are often the target of malware infections. Multithreading DPI provides additional
CPU resources, but requires packet scheduling to divide the work. Packet schedulers
can be optimized using different techniques such as load balancing or cache affinity.
These tradeoffs must be understood before an optimal packet scheduling algorithm
can be selected.
1.1 Thesis Statement
The goal of this thesis is to study real malware downloads and infections at the
network level using DPI on live traffic in order to design and build systems that aid
in their detection and annotation. Based on our analysis of network communication
generated by malicious applications we propose the following thesis statement.
Analyzing and modeling the network behavior of malware using DPI improves our
understanding of malware downloads and infections. Insights gained from this process
can be leveraged to improve detection, annotation and network defenses.
1.2 Thesis Overview
Modern malware utilizes the network for both the initial compromise and post infec-
tion management. The initial compromise often occurs through a web browser and
is typically due to social engineering or the exploitation of a software vulnerability.
The web browser remains a popular infection vector because it is widely used to com-
municate with other hosts, it provides the resources required for social engineering
and vulnerabilities are plentiful. Unlike prior research that focuses on the domains
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and websites that deliver the attack, we examine how and why a user came to down-
load malware. To better understand how users get infected and improve defenses, we
investigate the following research problems:
• Identify the sequence of web pages visited by a user that led to a malicious
download with only network visibility; i.e., reconstruct the download path from
observed HTTP transactions.
• Determine the reason for a malicious download by using features that can be
extracted from the download path.
• Leverage the download paths to better understand current attack trends and
develop more effective defenses.
Once a host is compromised, malware communicates with its command and control
(C&C) server for infection management. Hosts are often compromised for months
or years before they are discovered. Thus, effective network defenses against the
initial infection are not enough because most of the deployment networks will already
have infected hosts that need to be identified and hosts can become infected via
other mediums such as USB. Furthermore, trends like bring your own device result
in compromised hosts from unprotected networks joining in the future. To detect
compromised hosts at the network level, we explore the following research problems:
• Learn the structure of malware communication from packet captures of malware
executed in a sandbox or from an infected host.
• Detect infected hosts and new C&C domains by comparing the observed pro-
tocol structure to learned malicious communication.
• Adapt to the deployment network’s communication profile to provide a better
tradeoff between true and false positives.
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Detection, annotation and the defense of malware at the network level requires
significant processing resources. In order to deploy systems that address the above
research problems while scaling to large enterprise networks, it is necessary to multi-
thread deep packet inspection (DPI). This requires packets to be scheduled across DPI
threads. We examine the following research problems to optimize packet scheduling
for DPI performance:
• Determine if maximizing workload balance or cache affinity provides the best
performance.
• Identify the packet scheduling performance tradeoffs in regards to throughput
and latency.
Figure 1 shows a high level view of the systems developed and how they work
together to address the above research problems. Packets from a live network are
scheduled based on cache affinity for deep packet inspection. Reconstructed HTTP
transactions are then processed by both WebWitness and ExecScent. The focus of
WebWitness is on the initial infection. When it identifies an executable download
the web path is extracted and the cause is labeled as drive-by, social engineering or
update. WebWitness requires an oracle to determine if a download is malicious. For
malicious drive-by downloads the web paths are furthered processed to identify the
important web pages on the path to be blocked. WebSentry extends the capabilities of
WebWitness by detecting, without the need of an oracle, social engineering downloads.
Using WebSentry we further our analysis of malicious downloads as well as provide a
defense against an understudied infection method. Lastly, ExecScent detects already
infected hosts by comparing the protocol structure of their network communication
to that of known malware.
1.3 Contributions

















































Figure 1: Overview of the systems developed to address the research problems exam-
ined in this thesis. The systems include WebWitness, WebSentry, ExecScent and a
cache affinity packet scheduler.
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• Perform the first study of the web paths followed by real network users who even-
tually fall victim to different types of malware downloads, including social engi-
neering and drive-by downloads: Through this investigation, we provide quanti-
tative information on attack scenarios that have been previously explained only
anecdotally or through limited case studies.
• Design and implement WebWitness, a system that enables the continuous collec-
tion and study of web paths leading to malware download attacks: WebWitness
can automatically trace back and categorize in-the-wild malware downloads. We
show that this information can be leveraged to design more effective defenses
against future malware download attacks.
• Conduct the first systematic study of modern web based social engineering (SE)
malware download attacks: Our analysis of hundreds of SE malware attack in-
stances reveals that most attacks are enabled by malicious online advertisement
served through a handful of “low tier” ad networks. Also, we find that the most
common types of SE malware attacks include fake updates for Adobe Flash
and Java. However, fake antivirus (Fake AV), which has been a popular and
effective infection vector in the recent past, represent less than 1% of all SE
malware downloads observed in the wild.
• Create a categorization system for labeling social engineering malware download
attacks: The categorization system expresses how attackers typically gain the
user’s attention and the most common types of deception and persuasion tactics
used to trick victims into downloading malicious applications. It enables us to
abstract the specific tactics used by attackers and focus our end user training
and defenses at the deception and persuasion techniques currently used in the
wild.
• Develop WebSentry, a network defense system that aims to detect web-based SE
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malware attacks in real time: WebSentry leverages the download paths provided
by WebWitness to extract features from the download path. We show that our
system is able to accurately detect SE malware download attempts with 91%
true positives and only 0.5% false positives.
• Design and implement ExecScent, a novel system for identifying infected hosts
by analyzing their network communication on live networks: ExecScent auto-
matically learns C&C traffic models that can adapt to the deployment network’s
traffic. This adaptive approach allows us to greatly reduce the false positives
while maintaining a high number of true positives. To the best of our knowl-
edge, ExecScent is the first system to use this type of adaptive C&C traffic
models.
• Develop a packet scheduling algorithm that maximizes DPI throughput by op-
timizing for cache affinity: We design and implement two packet scheduling
algorithms. One designed to maximize workload balance and the other cache
affinity. We compare the performance of both algorithms to direct hash, a com-
mon packet scheduling algorithm used by industry. The algorithms are eval-
uated on three different types of network loads. Our evaluation results show
that our cache affinity packet scheduling algorithm provides the highest DPI
throughput for all workloads, besting the other two algorithms by almost 40%.
1.4 Research Impact
ExecScent is currently deployed as a feature in Damballa’s Failsafe product line as the
Request Profiler. Also, Damballa runs ExecScent daily on the network commutation
of malware samples executed in a sandbox where it provides the largest feed of new
C&C domains to their threat research staff. WebWitness is on Damballa’s Failsafe
product roadmap where it will be known as Traceback. Damballa is also considering a
standalone offering that could be deployed at web proxies using ICAP. Patents have
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been filed for both ExecScent and WebWitness. As for WebSentry, we are in the
process of filing a patent and Damballa plans to include it in an update to Traceback.
Our packet scheduling research greatly influenced the design of IBM’s multithreaded
version of the Protocol Analysis Module (PAM), which was the first DPI engine to
reach 20 gigabit per second performance in a software only architecture.
1.5 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, we describe related work and explain how the contributions in this
thesis relate to this work and advance our understanding of malware infections.
In Chapter 3, we discuss WebWitness, a system that provides context to malware
downloads. Section 3.2 reports the results of a large study of in-the-wild malware
downloads captured on a live academic network. This study describes the challenges
of download path traceback as well as potential features for determining the cause of a
download. Next, Section 3.3 we present the WebWitness system. The details of both
the Attack Path Traceback (ATC) and Malware Download Defense (MDD) Modules
are provided. In Section 3.4 we evaluate WebWitness ATC and MDD modules. We
also demonstrate the overall benefits of our new defense approach against drive-by
downloads, by measuring the effectiveness of blacklisting the injection domains dis-
covered by WebWitness. In Section 3.5 we cover the limitations of the system. Lastly
in Section 3.6 we discuss related work.
Chapter 4 presents our systematic study of modern web based social engineering
(SE) malware download attacks. In Section 4.2 we discuss how we collected and
identified SE downloads in live network traffic. Section 4.3 details our SE download
attack categorization and provides two real classification examples from our study
data. Next, Section 4.4 presents our SE study measurements. Our analysis of hun-
dreds of SE malware attack instances reveals that most such attacks are enabled by
malicious online advertisement served through a handful of low tier ad networks. In
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Section 4.5 we describe WebSentry, a system that defends against the most common
types of social engineering malware download attacks. In Section 4.6, we evaluate
the performance of WebSentry. In Section 4.7 we cover the limitations of the system.
Finally in Section 4.8 we discuss related work.
In Chapter 5, we describe ExecScent, a system that automatically learns C&C
traffic models that can adapt to the deployment networks traffic. Section 5.2 pro-
vides an overview of our system before we discuss the intuitions that motivated us
to build adaptive control protocol templates in Section 5.3. Furthermore, we discuss
the advantages of considering the entire content of C&C HTTP requests, rather than
limiting ourselves to the URL strings. Then we provide the system details of Exec-
Scent in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5 we present the experimental detection results in
different live networks and quantify the advantage of modeling entire HTTP requests,
rather than only considering URLs. In Section 5.6 we cover the system limitations.
Ending with related work in Section 5.7.
In Chapter 6, we examine algorithms for DPI packet scheduling with the goal of
maximizing throughput and minimizing latency. Section 6.2 discusses related work.
Section 6.3 describes the properties of the ideal packet scheduler then discuss the
algorithms we designed, implemented, and evaluated. In Section 6.4, we explain our
testing methodology and present the results. Our goal is to understand the impact
each scheduling algorithm has on throughput and latency. To that end we measure
raw and scaled throughput as well as average and maximum packet latency for each
packet scheduling algorithm.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. In Section 7.1 we summarize the contributions and
then in Section 7.2 we discuss limitations. Section 7.3 presents future work. Lastly,




This chapter discusses related work that applies to the research explored in this
thesis such as detection detection of malware using network communication. Also,
each chapter also contains a related work section that covers research specific to it.
2.1 Network Based Malware Detection
There have been a number of studies to address the problem of detecting botnet
traffic at the network level, e.g., [59, 60, 128]. BotSniffer [60] and BotMiner [59] are
anomaly-based botnet detection systems that look for similar network behavior across
hosts. The idea is that hosts infected with the same bot malware have common C&C
communication patterns. Furthermore, BotMiner [59] leverages the fact that bots
respond to commands in a coordinated way, producing similar malicious network ac-
tivities. This type of systems require multiple infected hosts on the same monitored
network for detection. In addition, being anomaly-based, they are not capable of at-
tributing the infections to a specific malware family, and tend to suffer from relatively
high false positive rates.
Wurzinger et al. [128] propose to isolate C&C traffic from mixed malicious and
legitimate traffic generated by executing malware samples in a controlled environment.
They propose to first identify malicious network activities (e.g., scanning, spamming,
etc.), and then analyze the network traffic going back in time until a network flow is
found that is likely to represent the command sent to the malware that caused the
previously identified malicious activities to be initiated. However, finding commands
in malware network traces is not always possible. In fact, most datasets of malware
network traces are obtained by running thousands of malware samples, with only a
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few minutes of execution time allocated to each sample. Therefore, the chances of
witnessing a valid command being sent to a sample within such a small amount of
time is intuitively small. On the other hand, malware samples typically attempt to
contact the C&C server as soon as they run, even though no command to perform
malicious activities may be issued at first contact. For this reason, our works does not
focus on identifying malicious network activities performed by the malware, and the
related commands. Rather, we leverage any type of (HTTP-based) communication
with a C&C server to learn malware communication that can be later used to identify
new C&C communications and related C&C domains, even when malicious activities
are not directly observable.
Recently researchers have proposed executable reputation systems [65, 110, 126]
due to the limitations of signature AV [103]. Instead of using content features from
the executable, they focus on properties of the network hosting the malware and re-
lated distribution infrastructure. These systems can be very effective at identifying
malicious downloads. However, they do not provide context such as how and why
the user came to download a malicious executable. Providing download context in
addition to detection is a major component of our work. These systems are com-
plementary and can aid in the detection of malicious executables for annotation and
study.
2.2 Domain Based Malware Detection
Recently, a number of approaches for identifying malicious domains by monitoring
DNS traffic have been proposed [28–30,34]. Both [28] and [34] are domain reputation
systems. The goal of these systems in to assign a low reputation score to a malicious
domain, which includes C&C, infector, update and monetization domains. Since no
distinction is made between the types of malicious domains they cannot be used
to detect infected hosts (e.g., a host may visit an infector domain but not become
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infected).
Pleiades [30] detects hosts infected with malware that use a domain generation
algorithm (DGA). To identify infections it collects groups of NX-domains generated
by a host. Features are extracted from these domains and classified using supervised
learning with models created from known DGA malware. Even though it is effective
at detecting DGA based botnets, they comprise a small subset of the threat landscape.
Thus, it is not a generic solution for detecting infected hosts or new C&C domains.
Kopis [29] is a domain based system that focuses on detecting the malicious do-
mains infected hosts query. It is designed to be deployed at the upper DNS hierarchy
so it can observe all hosts that lookup a domain. It calculates features such as the
diversity of the network locations of the hosts that query the domain name, their
“popularity” and the reputation of the IP address of the resolved domain. It uti-
lizes supervised learning to model malicious versus benign domain lookup behavior.
However, these features require the ability to monitor DNS traffic at the upper DNS
hierarchy, which is difficult to obtain.
2.3 Host Based Malware Detection
Host based antivirus (AV) is commonly run on end user systems to detect malware
infections. AV typically uses signature based detection to identify known malware.
In recent years malware has become more sophisticated through the use of packers
and crypters. Attackers can leverage popular toolkits to quickly create new variants
of their code that bypass AV detection [63, 99]. Since the new malware variant is
needed for signature generation, AV tends to lag behind the threat.
Sandboxes provide a controlled, instrumented host based system to execute mal-
ware [54]. They typically provide traces of the system calls and network communi-
cations performed by an executable. Traces from a sandbox can be used to identify
malicious executables [67]. Since the sandbox controls execution it has access to much
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more information and context than a system that only has network level visibility.
However, malware will often employ anti-sandboxing techniques that detect virtual
machine execution and its instrumentation as well as use timing measurements and
delays to circumvent analysis [50].
Other researchers have focused on building host based systems to defend against
drive-by downloads [46, 83]. Zozzle [46] is a JavaScript malware detector that can
be deployed in the browser. It is a supervised learning system that uses features
based on the structure and context of the code. Since it is browser based it is able to
analyze the code just prior to execution after it has been deobfuscated by the browser.
Blade [83] prevents host infections by limiting the execution of binaries downloaded
in the browser. When a binary is downloaded Blade places it in a security controlled
location that prevents execution. Only when consent is given by the user is the binary
allowed to execute.
Both Zoozle and Blade are limited to only detecting drive-by downloads; thus,
provide no defense against infections due to social engineering. In addition, they
require all hosts on the network to have the software installed and running. On
modern networks, imposing this requirement may not be possible due to the variety
of devices and the limited control an organization may have on many of them (e.g.,
bring your own device). Also, as with all host based systems, if malware is successfully
executed on the the device, defenses can be disabled leaving the device completely
vulnerable to more attacks and infections.
2.4 Malware Detection Challenges
Despite all the research, reliably detecting malware at the vantage point of the net-
work, domain or host remains a difficult problem. For one thing, there is no single
behavior that can be categorized as malicious. A network protocol or domain name is
not malicious in its own right; rather, we label it as malicious because it is employed
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by malware. Likewise on the host, the behavior of an executable (system calls, file
modifications, etc.) alone is not enough to label it as malicious – the context of the
behavior is also required. In addition, the benign is much more prevalent than the
malicious causing even a low false positive rate in a detection system to generate
many more false detections than true ones. This results in users losing confidence in
the system and ignoring all detections.
To detect malware at the network level we create models from known malware
behavior. These models label future observations using classifiers and similarity mea-
sures. The key to building a good malware model is selecting a behavior that is
difficult for the malware to change, but unique enough to separate it. For example,
modeling the protocol structure of the C&C communication of a malware family and
placing the emphasis of a match on the unique elements in relation to the traffic on
the deployment network (see Chapter 5). In the remaining chapters of this thesis we
explore malware behavior that persists across variants and discuss how to model it




AND MITIGATING MALWARE DOWNLOAD PATHS
3.1 Introduction
Remote malware downloads currently represent the most common infection vector.
In particular, the vast majority of malware downloads occur via the browser, typically
due to social engineering attacks and drive-by downloads. A large body of work exists
on detecting drive-by downloads (e.g., [44,46,83,92,113,132]), and a few efforts have
been dedicated to studying social engineering attacks [31, 111, 125]. However, very
little attention has been dedicated to investigating and categorizing the web browsing
paths followed by users before they reach the web pages from which the attacks start
to unfold.
In this chapter, we study the web paths followed by real users that become victims
of different types of malware downloads, including social engineering and drive-by
downloads. We have two primary goals: 1) provide context to the attack by auto-
matically identifying and labeling the sequence of web pages visited by the user prior
to the attack, giving insight into how users reach attack pages on the web; and 2)
leverage these annotated in-the-wild malware download paths to better understand
current attack trends and to develop more effective defenses.
To achieve these goals we propose a novel malware download incident investigation
system, named WebWitness, that is designed to be deployed passively on enterprise
scale networks. As shown in Figure 2, our system consists of two main components:
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Figure 2: WebWitness – high-level system overview.
defense (MDD) module. Given all (live) network traffic generated by a user’s brows-
ing activities within a time window that includes a malware download event, the
ATC module is responsible for identifying and linking together all HTTP requests
and responses that constitute the web path followed by the user from an “origin”
node (e.g., a search engine) to the actual malware download page, while filtering out
all other irrelevant traffic. Afterwards, a statistical classifier automatically divides
all collected malware download paths into update, social engineering and drive-by
attacks. We refer to the output of the ATC module as annotated malware download
paths (AMP).
The AMPs are continuously updated as new malware downloads are witnessed in
the live traffic, and can therefore be used to aid the study of recent attack trends.
Furthermore, the AMP data is instrumental in designing and building new defenses
that can be plugged into the MDD module (see Figure 2). As an example, by inves-
tigating real-world web paths leading to drive-by malware downloads, we found that
it is often possible to automatically trace back the domain names typically used in
drive-by attacks to inject malicious code into compromised web pages (e.g., via the
source of a malicious script or iframe tag). The injected code is normally used as an
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attack trigger, directing the browser towards an actual exploit and finally to a “trans-
parent” malware download and execution. We empirically show that automatically
discovering and promptly blocking the domain names serving the injected malicious
code is a much more effective defense, compared to the more common approach of
blacklisting the URLs that directly serve the drive-by browser exploits themselves or
the actual malware executables (see Section 3.4.4).
Chapter Summary. In this chapter we explore the following:
• Investigate the web paths followed by real network users who eventually fall vic-
tim to different types of malware downloads, including social engineering and
drive-by downloads. Through this investigation, we provide quantitative infor-
mation on attack scenarios that have been previously explained only anecdotally
or through limited case studies.
• To enable a continuous collection and study of web paths leading to malware
download attacks, we build a system called WebWitness. Our system can auto-
matically trace back and categorize in-the-wild malware downloads. We show
that this information can then be leveraged to design more effective defenses
against future malware download attacks.
• We deployed WebWitness on a large academic network for a period of ten
months, where we collected and categorized thousands of live malicious down-
load paths. Using these web paths, we were able to design a new defense against
drive-by downloads that rely on injecting malicious content into (hacked) legit-
imate web pages. For example, we show that by leveraging the incident in-
vestigation information output by WebWitness, on average we can decrease the
infection rate for this type of drive-by downloads by almost six times, compared
to existing URL blacklisting approaches.
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3.2 In-The-Wild Malware Download Study
Goals: In this section we report the results of a large study of in-the-wild malware
downloads captured on a live academic network. Through this study, we aim to
create a labeled dataset of download paths that can be used to design (including
feature engineering), train, and evaluate the ATC and MDD modules of WebWitness
shown in Figure 2. A detailed discussion of ATC and MDD is reported in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Collecting Executable File Downloads
To collect executable file downloads we use deep packet inspection to perform on-
the-fly TCP flow reconstruction, keeping a buffer of all recent HTTP transactions
(i.e., request-response pairs) observed on a live network. For each transaction, we
check the content of the response to determine if it contains an executable file. If
so, we retrieve all buffered HTTP transactions related to the client that initiated
the download. Namely, we store all HTTP traffic a client generated preceding (and
including) an executable file download; this allows us to study what web path users
follow before falling victim to malware downloads. All data is saved in accordance
with the policies set forth by our Institutional Review Board and are protected under
a nondisclosure agreement.
3.2.2 Identifying Malicious Executables
Since many legitimate applications are installed or updated via HTTP (e.g., Windows
Update), we immediately exclude all executable downloads from a manually-compiled
whitelist of domain names consisting of approximately 120 effective second level do-
mains (e2LDs) of popular benign sites (e.g., microsoft.com, google.com, etc.). For
the remaining downloads, we scan them with more than 40 antivirus (AV) engines, us-
ing virustotal.com. In addition, we rescan them periodically because many “fresh”
malware files are not immediately detected by AV scanners, allowing us to also take
into account some “zero-day” downloads. We label a file as malicious if at least one of
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the top five AV vendors (w.r.t. market share) and a minimum of two other AVs detect
it as malicious. The remaining downloads are considered benign until the rescan. In
addition, we discard binary samples that are assigned labels that are too generic or
based purely on AV detection heuristics.
3.2.3 Overview of Study Data
To gather our study data we deployed our collection agent (Section 3.2.1) on a large
academic network serving tens of thousands of users for a period of 6 months. Notice
that the system was deployed for a total of 10 months, with the study conducted in
the first 6 months and the evaluation in the 4 months that followed (see Section 3.4
details on the evaluation). During these 6 months, we collected a total of 174, 376 ex-
ecutable downloads from domains that were not on our whitelist. Using the malicious
executable identification process defined in Section 3.2.2, we labeled 5, 536 downloads
as malicious.
However, many of these malicious downloads were related to adware. As we are
primarily interested in studying malware downloads, because they are potentially
the most damaging ones, we devised a number of “best effort” heuristics to separate
adware from malware. For example, given a malicious file, if the majority of AV labels
contain the term “adware”, or related empirically derived keywords that identify
specific unwanted applications (e.g., “not-a-virus”, “installer”, “PUP”, etc.), we label
the file as adware. The malicious executables not labeled as adware by our heuristics
were manually reviewed to determine if they were truly malware. This resulted in
1, 064 malware downloads, with a total of 533 unique samples.
For these 533 unique malware downloads, we performed extensive manual analysis
of their download paths, including reverse engineering web pages, heavy javascript
deobfuscation, complex plugin content analysis, etc. This time-consuming analysis
produced a set of labeled paths, with 164 drive-by, 41 social engineering and 328
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update/drop malware download events.
Study Data Limitations: Our collection agent was deployed on an existing pro-
duction network monitoring sensor. This sensor had limited hardware resources; in
addition, our data collection system had to run alongside production software whose
functionality could not be disrupted. We therefore collected downloads only dur-
ing off-peak hours, due to traffic volumes that would oversubscribe the sensor and
result in dropped packets during other periods of the day. Thus, the malicious down-
loads in our study represent only a sample of the ones that occurred during the six
month monitoring period. In addition, our system monitors the network in a purely
passive way; therefore, any malicious downloads preemptively blocked by existing
defenses (e.g., URL blacklists such as Google Safe Browsing) were not observed. Yet,
based on our extensive manual analysis, we believe the 533 malware downloads to be
sufficiently diverse and representative of the overall set of malware downloads that
occurred during our study period.
3.2.4 Download Path Traceback Challenges
One of the goals of our system is to automatically trace back the sequence of steps
(i.e., HTTP transactions) that lead victims to be infected via a malware download.
One may think that reconstructing the web path to infection is fairly easy, because
we could rely on the Referer and Location header fields to link subsequent HTTP
transactions together (see RFC2616). For example, a simple strategy would be to
start from the download transaction and “walk back” the sequence of transactions by
following the Referer header found in the HTTP requests.
Unfortunately, in practice download path traceback is much more difficult than it
may seem at first. Depending on the particular version of the browser, JavaScript en-
gine, and plugin software running on the client, the Referer and/or Location headers
may be suppressed (e.g., see [70]), resulting in the inability to correctly reconstruct
23
the entire sequence of download path transactions in a given network trace.
Deriving and Measuring Surrogate Features: As part of our study, we reviewed
hundreds of malicious download traces. In most cases we cannot rely completely
on the Referer and Location headers, and we therefore derive surrogate “referrer
indicator” features and heuristics, which can be used to perform a more complete
download path traceback. Next, we define each of the features we observed, and then
provide a measure of how prevalent they are for malware download paths. While
in this section we simply measure their prevalence, we later use these features to
automate path traceback (Section 3.3).
First, let us more precisely define what we mean with download path traceback.
Let Td indicate an HTTP transaction carrying an executable file download initiated
by client C. Given the recording of all web traffic generated by C during a time
window preceding (and including) Td, we would like to reconstruct the sequence of
transactions (T1, T2, . . . , Td) that led to the download, while filtering out all unrelated
traffic. This sequence of transactions may be the consequence of both explicit user
interactions (e.g., a click on a link) and actions taken by the browser during rendering
(e.g., following a page redirection). Notice that the traffic trace we are given may
contain a large number of transactions that are completely unrelated to the download
path, simply because the user may have multiple browser tabs open and multiple web-
based applications active in parallel. Thus, potentially producing a large amount of
overlapping unrelated traffic.
Let T1 and T2 be two HTTP transactions. We found that the features/heuristics
listed below can be used to determine whether T1 is a likely source of T2, therefore
allowing us to “link” them with different levels of confidence. Table 1 summarizes
the prevalence of each feature in both drive-by and social engineering downloads (we
discuss how we can distinguish drive-by from social engineering later in Section 3.2.5).
A detailed discussion of how WebWitness uses these features for automated download
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path traceback is given in Section 3.3.
(1) Location: According to RFC2616, if transaction T2’s URL matches T1’s Location
header, it indicates that T2 was reached as a consequence of a server redirection
from T1.
(2) Referrer: Similarly, if T1’s URL matches T2’s Referer header, this indicates
that the request for T2 originated (either directly or through a redirection chain)
from T1, for example as a consequence of page rendering, a click on a hyperlink,
etc.
(3) Domain-in-URL: We observed that advertisement URLs often embed the URL
of the page that displayed the ad. So, if T1’s domain name is “embedded” in
T2’s URL, it is likely that T1 was the “source” of the request, even though the
Referer is not present. This is especially true if there is only a small time gap
between the transactions.
(4) URL-in-Content: If T1’s response content includes T2’s URL (e.g., within an
HTML or non-obfuscated JavaScript code), this indicates there is (potentially) a
“source of” relationship that links T1 to T2.
(5) Same-Domain: By investigating numerous drive-by malware downloads, we
found that in many cases the exploit code and the malware executable file itself
are served from the same domain. This approach is likely chosen by the attackers
because if the exploit is successfully served, it means that the related malicious
domain is currently reachable and serving the malware file from the same domain
helps guarantee a successful infection (a similar observation was made in [65]).
Therefore, if T1 and T2 share the same domain name and are temporally close,
this likely indicates that T1 is the “source of” T2.
(6) Commonly Exploitable Content (CEC): In our observations, most drive-
by downloads use “commonly exploitable” content (e.g., .jar, .swf, or .pdf files
that carry an exploit) to compromise their victims. The exploit downloads the
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malicious executable; thus, if T1 contains commonly exploitable content (CEC)
and T2 is an executable download that occurred within a small time delta after
T1, this indicates that T1 may be the “source of” T2.
(7) Ad-to-Ad: In some cases, we observed chains of ad-related transactions where
the Referer and Location header are missing (e.g., due to JavaScript or plugin-
driven redirections). Therefore, if T1 and T2 are consecutive ad-related requests
(e.g., identified by matching their URLs against a large list of known ad-distribution
sites) and were issued within a small time delta, this indicates there may be a
“source of” relationship.
Table 1: Success rate of traceback method and “Source-of” relationships in malware
download paths. The numbers indicate the percentage of analyzed download paths.
Traceback method success rate Drive-by Social Eng.
Only Referrer and Location 0% 53%
All surrogate referrer features 96% 95%








As a confirmation to the fact that tracing back malware download paths is chal-
lenging, we found that not a single drive-by download in our dataset could be traced
back by relying only on the Referer and Location headers. For example, even if
97% of the drive-by download paths contained at least one pair of requests linked via
the Referer, all drive-by paths contained at least some subsequence of the path’s
transactions that could not be “linked” by simply using the Referer header.
For social engineering paths, we found that 53% of the downloads could be traced
back using only the Referer and Location headers. When this was not possible, the
main cause was the presence of requests made via JavaScript and browser plugins. In
some cases, we were not able to fully trace back the download path. The cause for
the majority of the untraceable drive-by (4%) and social engineering (5%) downloads,
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when using all the features, was missing transactions likely due to our system not
observing all related packets.
3.2.5 Drive-by vs. Social Engineering
We label a malware download path as social engineering if explicit user interaction
(e.g., a mouse click) is required to initiate a malware download. In contrast, we label
as drive-by those malware downloads that are transparently delivered to the victim
via a browser exploit. As mentioned earlier (Section 3.2.3), during our study, we were
able to manually review and label 164 drive-by and 41 social engineering malware
downloads.
What distinguishes drive-by from social-engineering: In the following we re-
port the characteristics that we observed for different types of paths. In particular,
some of these characteristics could be leveraged as statistical features to build a clas-
sifier that automatically distinguishes between drive-by and social engineering down-
loads (see Section 3.3). We also discuss characteristics of malware updates/drops
that could be used to filter out download paths that belong neither to the drive-by
nor to the social-engineering class. Table 2 summarizes the prevalence of each of the
characteristics described below.
Table 2: Download path properties.
Feature Drive-by Social eng.
Candidate Exploit Domain Age 0 -
Drive-by URL Similarity 69% 0%
Download Domain Recurrence 0.6% 34%
Download Referrer 0.6% 95%
Download Path Length 6 7
User-Agent Popularity 95% 98%
(1) Candidate Exploit Domain “Age”: Drive-by download attacks often exploit
their victims by delivering exploits via files of popular content types such as .jar,
.swf, or .pdf files; we simply refer to these file types as “commonly exploitable”
content (CEC). For example, during our study, we found that 94% of the drive-
by download paths at some point delivered the exploit via CEC. The domains
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serving these exploits tend to be short-lived compared to domains serving benign
content of the same type. Therefore, CEC served from a recently registered
domain is an indicator of a possible drive-by download path. On the other hand,
none of the social engineering download paths we observed during our study had
this property. Table 2 reports the median domain name “age”, computed as the
number of days of activities for the domain of a page serving CEC, measured
over a very large passive DNS database. The median age is less than one day for
drive-by paths, and is not indicated for social engineering paths, because none of
the nodes in the social engineering path served content of the type we consider as
CEC (the overall traffic traces included HTTP transactions that carried content
such as .swf files, but none of those were on the download path).
(2) Drive-by URL Similarity: The majority of drive-by downloads (about 70%
of our observations) are served by a small number of exploit kits. Therefore,
in many cases the exploit delivery URLs included in drive-by download paths
share a structural URL similarity to known exploit kit URLs. Table 2 reports
the fraction of drive-by download paths that had a similarity to known exploit
kit URLs greater than 0.8, measured using the approach proposed in [96].
(3) Download Domain Recurrence: Most domains serving drive-by and social
engineering malware download are contacted rarely, and often only once by one
particular client at the time of the attack. On the other hand, malicious software
regularly checks for executable updates. To approximately capture this intu-
ition, we measured the number of queries to the malware download domain. As
shown in Table 2, only 0.6% of the malware download domains in our drive-by
paths are queried mulitple times within a small time window (two days, in our
measurements). The higher percentage of social engineering malware paths with
download domain recurrence is due to the fact that a significant fraction of the
ones we observed used a free file sharing website for the malware download and
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that we count the domain query occurrences in aggregate, rather than per client.
(4) Download Referrer: In case of social engineering attacks, the HTTP transac-
tion that delivers the malicious file download tends to carry a Referer, usually
due to the direct user interaction that characterizes them. On the other hand,
drive-by attack malware file delivery happens via a browser exploit. The request
initiated from the shell code typically does not have a Referer header. Similarly,
malware updates/drops initiated by malicious applications are already running
on a compromised machine, and usually do not carry any referrer information.
Table 2 shows that only 0.6% of all drive-by paths, in contrasts to 95% of social
engineering paths, carried a Referer in the download node.
(5) Download Path Length: Drive-by and social engineering attacks typically gen-
erate download paths consisting of several nodes, mainly because a user has to
first browse to a site that eventually leads to the actual attack. In addition, the
malware distribution infrastructure is often built in such ways that enables mal-
ware downloads “as a service”, which entails the use of a number of “redirection”
steps. In contrast, download paths related to malware updates or drops tend to
be very short. Table 2 reports the median number of nodes for drive-by and social
engineering paths. In case of malware updates/drops, the median length for the
path was only one node.
(6) User-Agent Popularity: The download paths for both drive-by and social en-
gineering downloads typically include several nodes that report a popular browser
user-agent string, as the victims use their browser to reach the attack. On the
other hand, in most cases of a malware drop/update, it is not the browser, but the
update software making the requests. In practice, we observed that the majority
of malware update download paths did not report a popular user-agent string
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Figure 3: WebWitness system details.
3.3 WebWitness
Inspired by our study of real-world malware download paths, we develop a system
called WebWitness that can automate the investigation of new malware download
attacks. The primary goal of this system is to provide context around malicious
executable downloads. To this end, given a traffic trace that includes all web traffic
recorded during a time window preceding (and including) a malicious executable file
download, WebWitness automatically traces back and categorizes the web paths that
led the victim to the malicious download event.
In this section, we describe the components of our system, which are shown in
Figure 3.
3.3.1 ATC - Download Path Traceback
Given a malicious file download trace from a given client, WebWitness aims to trace
back the download path consisting of the sequence of web pages visited by the user
that led her to a malware download attack (e.g., via social engineering or to a drive-by
exploit). As detailed in Section 3.2.4, the trace may contain many HTTP transactions
that are unrelated to the download. Furthermore, it is not always possible to correctly
link two related consecutive HTTP transactions by simply leveraging their HTTP
Referer or Location headers.
To mitigate the limitations of referrer-only approaches and more accurately trace
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back the download path, we devise an algorithm that leverages the features and heuris-
tics we identified during our initial study of in-the-wild malware downloads presented
in Section 3.2.4. In summary, we build a transactions graph, where nodes are HTTP
transactions within the download trace, and edges connect transaction according to
a “probable source of” relationship (explained in detail below). Then, starting from
the node (i.e., the HTTP transaction) related to the malware file download, we walk
back along the most probable edges until we find a node with no predecessor, which
we label as the “origin” of the download path. In the following, we provide more
details on our traceback algorithm.
Transactions Graph. Let D be the dataset of HTTP traffic generated by host
A before (and including) the download event. We start by considering all HTTP
transactions in D, and construct a weighted directed graph G = (V,E). The vertices
are A’s HTTP transactions and the edges represent the relation “probable source of”
for pairs of HTTP transactions. As an example, the edge e = (v1 → v2) implies that
HTTP transaction v1 likely produced HTTP transaction v2, either automatically (e.g.,
via a server-imposed redirection, javascript, etc.) or through explicit user interaction
(e.g., via a hyperlink click). Thus, we can consider v1 as the “source of” v2. Each
edge has a weight that expresses the level of confidence we have on the “link” between
two nodes (the weights are ordinal so their absolute values are not important). For
example, the higher the weight assigned to e = (v1 → v2), the stronger the available
evidence in support of the conclusion that v1 is the “source of” v2 (edge weights
are further discussed below). Also, let t1 and t2 be the timestamp of v1 and v2,
respectively. Regardless of any available evidence for a possible edge, the two nodes
may be linked only if t1 ≤ t2.
Heuristics and Edge Weights. To build the graph G and draw its edges, we
leverage the seven features that we indentified in Section 3.2.4. Specifically, given
two nodes (essentially, two URLs) in the directed graph G described earlier, an edge
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e = (v1 → v2) is created if any of the seven features is satisfied. For example, if
v1 and v2 can be related via the “Domain-in-URL”, we draw an edge between the
two nodes. We associate a weight to each of the seven features; the “stronger” the
feature, the higher its weight. For example, we assign a weight value we = 7 to the
“Location” feature, we = 6 to the “Referrer” feature, and so on, with the “Ad-to-Ad”
receiving a weight we = 1. The weight values are conveniently assigned simply to
express relative importance and precedence among the edges to be considered by our
greedy algorithm. If more than one feature happens to link two nodes, the edge will
be assigned a weight equal to the maximum weight among the matching features.
Traceback Algorithm. Once G has been built, we use a greedy algorithm to con-
struct an approximate “backtrace path”. We start from the graph node related to
the executable download event, and walk backwards on the graph by always choosing
the next edge with the highest weight. Consider the example graph in Figure 4, in
which thicker edges have a higher weight. We start from the download node d. At
every step, we walk one node backwards following the highest weight edge. We pro-
ceed until we reach a node with no predecessor, which we mark as the origin of the
download path. If a node has more than one predecessor whose edges have the same
weight, we follow the edge related to the predecessor node with the smaller time gap
to the current node (measured w.r.t. the corresponding HTTP transactions).
Possible False and Missing Edges: Naturally, the heuristics we use for tracing
back the download path may in some cases add “false edges” to the graph or miss
some edges. However, notice that these challenges are mitigated (though not always
completely eliminated) by the following observations:
i) Our algorithm and heuristics aim to solve a much narrower problem than finding
the correct “link” between all possible HTTP transactions in a network trace, be-
cause we are only concerned with tracing back a sequence of HTTP transactions

















Figure 4: Example of download path traceback.
ii) The “false edge” problem is mitigated by the fact that we always follow the
strongest evidence. For example, consider Figure 4. Suppose the edge (2 → 3)
was drawn due to rule (6), while edge (5→ 3) was drawn due to rule (2). In this
case, even though edge (2 → 3) was mistakenly drawn (i.e., nodes 2 and 3 have
no real “source of” relationship), the mistake is irrelevant, because our algorithm
will choose (5→ 3) as part of the path, which is supported by stronger evidence.
iii) Our algorithm can output not only the sequence of HTTP transactions, but
also the nature (and confidence) of every edge. Therefore, a threat analyst (or
a downstream post processing system) can take the edge weights into account,
before the reconstructed download path is used to make further decisions (e.g.,
remediation or takedown of certain domains in the download path).
3.3.2 ATC - Download Cause Classification
After we trace back the download path, we aim to label the reconstructed path as
either social engineering or drive-by download. As shown in Figure 3, the output
of this classification step allows us to obtain the annotated malware download paths
(AMPs), which are then provided as input to the defense module (MDD).
While we are mainly interested in automatically identifying social engineering and
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drive-by download paths, we build a three-class classifier that can distinguish between
three broad download causes, namely social engineering, drive-by, and update/drop.
Essentially the update/drop class allows us to more easily identify and exclude mal-
ware downloads that are not caused by either social engineering or drive-by attacks.
To automatically classify the “cause” of an executable file download, WebWitness
uses a supervised classification approach. First, we describe how we derive the features
needed to translate malware download events into feature vectors that can be given
as input to a statistical classifier. Then, we discuss how we derive the dataset used
to train the classifier. To actually build the classifier, we used the random forest
algorithm [37] (see Section 3.4).
Features: To discriminate between the three different classes, we engineered six
statistical features that reflect, with a one-to-one mapping, the six characteristics
of drive-by and social-engineering malware download paths that we discussed and
measured in Section 3.2.5. For example, we measure binary feature (1) “Download
Referrer” as true if the HTTP request that initiated the download has a Referer
header; a numerical feature (2) representing the “age” of domains serving “commonly
exploitable” content; etc.
Training dataset: To train the classifier, we use the dataset of in-the-wild malware
download paths that we collected and manually labeled during our initial investigation
of in-the-wild malware downloads discussed in Section 3.2.5. Our training dataset
contained the following number of labeled download paths: 164 instances of drive-
by download paths, 191 instances of social engineering paths, and 328 update/drop
samples.
3.3.3 MDD - Drive-by Defense
The annotated download paths output by ATC provide a large and up-to-date dataset
of real-world malware download incidents, including the web paths followed by the
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Drive-by Download Path (Labeled)
Figure 5: MDD: labeling of drive-by download paths based on malicious content
injections.
victims (see Figure 3). This information is very useful for studying new attack trends
and developing more effective defenses. As new defenses are developed, they can be
plugged into the MDD module, so that as new malware download paths are discovered
we can automatically derive appropriate countermeasures.
As an example that demonstrates how WebWitness can enable the development of
more effective malware download defenses, we develop a new defense against drive-by
download attacks based on code injections. While code injection attacks are not new,
current defenses rely mainly on blacklisting the URLs serving the actual drive-by
exploit or malware download, rather than blocking the URLs from which malicious
code is injected. Our results (Section 3.4) show that by automatically tracing back
drive-by download paths and identifying the code injection URLs, we can enable
better defenses against future malware attacks.
Identifying code injection URLs: Given a drive-by download path output by
the ATC module, we aim to automatically identify the landing, injection, and exploit
nodes within the download path.We tackle this problem using a supervised classifi-
cation approach. Namely, we train a separate classifier for each of the three types of
nodes on a drive-by download path. The final output is a labeled drive-by download
path.
Exploit Page Classifier: The exploit classifier takes as input a drive-by download
path and labels its nodes as exploit or non-exploit. We define an exploit node as a page
that carries content that exploits a vulnerability on the victim’s machine, causing it
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to eventually download a malicious executable. The search for exploit nodes proceed
“backwards”, starting from the node prior to the executable download and ending at
the root. It is not uncommon to have more than one exploit node in one path (e.g.,
some exploit kits try several exploits before success). Thus, multiple nodes could be
labeled as exploit.
To build the classifier, we use the following features:
(1) Hops to the download page. Number of nodes on the download path between the
considered node and the final malware download node. Intuition: It is typical for
the exploit node to only be a few hops away from the actual download. In many
cases, the node prior to the download event is an exploit node, because once the
exploit succeeds the executable is downloaded immediately.
(2) “Commonly exploitable” content. Boolean feature that indicates if a node contains
content for Java, Silverlight, Flash or Adobe Reader. Intuition: Browser plug-ins
are a popular exploitation vector. The exploit is typically delivered though their
content.
(3) Domain age. The number of days since the first observation of the node’s effective
second level domain in a large historic passive DNS database. Intuition: Exploit
domains tend to be short-lived and often only active for one day.
(4) Same domain. Boolean feature that is true if the node’s domain is equal to the
download domain. Intuition: It is common for the exploit and download to be
served by the same domain, as also noted in [65].
Landing Page Classifier: Once the exploit node(s) is labeled, we attempt to locate
the landing page URL. Essentially, the landing page is the web page where the drive-
by attack path begins. Often, the landing page itself is a non-malicious page that
was previously compromised (or “hacked”). The landing page classifier calculates
the probability that a node preceding the exploit node (labeled by the exploit page
classifier discussed earlier) is a landing page. Nodes with a probability higher than
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a tunable detection threshold (50% in our experiments) are classified as “candidate
landing” nodes. If there are multiple candidates, the one with the highest probability
is labeled as the landing node.
To label a node as either landing or non-landing, we engineered the following
statistical features:
(1) Hops to the exploit page. This feature set consists of the number of non-redirect
nodes and unique effective second level domains between the node and the exploit
node. Intuition: Often, all the nodes between the landing and exploit node are
redirects [124]. Also, most drive-by downloads use one to three types of malicious
domains (injection, exploit, download). Therefore, in most cases there are zero or
one domains (the one being the injection domain) on the download path between
the landing and exploit nodes.
(2) Domain age. We use two features based on domain age. The first feature is the
age of the node’s effective second level domain as computed from a passive DNS
database. Intuition: The domains associated to (“hacked”) landing pages tend to
be long-lived. Furthermore, “older” landing pages tend to offer more benefits to
the attackers, as they often attract more visitors (i.e., potential victims), because
it takes time for legitimate pages to become popular. The second feature is the
age of the oldest domain between the node and the exploit node. Intuition: Nodes
on the download path between the landing and exploit nodes tend to be less than
a year in age. This is because they are typically malicious and recently registered.
(3) Same domain. Boolean feature that is true if the node’s domain is equal to the
exploit domain. Intuition: It is uncommon for an exploit to be served from
the same domain as the landing page. They are typically kept separate because
installing an exploit kit on a compromised website may increase the likelihood
of detection by the legitimate site’s webmaster. In addition, it is much easier to
manage a centralized exploit kit server than keep all the compromised websites
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up-to-date with the latest exploits.
Injection Page Classifier: We define the injection page to be the source of the code
inserted into the “hacked” landing page. Typically, the injection and exploit nodes
are separate and are served via different domain names. This provides a level of
indirection that allows the exploit domain to change without requiring an update to
the landing page. The injection node by definition is a successor to the landing page,
but depending on the injection technique it may or may not be directly present in the
download path traced back by the ATC module. Therefore, the classifier calculates
the injection page probability for each direct successor of the landing node in the
transactions graph, instead of only considering nodes in the reconstructed download
path. The successor of the landing page node with the highest probability is labeled
as the injection page node.
To identify the injection page, for each successor of the landing node we measure
the following features:
(1) On path. Boolean feature indicating if the node is on the download path. Intu-
ition: Being on the download path and a successor of the landing page, makes
it a good candidate for the injection node. However, the injection node is not
always on the download path due to the structure of some drive-by downloads.
(2) Advertisement. Boolean feature that is true if the node is an ad. Intuition: By
definition, the injection page is not an ad, but code injected into the landing
page. It is common for ads that are not related to the malicious download to be
served on a landing page. This feature help us exclude those ad nodes.
(3) Domain age. The number of days since the first observation of the node’s effective
second level domain in passive DNS. Intuition: Injection pages typically have the
sole purpose of injecting malicious code. They are rarely hosted directly on
compromised pages, because this would expose the malicious code to cleanup
by the legitimate site owners, ending the attacker’s ability to exploit visitors.
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Consequently, injection pages are hosted on “young” domains that are typically
active for the lifetime of a website compromise.
(4) Successors. There are two features that are derived from the node’s successors.
First is the number of direct successors. Intuition: Injection nodes tend to have
only one direct successor. They typically perform an HTTP redirect or dynami-
cally update the DOM to include the URL of the exploit domain. Benign pages
often have more than one direct successor because they load content from many
different files or sources. The second feature is boolean and it is true if one of the
node’s successors is on the download path. It indicates there is a possible “source
of” relationship between it and a node on the download path. Even though the
node itself may not be on the download path.
(5) Same domain. There are two boolean features that compare domain names. The
first checks for equality between the node’s domain and the landing domain. In-
tuition: It is uncommon for the landing domain to equal the injection domain
for reasons similar to those described in the landing page classifier’s “same do-
main” feature described earlier. The second feature compares the node’s domain
to the exploit domain. Intuition: In approximately 70% of the observations in
our measurement study (Section 3.2), the exploit and injection domains were
different.
3.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate WebWitness’ ATC and MDD modules. We also demon-
strate the overall benefits of our new defense approach against drive-by downloads, by
measuring the effectiveness of blacklisting the injection domains discovered by Web-
Witness. We show that while blacklisting the injection domains provides a better
defense, compared to blacklisting only the exploit and download domains, injection
domains appear very rarely in current blacklists, including Google Safe Browsing and
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a variety of large public blacklists.
3.4.1 ATC - Download Cause Classification
The download cause classifier uses a supervised learning approach to label each down-
load path as either social engineering, drive-by or update/drop (Section 3.3.2). To
evaluate its accuracy, we use WebWitness to traceback and classify all malicious down-
loads collected from the large academic network (Section 3.2) in the months following
our initial study and development of the system. Specifically, all download events
and samples used during evaluation have no overlap with the data we used for the
study presented in Section 3.2, to design WebWitness’ features and heuristics, or to
train our classifiers. Each malicious download observed during the testing period was
then classified as one of the following: drive-by, social engineering or update. From
each of the three predicted classes we randomly sampled 50 downloads for manual
verification. We limited the sample size to a total of 150 downloads because of the
extensive manual analysis required to determine the ground truth, including reverse
engineering web pages, heavy javascript deobfuscation, complex html and plugin con-
tent analysis, etc. This time consuming review process allowed us to identify the
correct web path and the true cause of download, creating our ground truth for the
evaluation. Table 3 reports the confusion matrix for the cause classifier.
Table 3: Cause Classifier - confusion matrix results
Predicted Class
Class Drive-by Social Update/Drop
Ground Truth
Drive-by 47 1 0
Social 2 46 3
Update/Drop 1 3 47
The classifier correctly labeled over 93% of the downloads. Notice that these
results represent the overall system performance of the ATC module, because the
download paths used in the experiment (i.e., input to the cause classifier) were ex-
tracted using our download path traceback algorithm (Section 3.3.1). The two social
engineering samples classified as drive-by downloads both had commonly exploitable
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content (CEC) on the download path. They were misclassified even though the CEC
domain ages were greater than 200 days. The three update/drop samples classified
as social engineering was caused by invalid download paths resulting from the false
edges described in the next section. Finally the three social engineering downloads
misclassified as update/drop was a result of small downloads paths (all were length 3)
and high download domain recurrence (all greater than 20 of the 48 hourly buckets).
3.4.2 ATC - Download Path Traceback
To evaluate the accuracy of our download path traceback algorithm (Section 3.3.1), we
use the 150 manually reviewed downloads; i.e., our ground truth, from Section 3.4.1.
For path traceback, we consider two types of errors for review: (1) missing nodes: the
traceback stops short, before reaching the origin of the download path (recall that the
traceback algorithm works its way backwards from the download node to the path
origin); (2) false node: a node that should not appear in the download path. Table 4
summarizes the results of our evaluation.
Table 4: Download path traceback results.
Paths Correctly Traced Back Missing False
Drive-By 48 45 3 0
Social 51 46 2 3
Update/Drop 51 47 0 4
The results show that 92% of the download paths were correctly traced back by
our system. The 5 with missing nodes all had a referer header in the origin node’s
request, but a matching URL was not contained in the trace. This was likely due to
our system not observing all the packets related to those transactions. The 7 with the
false nodes were all caused by the “same-domain” heuristic incorrectly connecting the
paths of an update and a social engineering download. The heuristic failed because
the updates were performed by a malicious executable seconds after the user was
socially engineered into downloading it from the same domain as the update.
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3.4.3 MDD - Detecting Injection Domains
As discussed in detail in Section 3.3.3, we aim to automatically identify the malicious
code injection domains often employed in drive-by download attacks. To achieve this
goal, we use a cascade of three classifiers: an exploit, a landing, and an injection
classifier (Section 3.3.3). In the following, we evaluate the performance of each one.
To build the training dataset, we use 117 drive-by malware downloads collected
and manually labeled during our six-month malware study described in Section 3.2.
These 117 drive-by paths contained 246 exploit nodes (notice that it is not uncommon
for a drive-by attack to serve more than one exploit, especially when the first exploit
attempt fails). There is only one landing node and one injection node per download
path.
Table 5: Node labeling for drive-by download paths





We performed 10-fold cross-validation tests using the dataset described above.
Table 5 summarizes the results. As can be seen, all classifiers are highly accurate.
The results of the the injection page classifier represent the performance of the final
injection domain detection task. This is due to fact that all tests were conducted
using the three classifiers (exploit, landing, and injection) in cascade mode to mirror
an actual deployment of WebWitness’ MDD module. Thus, overall, we obtained a
minimum of 94.87% detection rate at 0.07% false positives.
There were a total 7 domains mislabeled as injection by our system. The most
common error was labeling the exploit domain as the injection domain; i.e., missing
the fact that a separate injection domain existed. This was the case for 5 of the 7
mislabeled domains. Since these domains are malicious, blacklisting them will not
cause false positives. The other two domains were benign. One of them had an Alexa
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rank over 260, 000 and the other above 1, 600, 000. To mitigate such false positives, the
newly discovered injection domains could be reviewed by analysts before blacklisting.
As WebWitness provides the analyst with full details on the traffic collected before
the download and the reconstructed download path, this information can make the
analyst’s verification process significantly less time-consuming.
3.4.4 MDD - Defense Efficacy & Advantages
Domain name and URL blacklisting are commonly practiced defenses [6]. However,
blacklists are only effective if the blacklisted domains remain in use for some period
of time after they are detected. The longer-lived a malicious domain, the more useful
it is to blacklist it. As discussed in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.4.3, WebWitness is able not
only to identify the domains from which malware files are downloaded, but also to
identify the malicious code injection and exploit domains within drive-by malware
download paths. Clearly, these domains are all candidates for blacklisting.
To evaluate the efficacy of blacklisting the code injection domains, we demonstrate
the advantages this provides compared to the currently more common approach of
blacklisting the exploit and download domains. To this end, we use a set of 88
“complete” injection-based drive-by download paths that we were able to collect from
a large academic network. These samples were “complete” paths in the sense that
they were manually verified to have an injection, exploit, and malware download node
(and related domain).
We evaluate the effect of blocking the different types of drive-by path domains by
counting the number of potential victims that would be saved by doing so. Specifically,
we define a potential victim as a unique client host visiting a blacklisted domain.
Notice that the actual number of hosts that get infected may be smaller than the
number of potential victims, because only some of the hosts that visit a malicious
domain involved in a drive-by download attack will “successfully” download and run
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the malware file (e.g., because an anti-virus blocked the malware file from running on
the machine). However, we can use the potential victim count to provide a relative
comparison on the effectiveness of blacklisting injection versus exploit and malware
download domains.
To count the potential victims, we rely on a very large passive DNS (pDNS)
database that spans multiple Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and corporate net-
works. This pDNS dataset stores the historic mappings between domains and IP
addresses, and also provides a unique source identifier for each host that queries a
given domain name. This allows us to identify all the unique hosts that queried a
given domain in a given timeframe (e.g., a given day). For each injection-based drive-
by download paths in our set, we compute the potential victims saved by counting the
number of unique hosts that query the injection, exploit, and file download domains
in the 30 days following the date when we observed and labeled the download event.
Figure 6 shows our results, in which day-0 is the day when we detected a malicious
download path (the victims counts are aggregated, per day, for all hosts contacting
a malicious domain). We can immediately see that the number of potential victims
that query the exploit or file download domains rapidly drops as the exploit domain
ages. On the other hand, injection domains are longer lived, and blacklisting them
would prevent a much larger number of potential victims from being redirected to
new (unknown) and frequently churning exploit and file download domains. Black-
listing the injection domain saves almost 6 times more potential victims, compared
to blacklisting the exploit domain.
3.4.5 Blacklists & Google Safe Browsing
In this section, we aim to gain additional insights into the advantages that could be
provided by our WebWitness’ MDD module, compared to existing domain blacklists.

























Figure 6: Potential victims saved by blocking the injection versus exploit/download
domains on drive-by paths.
related to drive-by downloads discovered during our study and deployment of Web-
Witness, we counted how many of these domains appeared in popular public black-
lists. We also measured the delay between when we first discovered the domain
on a malware download path and when it appeared on a blacklist. This was pos-
sible because we repeatedly collected all domain names reported by the following
set of public blacklists every day for more than a year: support.clean-mx.de, mal-
waredomains.com, zeustracker.abuse.ch, phishtank.com and malwaredomainlist.com.
Table 6 summarizes our findings.
Table 6: Public blacklisting results.
Uniq. Domains Days: Detect to Blacklist
Observed Blacklisted Min. Med. Mean
Exploit/Download 152 9 1 20 29
Injection 52 6 20 31 36
As shown in Table 6, from all drive-by download paths that we were able to iden-
tify, reconstruct, and label, we collected a total of 52 unique drive-by code injection
domains and 152 unique drive-by exploit and malware file download domains. Over-
all, less than 10% of these domains ever appeared on a public blacklist. As we can
see, more exploit/download domains (a total of 9) were blacklisted, compared to the
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injection domains (only 6). Furthermore, we can see that the minimum time it took
for an injection domain to appear in at least one blacklist was 20 days, whereas some
exploit domains were blacklisted almost immediately (after only one day).
Because injection domains are typically longer lived than exploit domains, and
because the same injection domain is often used throughout the course of a drive-
by download campaign to redirect users to different (short-lived) exploit domains,
identifying and blocking injection domains has a significant advantage. By helping
to quickly identify and blacklist injection domains, WebWitness enables the creation
of better defenses against drive-by downloads, thus helping to significantly reduce
the number of potential malware victims, as we also demonstrated in the previous
Section 3.4.4.
Google Safe Browsing For the last few weeks of our deployment of WebWitness,
we checked the domain names related to the drive-by download paths reconstructed
by our system against Google Safe Browsing (GSB) [6]. Specifically, given a malware
download path and its malicious domains, we queried GSB on the next day, compared
to the day the malware download was observed. Overall, during this final deployment
period we observed 34 drive-by download paths. GSB detected a total of 6 malicious
domains that were related to only 4 out of the 34 downloads. The domains GSB
detected were used to serve drive-by exploits, the malware file themselves, or were
related to ads used to lead the victims to a browser exploit. None of the domains
detected by GSB were injection domains, even though our 34 download paths included
12 unique injection domains.
It is important to notice, however, that while GSB detected malicious domains
related to only 4 out of our 34 drive-by download paths, there may be many more
malware downloads that WebWitness cannot observe, simply because they are blocked
“up front” by GSB. Because WebWitness passively collects malware download traces
from the network whenever a malicious executable file download is identified in the
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traffic, it is very possible that in many cases GSB simply prevented users who were
about to visit a drive-by-related domain from loading the malicious content, and
therefore from downloading the malware file in the first place. Nonetheless, the fact
that WebWitness automatically discovered 30 drive-by download paths that were not




Figure 7 shows the download path for an in-the-wild social engineering attack, in-
cluding the “link” relationships between nodes in the path. The user first performs a
search on www.youtube.com (A) for a “facebook private profile viewer”, which is the
root of the path. Next, the user clicks on the top search result leading to a “trick”
page on www.youtube.com (B), which hosts a video demonstrating a program that
supposedly allows the viewing of the private profiles of Facebook users. A textual
description under the video provides a link to download a “profile viewer” application
through a URL shortener goo.gl (C). This shortened URL link redirects the user to
uploading.com (D), a free file sharing site that prompts the user with a link to start
the download. This leads to another uploading.com (E) page that thanks the user
for downloading the file and opens a new uploading.com (F) page that includes an
<iframe> with source fs689.uploading.com (G), from which the executable file is
downloaded. The file is labeled as “Trojan Downloader” by some anti-virus scanners.
Notice that no exploit appears to be involved in this attack, and that the user
(highly likely) had to explicitly click on various links and on the downloaded malware
file itself to execute it.
3.4.6.2 Drive-by

















Figure 7: Social engineering download example.



















Figure 8: Drive-by download example.
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The download path originates from (A) www.google.com (the root page), where
the user entered the search terms “add years and months together.” The first link in
the search results, which the user clicked on, is for a webpage (B) on www.excelforum[dot]com
(the landing page). Sadly, the page the user landed on was compromised several days
earlier, resulting in the addition of a <script> tag with source at coscoslidia[dot]org,
which is the injection page. The script is automatically retrieved from (C) and exe-
cuted, forcing an <iframe> to be added and rendered. The source of the frame (D)
is on the site smalltableschears[dot]biz, from which the content is immediately
fetched and included in the page. The newly loaded javascript served by (D) then
checks for the presence of vulnerable versions of several browser plugins. It quickly
matches a version of the installed Adobe Flash Player to a known vulnerability and
dynamically adds another <iframe> to the page, which pulls a malicious Flash ex-
ploit file from (E) on the same smalltableschears[dot]biz site (the exploit page).
The Flash exploit succeeds and the shellcode fetches a malware binary (labeled as Ze-
roAccess by some AVs) from (F) on the same domain smalltableschears[dot]biz
(the download page).
3.4.7 “Origin” of Malware Download Paths
Figure 9 shows a breakdown of the drive-by and social engineering “origins” behind
the malware downloads. For drive-by downloads, 64% of the download paths started
with a search. We noticed that the search query keywords were typically very “nor-
mal” (e.g., searching for a new car, social events, or simple tools, as shown in the
example in Section 3.4.6.2), but unfortunately the search results linked to hacked
websites that acted as the “entry point” to exploit distribution sites and malware
downloads.
For social engineering downloads, about 60% of the web paths started with a














Figure 9: “Root” of malware download paths.
to be related to less legitimate content. For example, the search queries were often re-
lated to free streaming links, pirated movies, or pirated versions of popular expensive
software. In these cases, the search results contained links offering content relevant
to the search, but the related search result pages would also encourage the user to
install malicious software disguised as some required application (e.g., a video codec
or a software key generator).
The second most common origin is direct links, whereby a user arrives to a webpage
directly (e.g., by clicking on a link within a spam email), rather than through a link
from another site. Most of these direct links point to a benign website that is either
hacked or displays malicious ads.
Facebook and Twitter represent a relatively infrequent origin for malware down-
loads (7% and 3% of the cases, respectively). While both Facebook and Twitter
usually rely on encrypted (HTTPS) communications, we were able to determine if a
download path originated from their sites by noticing that Facebook makes sure that
all external requests carry a generic www.facebook.com referrer [70]. On the other
hand, requests initiated by clicking on a link published on twitter carry a referrer
containing a t.co shortening URL. During our entire deployment, we only observed
one case in which a link from Facebook or Twitter led directly to a drive-by exploit
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kit. In all other cases, the links led first to a legitimate page that was hacked or that
displayed a malicious ad.
For the remaining malicious downloads (less than 3%, overall) we were unable to
trace them back to their origin (e.g., due to missing traffic).
During our deployment, we also found that malicious ads are responsible for a
significant fraction of the malware downloads in our dataset. Specifically, malicious
ads were included in the web path of about 25% of drive-by and 40% of social engi-
neering malware downloads. The malicious ads we observed were typically displayed
on relatively unpopular websites. We observed only one example of a malicious ad
served on a website with a US Alexa ranking within the top 500.
3.5 Discussion and System Limitations
Our system only collected data during off-peak hours because it was sharing hardware
resources with a production network monitoring system whose functionality could not
be disrupted. Thus, our data is just a sample of the malicious downloads that occurred
during this period. Also, due to the significant efforts required to analyze complex
malware download traces, our evaluation ground truth is limited to a representative
sample of the malicious downloads that occurred in the monitored network. However,
based on our extensive manual analysis, we believe the samples to be very diverse
because of the various exploit kits, exploits, social engineering tricks and malware
observed, and therefore representative of the overall set of malware downloads that
occurred during our deployment.
Because the detection of malicious executable files is outside the scope of this
chapter, we have relied on a “detection oracle” to extract malicious download traces
from the network traffic. For the sake of this study, we have chosen to rely on multiple
AV scanners. It is well known, though, that AV scanners suffer from false positive
and negatives. In addition, the labels assigned by the AV are often not completely
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meaningful. However, we should consider that using multiple AV scanners reduces
the false negatives, and the set of filtering heuristics we discussed in Section 3.2.2
can mitigate the false positives. In addition, we used re-scanning over a period of a
month for each of the downloaded executable files we collected, to further improve our
ground truth. Finally, we used the AV labels to filter out adware downloads, because
we are mainly interested in the potentially most damaging malware infections. We
empirically found that the AV labels usually do a decent job at separating the broad
adware and malware classes. Also, we manually reviewed all samples of malware
downloads in our dataset, to further mitigate possible mislabeling problems.
Attackers with knowledge of our system may try to evade it by using a purposely
crafted attack in attempt to alter some of the features we use in Section 3.3 to perform
path traceback, categorization and for node labeling. Most likely, the attacker will
have as a primary goal the evasion of our traceback algorithm. This, for example,
could be done by forcing a “disconnect” between the final malware download node
and its true predecessors. Such an attack theoretically may be possible, especially in
case of drive-by attacks. In such events the browser is compromised and is (in theory)
under the full control of the attacker. Now, if the malware download node is isolated
in the reconstructed download path, the cause classifier may label the download event
a malware update, thus preventing any further processing of the download path (i.e.,
any attempt to identify the exploit and injection domains).
However, we should also notice that most drive-by downloads are based on what we
refer as “commonly exploitable” content in Section 3.3.3 (e.g., .jar, .swf, or .pdf files
that carry an exploit). For such type of drive-by download attacks, the “commonly
exploitable” content feature should connect the exploit and the download, if they
occur in a small time window. If needed, the time window could be extended by
requiring the domain severing the content to be young by checking its “age” before
making a connection. Since the exploit must occur before the attacker has control of
52
the browser, it is more difficult to evade.
3.6 Related Work
Client honeypots actively visit webpages and detect drive-by downloads though ob-
serving changes to the system [2, 87, 89, 107, 108] or by analyzing responses for ma-
licious content [7, 44, 93]. These systems tend to have a low false positive rate, but
only find malicious websites by visiting them with exploitable browser configurations;
also, they have limited range in the quantity of pages they can crawl because they
are much slower than static crawlers. Often candidate URLs are selected by filtering
content from static crawlers [107, 108, 121], using heuristics to visit parts of the web
that are likely more malicious [39] or using search engines to identify webpages that
contain content similar to known malicious ones [64].
A number of techniques have been developed to detect drive-by downloads through
examining content [44, 46, 72, 112, 114]. Signature based intrusion detection systems,
such as Snort [114], passively search network traffic content for patterns of known
attacks. Both static [46] and dynamic [44] analysis of JavaScript has been used to
detect attacks. The disadvantages of using content is that it is complex and under
the control of the attacker. Polymorphic malware and code obfuscation results in
missed attacks for signature and static analysis systems, and dynamic analysis can
be detected by malware and subverted by altering its execution path [72].
Other systems focus on the redirection chain that leads to drive-by downloads.
Stringhini et al [124] create redirection graphs by aggregating redirection chains that
end at the same webpage. Features from the redirection graph and visiting users are
then used to classify the webpage as malicious or benign. Mekky et al [86] build brows-
ing activity trees using the referrer and redirection headers as well as URLs embedded
in the content. Features related to the redirection chain for each tree are extracted
and used to classify the activity as malicious or benign. Li et al [80] apply page
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rank from the dark and bright side of the web to a partially labeled set of redirection
chains to separate benign and malicious web paths. They find the majority of mali-
cious paths are directed through traffic distribution systems. Using features from the
redirection chain, Surf [82] detects malicious websites found in search engine results
due to search poisoning and WarningBird [78] identifies malicious webpages posted
on Twitter. These systems focus on the redirection chain and features extracted from
it to classify a web activity as benign or malicious. Whereas, WebWitness provides
context to malicious downloads by reconstructing the full download path (not just
the redirection chain), classifying the cause of the download (drive-by, social, update)
and identifying the roles of the domains involved in the attack.
Static blacklists [6] of domains/URLs and domain reputation systems [28,29] iden-
tify malicious websites to prevent users from visiting them. Many of the domains on
static blacklists are exploit and download domains that change frequently rendering
them less effective. On the other hand, reputation systems only provide a malicious
score for a domain and do not indicate their role or give context to an attack. By
analyzing the structure of a malicious download, WebWitness can identify the type
of attack and the domain roles; providing the highest value domains for blocking and
reputation training data.
Web traffic reconstruction has been studied for example in [42, 94, 129]. Web-
Patrol [42] uses a client honeypot and a modified web proxy to collect and replay
web-based malware scenarios. Unlike WebPatrol, WebWitness is not limited to drive-
by downloads invoked through client honeypots and can provide context to drive-by
and social engineering attacks on real users observed on live networks. ReSurf [129]
uses the referrer header to build graphs of related HTTP transactions to reconstruct
web-surfing activities. As discussed in Chapter 3 and evaluated in [94], this approach
is very limited especially in reconstructing the entire download path of a malicious
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executable. Lastly, ClickMiner [94] reconstructs user-browser interactions by replay-
ing recorded network traffic through an instrumented browser. Its focus is on the
user’s behavior that led to a webpage; whereas, WebWitness identifies the cause and
structure of an attack that led to a malicious download.
3.7 Conclusion
We proposed a novel incident investigation system, named WebWitness. Our system
targets two main goals: 1) automatically trace back and label the chain of events (e.g.,
visited web pages) preceding malware downloads, to highlight how users reach attack
pages on the web; and 2) leverage these automatically labeled in-the-wild malware
download paths to better understand current attack trends, and to develop more
effective defenses.
We deployed WebWitness on a large academic network for a period of 10 months,
where we collected and categorized thousands of live malware download paths. An
analysis of this labeled data allowed us to design a new defense against drive-by
downloads that rely on injecting malicious content into (hacked) legitimate web pages.
For example, we show that on average by using the results of WebWitness we can
decrease the infection rate of drive-by downloads based on malicious content injection
by almost 6 times, compared to existing URL blacklisting approaches.
Even though WebWitness can categorize a malicious download as social engineer-
ing, we focused the majority of this chapter on understanding drive-by downloads and
creating a defense for them. In the next chapter, we will use the web path and context
provided by WebWitness to continue our study of malicious downloads, but with our
full attention on studying, detecting and developing a defense for social engineering.
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CHAPTER IV
TOWARDS MEASURING AND MITIGATING SOCIAL
ENGINEERING MALWARE DOWNLOADS
4.1 Introduction
Most modern malware infections happen via the browser, typically triggered by drive-
by download attacks [108] or social engineering [36]. In the previous chapter we used
WebWitness to analyze drive-by downloads and there have been numerous studies
that are centered on measuring and defending against them [44,58,92,124]. However,
malware infections enabled by social engineering attacks remain notably understud-
ied [106]. Furthermore, cyber-criminals increasingly aim their attacks against the
weakest link, namely the user, by leveraging increasingly sophisticated social engi-
neering tactics [88]. In this chapter, we examine social engineering downloads using
the web paths and context provided by WebWitness.
There is a pressing need for a comprehensive study of social engineering malware
downloads that can shed light on the tactics used in modern attacks. In particu-
lar, we need to build systems capable of continuously collecting and automatically
reconstructing (or “explaining”) recent in-the-wild SE malware attacks. At the same
time, our research around SE tactics should assist in the development of training and
awareness programs that aim to better educate users to recognize such attacks and
reduce infection rates. In addition to better security awareness programs for users,
we need to build technical solutions that can mitigate SE malware attacks without
requiring the user to be in the loop.
To that end, we present a system developed to capture and analyze SE malware
downloads in live networks. Specifically, we focus on studying web-based SE attacks,
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namely SE attacks that unfold exclusively via the web and that do not require “ex-
ternal” triggers, such as email spam/phishing, etc. An examples of such attack is
described in [36]: a user is simply browsing the web, visiting an apparently innocuous
blog; his attention is drawn to an online ad that is subtly crafted to mimic a warning
about a missing browser plugin; clicking on the ad takes the user to a page that re-
ports a missing codec, which is needed to watch a video; the user clicks on the related
codec link, which results in downloading malicious software.
Via a detailed analysis of hundreds of in-the-wild web-based SE malware attacks
collected over a period of several months at a large academic network, we attain the
following results: (i) we develop a categorization system that expresses how attackers
typically gain users’ attention, and which are the most common types of deception
and persuasion tactics used to trick victims into downloading malicious applications;
(ii) we reconstruct the web path followed by SE malware victims, and observe that
a large fraction of SE attacks are delivered via malicious online advertisement (e.g.,
served via “low tier” ad networks); (iii) we measure the characteristics of the network
infrastructure (e.g., domain names) used to deliver such attacks, and discover a num-
ber of features that can be leveraged to distinguish between SE malware and benign
(or non-SE) software downloads.
One of our findings shows that a large fraction of SE malware attacks (almost
50%) are accomplished by repackaging existing benign applications. For instance,
users often download free software that actually comes as a bundle including the
software actually desired by the user plus some Adware or other Potentially Unwanted
Programs (PUPs). This confirms that websites serving free software are often involved
(willingly or not) in distributing malicious software [22,25].
The second most popular category of attacks is related to alerting or urging the
user to install an application that is supposedly needed to complete a task. For
instance, the user may be warned that they are running an outdated or insecure
57
version of Adobe Flash or Java, and are offered to download a software update.
Unfortunately, by downloading these supposed updates, users would instead receive
malicious software. Similarly, users may stumble upon a page that supposedly hosts
a video of interest. This page may then inform the user that a specific video codec
is needed to play the desired video, for example. The user complies by downloading
the suggested software, thus causing a malware infection (see Section 4.2 for details).
Another example is represented by fake anti-virus (FakeAV) attacks [111]. In this
case, a malicious page alerts the user that their machine is infected, and that an
AV software is needed to clean up the machine. In a way similar to the SE attack
examples reported above, the user may be persuaded to download (in some cases after
a payment) the promoted software, which will infect the user’s machine. However,
while FakeAVs have been highly popular among attackers in the recent past, in our
study of in-the-wild SE malware downloads we find that they represent less than 1%
of modern SE attacks. This sharp decline in the number of FakeAV attacks within
the last few years is likely due to a combination of technical countermeasures [23] and
increased user awareness [24].
As mentioned earlier, a large fraction of SE malware attacks (more than 80%) are
initiated via malicious advertisement, and that the “entry point” to these attacks is
represented by only a few low-tier advertisement networks. For instance, we found
that a large fraction of the web-based SE attacks described above are served primarily
via two ad networks: onclickads[.]net and adcash[.]com.
Guided by these discoveries, we build WebSentry, a novel network defense system
aimed at automatically detecting and preventing SE malware downloads. WebSentry
can be deployed at the edge of a network or as a web proxy module to monitor all
inbound and outbound web traffic, and is able to accurately detect malware download
events triggered by ad-based SE attacks.
Chaper Summary. This chapter discusses the following:
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• We present the first systematic study of modern web-based SE malware down-
load attacks. For instance, our analysis of hundreds of SE malware attack
instances reveals that most such attacks are enabled by malicious online adver-
tisement served through a handful of “low tier” ad networks.
• We find that the most common types of SE malware attacks include fake updates
for Adobe Flash and Java, and that fake anti-viruses (FakeAVs), which have
been a popular and effective infection vector in the recent past, represent less
than 1% of all SE malware downloads observed in the wild. Furthermore, we
find that existing defenses, such as traditional anti-virus (AV) scanners and
popular URL blacklists, are largely ineffective against SE malware downloads.
• To assist the process of understanding the origin of SE malware attacks, we de-
velop a categorization system that expresses how attackers typically gain users’
attention, and what are the most common types of deception and persuasion
tactics used to trick victims into downloading malicious applications. This
makes it easier to track what type of attacks are most prevalent, and may help
to focus user training programs on specific user weaknesses and particularly
successful deception and persuasion tactics currently used in the wild.
• In addition, we present WebSentry, a network-defense systems that aims to
detect web-based SE malware attacks in real time. We deploy WebSentry in
a large academic network for a period of eight months, and show that our
system is able to accurately detect SE malware download attempts with 91%
true positives and only 0.5% false positives. To the best of our knowledge,
WebSentry is the first network-based system capable of accurately detecting
and mitigating SE malware attacks.
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4.2 Collecting & Labeling SE Downloads
In this section we discuss how we collected and identified downloads that were the
result of social engineering attacks on the web. In addition we explain how we label
the downloads based on the different techniques used by adversaries to trick the user.
Based on the observations from this study we define a categorization system for social
engineering attacks in the following section.
4.2.1 Overview of Data Collection
We collect and extract the download path of executable file downloads using Web-
Witness. We deployed WebWitness to a large academic network serving tens of
thousands users for a period of two months. During this period we collected a total
of 35, 638 executable downloads that did not match our whitelist filter. The whitelist
consists of 128 benign domains that were responsible for the majority of the benign
executable downloads we observed on the network. We review these downloads in the
next sections to identify the ones that are the result of a social engineering attack.
4.2.2 Automatically Filtering Update
The majority of executable downloads observed on a network are updates to software
already installed on systems. We can automatically identify and filter out a large
fraction of these by examining the length of the download path and the HTTP user-
agent. Executable downloads that are updates tend to have very short paths. In fact,
they typically consist of a single HTTP request to fetch a new executable.
The user-agent for an update download is often different from the one used by
the browser [97]. This is because the application performing the update supplies the
user-agent. We determine if the user-agent in an executable download belongs to
the update using two methods. First, if there are buffered HTTP transactions from
the same client prior to the download, we calculate each user-agent’s popularity by
the number of unique domains visited. We expect applications performing updates
60
to visit a small number of domains (typically only one) whereas a browser will visit
many due to the fact that most webpages display content from other sites such as
advertisements. So, even a user visiting a single webpage will likely create a number
of browser HTTP requests to other domains.
Second, we check the user-agent to see if it contains the string “mozilla”. Most
browsers (FireFox, Chrome, IE, Safari, etc.) still add “mozilla” to their user-agent
to help websites understand the browser’s features and capabilities. However, many
applications performing an update do not include it. Instead the user-agent contains
the name of the application performing the update.
To automatically identify update downloads we use the following heuristic: 1) the
length of the download path must be one, 2) the user-agent is unpopular or does
not contain the string “mozilla”. If both conditions 1 and 2 are met, we label the
download as an update. Using this simple heuristic we are able to automatically
identify almost 95% of the updates observed on the network. Note that this heuristic
is evadable; however, our goal is not to filter out malicious updates from the network,
which is small, but to quickly filter out the large number of benign updates from our
study data so we can focus on social engineering downloads.
4.2.3 Clustering Downloads for Analysis
Filtering the updates reduced the total number of downloads by 61% leaving 13, 762
that require manual analysis for labeling. For the labeling task, we leverage unsu-
pervised learning to maximize efficiency to group together related benign and social
engineering downloads. Then we manually label a random sample of downloads and
cascade the same label to the rest of the cluster. For this to be successful, the statis-
tical features used for clustering must have the potential to differentiate downloads
that are not related. Next, we introduce and briefly discuss the intuition behind these
features:
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(1) Filename Similarity: Benign file downloads that are from the same organiza-
tion, entity or group tend to have similar filenames. This is also true for social
engineering campaigns because the filename often aids in the deception of the end
user. For example, having the word “adobe” in the filename of a fake flash player
upgrade attack.
(2) File Size Similarity: Benign files that are identical or variations (i.e., by ver-
sion) of the same software are usually very close in size. Social engineering cam-
paigns typically infect victims with the same malware family. The sizes of the
malicious executables per victim do vary due to polymorphism, but the size dif-
ference is typically small in respect of the total file size.
(3) URL Similarity: A website that is benign will often host all of its executable
downloads at the same or very similar structured URLs. Social engineering cam-
paigns often go weeks or even months before a noticeable change in the structure
of their URLs is observed. On the other hand, the domains and IP addresses
that facilitate their illicit activities tend to change more frequently — so they can
avoid the domain name and IP blacklisting.
(4) Domain Name Similarity: Files downloaded from the same domain tend to
share both file reputation and reason for the actual download. This is true for
both benign and malicious downloads. Some social engineering campaigns will
reuse terms in their second and third level domains that aid in deceiving the user
(e.g, “security”, in the case of some Fake AV campaigns).
(5) Shared Predecessor: Social engineering attacks that share a common node (or
predecessor) in the download path are often related. For example, adversaries
performing a social engineering attack, will ofter lure victims by posting links to
a web forum or exploit an ad network with weak anti-abuse practices. Now, the
actual download domains used in the attack may change (i.e., to avoid black-
listing), however the “tactics” employed by the adversaries to attract the users
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attention are often the same. In benign cases, both the download and attention
grabbing domain tend to be stable, as the main goal is quality of service towards
the end user.
(6) Shared Hosting: Social engineering campaigns often reuse the same hosting
network after they switch domains. Hosting networks that tolerate abuse (know-
ingly or otherwise) is a rare and costly resource. On the other hand, domain
names are significantly easier to obtain (often without yielding any information
that can be used for attack attribution) and can be used as crash-and-burn re-
source from the adversary. Benign websites do not change hosting very frequently
for, again, quality of service but also brand protection reasons.
(7) HTTP Response Header Similarity: The headers in an HTTP response are
the result of the installed software and configuration of the web server. The set
of response headers and their associated values offer a lot of variation. However,
most of the web servers for a benign site tend to have common configurations so
they respond with similar headers. Also, social engineering campaigns tend to
use the same platform and do change their configurations even when they move
domains.
For each of the13, 762 downloads we calculate the pairwise distance between the
downloads using the previously descried features. We apply an agglomerative hier-
archical clustering algorithm to the derived distances. We chose a conservative cut
height θ to error on the side of not grouping related downloads instead of potentially
grouping unrelated ones. This process produced 1, 205 clusters resulting in an order




For each cluster we randomly sample 10% of the downloads for manual review. For
small clusters we sample a minimum 5 downloads and for clusters with < 5 all are
reviewed. Our goal is to label each cluster as “likely” benign, social engineering,
drive-by download or update. In addition to reviewing the download paths to label
a cluster, we use antivirus (AV) labels for the downloaded executables as indicators
of being malicious. To increase AV detections we age the downloads for a period of
two months before scanning them with more than 40 antivirus (AV) engines using
virustotal.com. If we suspect a cluster is malicious, having one or more downloads
labeled by AV offers additional confirmation.
We perform an extensive review of each download in our sample from each clus-
ter. First we look for attributes that suggest the download is an update because
they require less analysis to confirm. Even though our heuristics in Section 4.2.2
eliminated the majority, some still remain. To determine if a download is an update,
we examine the length of the download path and the time between requests. If the
length of download path is < 4 or the time between requests is < 1 second, we review
the content of the first non-redirect HTTP transaction immediately preceding the
download. If it does not contain content suitable for human consumption we label
the download as an update.
Next we look for drive-by download indicators [97]. For instance we look for
content such as pdf, flash, and java on the path just prior to the download. Browser
plugins and extensions that process this type of content often have vulnerabilities
that are exploited by attackers. If we suspect it is a drive-by, we inspect the content
of the HTTP transactions that precede the suspected attack. This typically requires
reverse engineering and deobfuscating javascript. If we identify code that checks for
vulnerable versions of browser software, we label the download as drive-by.
If the cluster is not related to update or drive-by downloads, we further examine
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the samples to determine if the they are the result of social engineering. For this anal-
ysis, we inspect the content of all non-redirect HTTP transactions on the download
path. Our goal is to identify the page that contains the link the user likely clicked
that ultimately resulted in the download. Since social engineering is an attack on the
user, interaction (e.g., clicking a link) is required. Once identified the content can be
reviewed to determine if deception or questionable persuasion techniques were used
to trick the user into downloading the binary. If found, we label the cluster as social
engineering; otherwise, we label it as “likely” benign.
For the majority of the clusters we label as social engineering, one or more of
the downloads are labeled malicious by AV. This provides additional confirmation of
our classification. The clustering also aided in the labeling process by allowing us
to examine related downloads as a group versus having to label a single download
in isolation. From the 1, 205 clusters we label 136 as social engineering giving us a
total of 2, 004 such downloads. Analysis of the social engineering clusters allows us to
derive a categorization system for further classification of social engineering attacks.
We discuss this in the following section.
4.3 SE Download Attack Categorization
The 2, 004 social engineering downloads we labeled in the previous section contain
a wide range of depiction and persuasion techniques as well as numerous tactics
employed to victimize users. We develop our categorization system by studying the
techniques used in these successful attacks that trick real users into downloading and
installing malicious software. The categorization system allows us to label different
download paths according to; (1) the ways the adversaries get the user’s attention and
(2) the type of deception and persuasion techniques employed. Our categorization
system is shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Categorizing social engineering malware downloads on the web.
accomplished using advertisement (ad), search result, web post or a combination of
these three. As we will show in our measurements, the most popular of these methods
are ads. On-line advertisement allows the attacker to “publish” their malicious ad on
a site that is already popular among the targeted victims. In addition, ads help hide
(from the average Internet user and security researchers) the malicious campaign
and attack infrastructure, simply because they are exposed only to the users that
trigger the delivery of the ad (according to their search key words, cookies, referrer,
user-agent etc.).
Another method employed to the get the user’s attention is search. Search engines
get abused through techniques such as black hat search engine optimization. However,
we do not limit our definition of search to just search engines. Anytime, a user
performs a query to locate specific content on a website we classify it as search. For
example, we have observed users become victims of SE attacks while searching for
content on a video hosting website.
Web posts are also utilized by attackers to get the user’s attention. We define a
web post as content that has been added to a website by a visitor and is now available
for display to others. Many of the web posts we observed were located within groups
of legitimate posts about a topic of interest. The majority of social engineering web
posts were related to free software, books, music and movies.
It is not uncommon for these techniques to be combined. For instance, attackers
will combine search and ad to get the user’s attention. Search engine ads related
to the search terms are often displayed before the real results thus increasing the
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likelihood of a click. This is abused by attackers. Also, users will search web forums
and fall victim to a malicious web post.
After the attacker gets the user’s attention, they must convince them to download
and install malicious software. This typically involves combining a subset of the
deception and persuasion techniques shown in Figure 10. As one scrolls from left to
right in the figure, the techniques move from deception towards persuasion. However,
none of the techniques involve only deception or persuasion; instead, the different
techniques vary in their levels of each. The following is a description of the deception
and persuasion techniques:
(1) Decoy: An object such as a hyperlink that is purposely placed at a location on
the page that will attract users to it and away from the actual object desired by
the user. An image of a download button delivered as an ad on a free download
site located prior to the actual download link is an example of this technique.
(2) Repackage: A benign and malicious executable grouped together and presented
to the user as a single download or install. An example, is adware bundled with
a benign application downloaded from a free software distribution website.
(3) Impersonate: Using specific images, terms and colors to make a malicious ex-
ecutable appear to be a known popular benign application. Also, claiming that
an executable provides features or services, but has no intention to supply them,
as a way to get the user to download and install the application. Malicious exe-
cutables pretending to be a Flash Player update by using words like “adobe” and
“flash” along with Flash Player images and graphics is an example.
(4) Invent: Creating a false reality for the user that compels them to download a
malicious executable. For example, alerting the user stating that their machine is
infected with malware and instructing them to download a malicious executable,
pretending to be AV software, to clean up the fake infection.
(5) Alarm: Using fear and trepidation to scare the user into downloading a malicious
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executable that promises to safeguard them. An ad claiming that the user’s
browser is out-of-date and is vulnerable to exploitation is an example.
(6) Entice: Attracting users to download a malicious executable by offering features,
content or advantage. As an example, a user is displayed an ad for a system
optimization utility, that is really a malicious executable, stating that it will
“speedup” their PC.
(7) Comply: Requiring or appearing to require the installation of a malicious ex-
ecutable before the user can continue or get what they want. A user that is
prompted to install a necessary “codec” before they can watch a free movie is an
example.
It is important to note that none of the social engineering attacks in our study
fall into a single class. Instead they use techniques across two or more of the above
categories to trick the user into infecting themselves.
4.3.1 SE Download Classification Examples
In this section we present two SE examples from our observations and classify them
using our categorization system. To aid in our discussion we define the notation
“a[+b]:1[+2+3]” where the letters are ways of getting the user’s attention and the
numbers are the deception/persuasion techniques. For example, if a malicious ad uses
the deception/persuasion techniques alarm and impersonate then we label it using
our notation as ad:alarm+impersonate.
Example A. User searches for “gary roberts free pics” using a popular search en-
gine. A page from a compromised website is returned as a top result. The page
contains various content referring to “gary roberts”, but it is incoherent and likely
only present for blackhat search engine optimization (SEO). However, the user never
sees the content because javascript located at the top of the page immediately closes
the document then reopens it to inject a script that redirects the user to a page that
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says “gary-roberts-free-pics is ready for download. Your file download should auto-
matically start within seconds. If it doesn’t, click to restart the download.” But the
downloaded file is not pictures instead it is malware.
Using our categorization system we classify this attack as “search:entice+decoy+impersonate.”
Search as the method of gaining the users attention in this example is obvious because
the social engineering page appeared in the results of a search engine. The entice part
of the attack is the offering of “free” pics of the subject of interest. Decoy is due to
the fact that blackhat SEO was used to elevate the social engineering page in the
search results above other legitimate pages. Lastly, what the user downloads is not
pics of gary roberts; instead, it is a malicious executable impersonating what the user
wants.
Example B. A user is watching an episode of “Agents of Shield” on a free video
website when they are presented with an ad. The ad, shown in Figure 11, presents
the user with the option of downloading an early warning system for Ebola. However,
the download does not warn them of an outbreak; instead, it infects the user’s system
with malware.
We classify this attack as “ad:alarm+impersonate” using our categorization sys-
tem. The user’s attention is gained through an ad, where their fear of Ebola is used
to alarm the user into downloading a tracking system. But, what the user downloads
only impersonates a tracking systems and is really malware.
4.4 SE Attack Download Measurements
In this section we measure the popularity of the SE user attention and deception/persuasion
techniques that convince users to download malicious software. In addition we mea-
sure properties of the SE advertisement paths and the downloads themselves. Finally,
we examine how AV and current blacklisting approaches detect SE attack downloads.
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Figure 11: Social engineering ad for Ebola early warning system.
4.4.1 Prevalence of Attacks
Table 7 shows the number and percentage of downloads for each technique used to get
the user’s attention. Over 87% of the SE attacks use ads to get the user’s attention
with 80% being displayed on websites visited by the user. The other 7% of SE ads
is a combination of search and ad where the user queries a search engine and is then
presented with ads based on the search terms as part of the results. Ads are popular
with SE campaigns because it is an efficient way to get the malicious page displayed
to the most users.
Table 7: Popularity of SE techniques for getting the user’s attention.
User’s Attention Total Percentage
Ad 1, 616 80.64%
Search+Ad 146 7.29%
Search 127 6.34%
Web Post 115 5.74%
Gaining the user’s attention is not sufficient to infect them. They must be tricked
into downloading and running the malicious executable. Table 8 shows the total
and percentage for each technique. The most popular, making up over 48% of the
observations, is repackage+entice. It is popular because it is primarily composed of
downloads for “free” software that delivers adware or possible-unwanted-programs
(PUPs) in addition to what the user desires.
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The next two most popular categories are invent+impersonate+alarm and in-
vent+impersonate+comply comprising 22% and 19% of the SE downloads observed.
An example of an invent+impersonate+alarm technique is a fake java update where
the user is shown an ad stating “WARNING!!! Your Java Version is Outdated and
has Security Risks, Please Update Now!” and uses images associated with java. Ads
like this are typically presented to users while they are visiting legitimate websites. In
this example, the attacker is inventing the scenario that the user’s java is out-of-date,
alarming them with “WARNING!!!” displayed in a pop-up ad and impersonating a
java update for download to resolve the issue.
The difference between invent+impersonate+alarm and invent+impersonate+comply
is the persuasion component; i.e., alarm versus comply. Alarm uses fear, e.g. com-
puter may be compromised, to compel the user to download and install malicious
software; whereas, comply imposes a requirement on the user in order to proceed. An
example of invent+impersonate+comply is an ad on a free video website that says
“Please Install Flash Player Pro To Continue. Top Video Sites Require The Latest
Adobe Flash Player Update.” In this example the attacker is inventing the require-
ment to install flash player pro and tells the user they must comply by downloading
a malicious executable impersonating flash play before they can continue.
Table 9 shows the popularity of each scam tactic in the invent+impersonate sub-
classes alarm and comply. Fake flash and java updates are the two most popular
in the alarm class. Also, we observed fake browser updates and fake av alerts, but
they were much less common, each comprising less than 1% of our observations. Fake
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Table 9: Popularity of different scam tactics in the Ad:Invent+Impersonate sub-
classes.
Alarm Comply
Fake Flash 68% 20%
Fake Java 30% 0%
Fake AV 1% 0%
Fake Browser 1% 0%
Fake Codec 0% 22%
Fake Player 0% 58%
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Figure 12: How attackers gain the user’s attention per deception/persuasion tech-
nique.
flash updates are also common for the comply class; however, the most popular scam
tactic is telling the user that a “video update” is required to continue. In these fake
player ads, images that resemble flash are used, but not the terms “adobe” or “flash.”
Lastly, the requirement to install a fake codec in order to watch a video is still tricking
users into installing malicious software.
Figure 12 shows the how attackers get the user’s attention for each deception/persuasion
technique. For instance, ads were the most common technique used in repack-
age+entice attacks making up 75% of their observations with search and web post con-
tributing the remaining 25%. All of our observations for invent+impersonate+alarm,
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invent+impersonate+comply, impersonate+alarm and impersonate+decoy only use
ads to get the user’s attention.
4.4.2 SE Download Advertisement Paths
The ad path begins at the first HTTP transaction on the download path that is
responsible for ad delivery and ends at the download. We identify ads using reg-
ular expressions automatically derived from the rules of the popular Adblock Plus
browser extension. To measure their effectiveness we compare detections against
the set of SE ad downloads we manually labeled. We find that they correctly iden-
tify almost 85% of them. For our measurements we use the set of SE ad down-
loads identified using these regular expressions, and focus on the ad:repackage+entice
(entice), ad:invent+impersonate+alarm (alarm) and ad:invent+impersonate+comply
(comply) SE classes because they are responsible for over 90% of the ad based SE
downloads we observe.
The ad entry point is the first HTTP transaction on the ad path. We label the
first HTTP transaction on the download path that matches an ad regular expression
the ad entry point. In most cases, the true ad entry point and the one we label are
the same, but they can differ due to a missed detection. We measure the popularity
by the percentage of downloads that have the same ad entry point domain.
Table 10: Top five ad entry point domains per class by percentage of downloads.
Comply Alarm Entice
26% onclickads.net 16% adcash.com 20% doubleclick.net
10% adcash.com 7% onclickads.net 16% google.com
10% popads.net 7% msn.com 12% googleadservices.com
7% putlocker.is 6% yesadsrv.com 11% msn.com
3% allmyvideos.net 4% yu0123456.com 8% coupons.com
Table 10 shows the top 5 domain ad entry points for the comply, alarm and
entice classes. The top 3 ad entry points for the comply class are domains that
have been abused by adware to inject pop-up advertisements into the user’s browsing
experience. To determine if these downloads are due to adware pop-ups, we select 10
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random samples from the 3 adware abused domains on our list (i.e., onclickads.net,
adcash.com, popads.net) and manually examine the content of the HTTP transaction
that precedes it. If a request is the result of adware, there should not be a matching
URL in the preceding webpage since the ad would have been injected locally at the
host. For all of the reviewed samples, we are able to identify the preceding webpage
as the source of the ad; thus, the these download are not the result of adware pop-ups.
The top two ad entry points for the alarm class match the comply class, but are in
reverse order. The third domain msn.com has a good reputation, but is probably being
abused by less reputable ad networks several redirects later at the end of the download
path. The top entry domains in the entice class all have very good reputations. This
is likely due to the fact that the majority of downloads in this class are for legitimate
software that is bundled with PUPs. The domain coupons.com makes the list because
it is one of the most popular software downloaded in this class.
Table 11: Top five ad download domains per class by percentage of downloads.
Comply Alarm Entice
17% softwaare.net 7% downloaddabs.com 41% imgfarm.com
5% newthplugin.com 4% downloaddado.com 17% coupons.com
5% greatsoftfree.com 4% whensoftisupdated.net 11% shopathome.com
4% soft-dld.com 3% safesystemupgrade.org 5% crusharcade.com
3% younplugin.com 3% onlinelivevideo.org 3% ilivid.com
At the end of the ad path is the download. Table 11 show the most popular
download domains for the comply, alarm and entice classes. All of the domains listed
for the comply and entice classes are known to serve malicious software with most
being adware and PUPs. We measure the age of these domains using a large passive
DNS (pDNS) database that stores historic domain name resolutions. We define the
domain age as the difference in days from the time it was first recorded in pDNS to
the day of the download. All the domains in table that are part of the comply and
alarm classes are less then 200 days old with the majority being less than 90 days.
The domains in Table 11 for the entice class are all at least several years old.
This is because most of the downloads in this class are for legitimate software that is
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bundled with adware or PUPs. For instance, we find a large variety of “free” software
that directs users to the domain imgfarm.com for download. This is the reason over
40% of the downloads in the entice class are from that domain.
The middle domains, the ones between the ad entry point and the download on
the ad path, tend to be a mix of young and old. In fact, the most popular comply
and alarm class middle domains are a 50/50 split of young and old. But, this is not
the the case for the entice class where all them are several years old. However, the
majority of ad paths for all three classes have at least one middle domain with an age
that is less than 200 days.
4.4.3 Downloads Detected by Antivirus
We measure the percentage of downloads that are malware, adware and potentially-
unwanted-programs (PUPs) for downloads in the comply, alarm and entice classes.
For this measurement the downloads are aged for a period of one month before per-
forming the AV scan to collect AV labels. First, we automatically separate binaries
based on strings found in the AV labels. For adware we look for the string “adware”
and the names of popular adware applications. We perform the same matching for
PUPs looking for the strings “PUP”, “PUA” and popular PUP applications. The ex-
ecutable is labeled based on majority matching. If there is a tie in matching between
adware and PUP we label the executable as PUP. The majority of binaries can be
classified using these heuristics. Most of the ones that remain are malicious, but we
manually inspect the labels to verify.
Figure 13 shows the percentage of downloads that are malware, adware and PUP
for the comply, alarm and entice classes. The majority of detected downloads in the
comply and alarm classes are adware. Only a small amount of malware 3.2% and
2.4% are detected in the comply and alarm classes. This is expected because adware
is much more common than malware. The majority of labeled downloads in the entice
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Figure 13: AV detections one month after download.
class are PUPs and no malware was detected. Most of the downloads in the class are
for legitimate software that are bundled with PUPs/adware. Lastly, between 70%
and 75% of the binaries were labeled by AV after aging them for one month. We
suspect that these binaries are also malicious because their downloads are in clusters
with AV labeled malicious binaries.
On the day of the download we scanned each executable with AV software. Fig-
ure 14 shows the percentage of binaries that would eventually be labeled as malware,
adware and PUPs that were detected by AV on the day of the download. The highest
percentage of detections across all three social engineering classes was PUPs followed
by adware. None of the malware downloads for the comply class were detected on
the day of the download. Overall, only about a third of the binaries that would be
label by AV were detected on the download day.
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Figure 14: Percentage of AV detections per ad social class on the day of download.
4.4.4 Blacklisting SE Attack Downloads
In this section we measure the types of SE attack downloads that are currently blocked
by blacklists. For our blacklist we chose Google Safe Browsing (GSB) because it
commonly used in browsers to prevent users from accessing malware sites. We checked
each URL on the download path for all downloads collected. It is important to note
that this evaluation was performed in the months following our data collection so it is
likely that the GSB results do not reflect the true detection rate since some malware
URLs may have been aged off the blacklist reducing detections. For the downloads
that are detected we use our label to determine if it is social engineering or benign.
If it is in the social engineering we determine its class.
Table 12: Google Safe Browsing detections by class.
Class Downloads Detections


















































Figure 15: WebSentry system overview.
class. All but one of these was fake flash with the other being fake java. The two
detections in the ad:repackage+entice class were for software offering to “scan your
PC for free” and “repair Window’s errors”. None of the downloads in any of the other
classes including benign were detected by GSB as malicious.
4.5 Detecting SE Malicious Downloads
Guided by the results of our study of in-the-wild SE malicious downloads, we develop
a system called WebSentry that aims to automatically detect the most prevalent types
of SE attacks. Specifically, it is designed to detect ad-driven attacks because more
than 80% of SE malicious downloads we observed in our study are the result of an ad
(see Table 7). WebSentry’s components and features are summarized in Figure 15.
The input to WebSentry is a download path. The download path is the sequence
of URLs traversed by the victim’s browser as the user navigated to the malware
download page. The download path is reconstructed as using WebWitness described
in the previous chapter.
Features are extracted from the download path for classification. They were se-
lected based on the measurements performed in Section 4.4.2 and are described next:
• Advertisement Predecessor. If the download path contains an ad, the value
is 1 otherwise it is 0. This feature is calculated by matching regular expressions
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automatically derived from the rules written for the popular AdBlock browser
extension against URLs on the download path. Intuition: most benign down-
loads are not the result of an ad, but they are used in the majority of SE
downloads. In fact, we measure our study data and find that less than 6% of
the “likely” benign downloads are the result of an ad.
• Download Domain Age. The number of days between the download and
the first time we observed the effective second level download domain resolve
in pDNS. Intuition: the vast majority of benign downloads are from domains
that have been active for a year or more because it takes time for a website to
establish itself and attract visitors. On the other hand, SE domains are often
young because they get blacklisted. Our study data shows that over 80% of the
comply and alarm class download domains are less than 1 year in age, but that
is true for less than 5% of the “likely” benign downloads.
• Minimum Ad Predecessor Domain Age. The minimum domain age for
an ad predecessor on the download path. We measure the age of each domain
on the ad path and use the minimum calculated age as the feature. Intuition:
ad networks that consistently direct users to malicious ads are often blacklisted
so they move to new domains. Minimum predecessor age is way of measuring
the reputation of the ad path. By measuring our study data we find that the
majority of ad paths for the comply, alarm and entice class all have domains
less than 1 year in age. This is true less than 5% of the “likely” benign class ad
based downloads.
• Download Domain Alexa Rank. The Alexa rank of the download domain.
We measure this features using the effective second level download domain and
the Alexa top 1 million list. Intuition: malicious executables are more likely
to be hosted on unpopular domains because they do not want to be detected
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and move domains when they are discovered. Also, we expect popular benign
downloads to be hosted on popular domains because they are popular. Mea-
surements on our study data show that over 60% of the benign downloads are
from domains with an Alexa rank of 100, 000 or below. The more malicious
social engineering downloads, such as those from the alarm class, are from very
unpopular domains (very few are even in the top 1 million). Whereas, social en-
gineering downloads that are typically PUPs (e.g., entice class) fall somewhere
between in terms of domain popularity.
• Maximum Ad Predecessor Popularity. The percentage of SE downloads
that share an ad predecessor with an identical effective second level domain.
Using the study data we count the number of downloads per domain for both
the SE and “likely” benign classes. For domains that are found in more than
1% of the downloads of at least one class, we store them in a lookup table. We
calculate this feature by checking the table with domains on the ad path. If
the domain is found and more than 1% of the “likely” benign downloads have
the domain, it is discarded. Otherwise, we store the SE download percentage.
The maximum is used for the feature. Intuition: there are some ad networks
are more abused than others due to policy and controls; thus, appear more
frequently in the download path of SE downloads. Table 10 in Section 4.4.2
shows popular ad entry points for SE downloads.
To construct the SE classifier we use Random Forest [37]. Random Forest is
an ensemble learning technique that uses many decision trees, each with a random
subset of features, for classification. This helps prevent overfitting that is common
for decision trees. We use Random Forest to predict the probability that a download
is malicious. This allows us to control the true and false positive rate by adjusting a
threshold.
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To detect SE downloads, WebSentry monitors live network traffic for executable
downloads. When one is discovered, the download path is extracted as described
in Section 4.2.1. The features discussed above are computed and input to the SE
classifier. The output is the probability that it is malicious. If it exceeds our threshold,
WebSentry alerts the user.
4.6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the efficacy of WebSentry in detecting SE downloads.
Using downloads collected in the months following our study and system development,
we explore classification, feature importance and model selection. In addition, we
examine adding a content feature and measure how well the system performs at
detecting new SE campaigns.
4.6.1 Ground Truth
To evaluate our SE malware classifier, we collected two separate datasets. The first
dataset, D1, which we use to train WebSentry, consists of malware downloads that
occurred during our study of in-the-wild SE malware attacks, as described in Sec-
tion 4.2. The second dataset, D2, consists of new SE malware downloads that were
collected from the same deployment network in the three months following the comple-
tion of our initial study (Section 4.2) and after the design of WebSentry was complete.
Namely, both the feature engineering and the training of WebSentry were completed
with no access to the data in D2. Therefore, we use D2 as test data to evaluate the
accuracy of WebSentry.
We label the download events in datasets D1 and D2 using the following labels:
1. Benign: This set consists benign executable downloads. To create it we col-
lected downloads from clusters that had no AV detections on the downloaded
executable. In addition, we sampled downloads from each AV clean cluster
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and manually analyzed the download path to confirm they were not malicious
downloads. This set forms our negative class and we use it to measure the false
positive rate of our classifier.
2. Ad-Based: This set consists of SE downloads where the user’s attention was
gained using an advertisement. However, we do exclude downloads from this set
that are in the ad:repackage+entice class that have a download domain where
the effective second level domain is one of the top five domains observed in our
study. We exclude these because more than 90% of the downloads in that class
are from one of those domains. Including them artificially raises the accuracy
of our classifier. Downloads from these domains are adware and, if desired, can
easily be detected and blocked using a blacklist. This set is our positive class
and we use to measure the true positive rate of our classifier.
3. Non-Ad-Based: This set consists of social engineering downloads that are
NOT in the Ad-Based set because the user’s attention was gained through a
search or web post. The social engineering classifier models social engineer-
ing downloads that use advertisements to get the user’s attention. Therefore,
this set is not part of the positive class; however, they are social engineering
downloads and we use this set to see how the classifier performs on them.
4. Entice: This set consists of downloads in the SE class ad:repackage+entice.
However, as discussed in the Ad-Based set description above, downloads in
the ad:repackage-entice class that have a download domain where the effective
second level domain is one of the top five domains observed in our study are
excluded. This is a subset of the Ad-Based set and is used to break the positive
class into specific classes of attacks.
5. Comply: Downloads that are ad:invent+impersonate+comply comprise this
set. This is a subset of the Ad-Based set and is used to break the positive class
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into specific classes of attacks.
6. Alarm: Downloads of the SE class ad:invent+impersonate+alarm form this
set. This is a subset of the Ad-Based set and is used to break the positive class
into specific classes of attacks.
4.6.2 SE Classification
WebSentry classifies downloads as social engineering or not using features from the
download path. The features used by the SE classifier are designed to identify ad
based SE downloads, which are responsible for more than 80% of the social engineering
downloads we observed in our study. For this part of the evaluation we use the
benign set for our negative class (NOT social engineering) and the ad-based set for
our positive class (social engineering). Table 13 reports the confusion matrix for the
social engineering classifier.
Table 13: Social Engineering Classifier - confusion matrix.
Predicted Class
Benign Ad-Based
Benign 9, 711 49
Ad-Based 63 655
The classifier correctly identified over 91% of the ad based SE downloads. Further-
more, it has a very low false positive rate of 0.5%. This results in 93% of all detections
being true positives even though there are 13 times more benign downloads. If we
run the social engineering classifier on the non-ad-based set, 37% are detected as
social engineering. The majority of these detections are due to very young download
domains (< 30 days old) and a predecessor domain popular with downloads in the
ad-based training set.
Table 14: Social Engineering Classifier - subclass performance.
True Positives False Negatives
Entice 63 (65%) 34 (35%)
Alarm 412 (98%) 9 (2%)
Comply 180 (90%) 20 (10%)
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Figure 14 shows the performance for the subclasses of the ad-based set. The
alarm and comply classes have 98% and 90% true positive rates respectfully. Both
classes perform very well and are close to the overall class performance of 93%. The
entice class, however, performs significantly below the overall classifier. The lower
performance is due to downloads of legitimate software from well established domains
that are bundling potentially-unwanted-programs (PUPs). There are many websites
that offer free legitimate software and use bundled PUPs to generate revenue. As
discussed in Section 4.6.1, we did not include downloads from the top five domains of
the ad:repackage-entice class in the entice set. PUP downloads from those domains
are responsible for over 90% of the PUP downloads and can be prevented by simply
blacklisting the domains.
4.6.3 Content Features
Unlike other attacks such as drive-by downloads, the filename in a social engineering
attack is an important component because it is shown to the user. Often, it plays a
role in the deception by using terms from the software the attack is imitating and at
a minimum it should not raise the user’s suspicion.










Table 15 shows the top 8 tokens in terms of download percentage extracted from
the filenames for comply, alarm and benign classes. Notice that popular tokens ex-
tracted from benign download filenames are very different from the two social engi-
neering classes. This holds for the vast majority of tokens that are common in more
than 1% of the observations. However, there is some overlap such as “setup”, which
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is found in all three classes. For the benign class “setup” is typically a component of
a larger filename such as “xxxxxxx-setup.exe”, whereas “setup.exe”, as can be seen
from Table 15, is a common filename for the two social engineering classes. Using a
simple filename like “setup.exe” helps to minimize user suspicion.
We also observe tokens from the social engineering filenames that aid in the decep-
tion like “java”, “flash” and “adobe”. For instance, if the user is told their flash player
is outdated having the terms “flash” and “adobe” in the filename aids in convincing
the user that the update is legitimate. We do not expect benign downloads to contain
tokens from popular software packages because they are not trying to appear to be
those packages. Specially, we only expect those names to appear in the filenames of
downloads from the vendors that distribute the software.
Before we can tokenize the filename we must extract it from the request. In HTTP,
the filename can appear in the path of the URL or the content-distribution header.
Once it is extracted we split it into tokens. First the filename is partitioned into
substrings by splitting on common separators such as “ ”, “-” and “.”. Next, for each
substring, we start with the first character and find the longest prefix consisting of
a minimum of two characters that matches a word in a large english dictionary. If
there is no match, we move to the next character and repeat the algorithm. When a
match is found the word is our token. On a match, one additional token is created for
characters preceding the match that are not part of any tokens. When the algorithm
reaches the end of a substring, all preceding characters that are not part of a token
become the finial one.
Once the tokens are extracted, we assign each a class popularity based on the
percentage of filenames the token appeared in a given class. All tokens that have
greater than a 1% popularity are saved for feature calculation. To calculate the
filename feature we tokenize the filename as described above then find the token with
the highest popularity for the social engineering class that is not in the benign set.
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The popularity of that token is the feature.
Table 16: Social Engineering Classifier + filename feature - confusion matrix.
Predicted Class
Benign Ad-Based
Benign 9, 709 51
Ad-Based 51 667
Table 16 shows the results of the social engineering classifier with the additional
filename feature. The true positive rate is 93%, which is almost a 2% improvement,
with only 2 additional false positives. We did not include this feature in the set defined
in Section 4.5 because we believe this feature is more evadable than the others because
the attacker has complete control over it, even through it often plays a role in the
deception.
Increasing the true positive performance by adding an additional feature is useful.
However, we do not want the classifier to perform poorly if the attacker attempts to
evade this feature. To determine the performance impact of filename feature evasion
on the classifier, we use the same training set, but modify the positive class in the
testing set to have popular filenames from the benign set. This resulted in a 3% drop in
classifier performance to 90%. This is 1% drop in performance when filename evasion
is used compared to not using the filename at all. Thus, to get the improvement of
having this feature without the potential evasion downside, we train two classifiers
– one with the filename feature and one without. If either classifier identifies a
download as social engineering, it is labeled as social engineering by WebSentry. We
do not believe having the two classifiers will greatly increase false positives because
the 49 downloads in Table 13 are a subset of the 51 downloads in Table 16.
4.6.4 SE New Campaign Detection
In this section, we evaluate WebSentry’s ability to detect downloads from new social
engineering campaigns versus new downloads from known campaigns. To separate
downloads into campaigns, we cluster them using the features and algorithm defined
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in Section 4.2.3. Based on the manual analysis we performed on the clusters during
our study, we believe they are a good approximation for campaigns. Therefore, we
treat each cluster as a unique campaign for our evaluation.
We define a social engineering campaign as new if it is not in our training set.
To evaluate WebSentry’s performance on downloads from new campaigns, we train n
classifiers where n is the total number of campaigns. Each classifier is trained using
downloads from all campaigns but the one that represents a new campaign. The
test set consists of downloads from the new campaign and the benign set that were
observed in the months following those in the training set.
Table 17: New campaigns.






Table 17 shows the true positive rate for the classifier trained on all campaigns ver-
sus leaving the testing campaign out of the training set. All, but Ad:Repackage+Entice,
perform well at finding new campaigns with only a minor or no decrease in perfor-
mance. The reason for the 45% decrease in performance for Ad:Repackage+Entice is
that the majority of downloads are for PUPs that are bundled with legitimate software
from well established domains. An important feature for classifying these downloads
is predecessor popularity. Removing the campaign from the training set removes the
predecessor domains between the first advertisement related HTTP transaction and
the download. This causes the lower performance for this class of social engineering
attacks. However, since new campaigns are much less common for this class since
























Figure 16: Feature importance using forward feature selection.
4.6.5 Feature Importance
We examine feature importance by performing forward feature selection. We begin
by training n classifiers (where n equals the number of features) each with a unique
single feature from our feature set. We evaluate each classifier on our test set and
keep the feature that performs the best. Then we train n− 1 classifiers with the best
performing feature from the previous step and one of the n − 1 remaining features.
Then the two features from the best performing classifier are retained and used in
the next iteration. This process continues until we run out of features or adding a
feature no longer improves performance. We measure classifier performance using
information gain with the top performing classifier having the highest score.
Figure 16 shows the true and false positive rates measured using forward feature
selection. The single feature that provides the largest information gain is download
domain age. Using only that feature we have a 69% true positive rate and a 6%
false positive rate. Notice that both the true positives and false positives continue





















Figure 17: ROC-curve of different models for the Social Engineering Classifier
achieve the performance of our classifier.
4.6.6 Model Selection
For model selection we use our ground truth with the benign set for our negative
class (NOT social engineering) and the ad-based set for our positive class (social
engineering). We train on data labeled during our study and test on data collected
in the months that followed. We evaluate four different models: random forest, k-
nearest neighbors, gaussian naive bayes and logistic regression. Figure 17 shows the
ROC-curve comparing the performance of the different models.
Random forest outperforms the other models when a false positive rate below 5%
is preferred. Both gaussian naive bayes and logistic regression perform better once
the false positive rate exceeds 8%. Due to a high base rate of benign downloads (93%
are benign), even a 5% false positive rate results in low precision. In fact, at 5% it is
only around a 50% chance that the download is social engineering. For these reasons,
we chose random forest for our model.
4.7 Discussion and System Limitations
Our study focused exclusively on social engineering (SE) attacks on the web that
result in a malicious download. We ignored SE attacks that occur over different
mediums (e.g., email) and ones that have other objectives such as phishing. This
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limited the types of the SE attacks we studied, but the narrower focus allowed us
to examine these attacks in detail. Furthermore, the download and installation of
malware offers the attacker many more options for monetization than simply steal-
ing information from the user. As our defenses for drive-by downloads continue to
improve, attackers will increase their use of SE attacks for malware distribution. By
narrowing the scope of our study we were able to focus our investigation on the tricks
and techniques used for SE malware downloads on the web.
Only a small percentage of the SE downloads collected during the study were
identified by AV as malware. The majority were adware or PUP. However, AV sig-
natures are far from perfect and we were very conservative with our labeling. For
instance, if a single AV identified the executable as adware or PUP we labeled it as
such even though others identified it as a trojan. Furthermore, 25% of the downloads
are still unlabeled due to lack of AV detection. Therefore, malware downloads are
likely under represented in our measurements. As far as the taxonomy and detection,
the SE techniques that deliver adware are identical to ones that result in malware;
therefore, apply equally well to both SE adware and malware downloads.
The executable downloads for the SE study were collected from a single network.
One could argue that this restricted visibility may result in missing classes of SE
attacks that are common on other networks that are in different industries or have a
different user demographic. Even though it was a single network, it was very large,
serving tens of thousands users, and diverse consisting of students, faculty and staff
of different ages, cultures and backgrounds. Furthermore, we designed our taxonomy
with enough abstraction that the specific tactics and details of an attack can change
without altering its classification. As for detection, WebSentry’s features are not
dependent on the deception and persuasion techniques of an attack, but rely on
components such as delivery, which are more difficult for the attacker to modify and
are common to many attack classes.
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For the SE study we presume an ad click to be caused by the user. Yet, we cannot
be certain since our observations are at the network level and not the host. However, it
seems unlikely that malicious software would be the cause of the clicks. For one thing,
we are not aware of any malicious software that updates itself or installs additional
malicious software using ads. Typically, these are hosted at specific URLs designated
for that purpose. Furthermore, it would be difficult for the malicious software to get
the correct ad shown to the user when visiting a site due to ad syndication. Also,
downloading malicious software by clicking on an ad provides no benefits. Software
updates are the most common download observed on the network so it is easy for
malicious updates to blend into the traffic. For these reasons, we believe that the
vast majority of downloads, most likely all of them, are due to a user clicking on the
ad not malicious software already on the victim’s machine.
Since WebSentry is designed to detect ad based SE downloads, an attacker could
evade the system by using search or a web post to get the user’s attention instead of an
advertisement. Ads, however, are popular with attackers because they can “publish”
their SE ad on a site that is already popular with the targeted victims. In addition,
ads are only shown to users that trigger their delivery thus reducing exposure that
could result in discovery.
Another way an attacker may try to evade the system is to host the executable
download on a free file sharing site. This could result in a download with an age > 1
year and a high Alexa score. However, the ad predecessor features “minimum age”
and “maximum popularity”, which are harder for the attacker to control, would be
unaffected. Therefore, it is likely the attack would still be detected. Also, simply
knowing that a download is due to an ad implies there is a 50% probability that
it is malicious. Furthermore, if hosting malicious downloads on free hosting sites
becomes popular then a feature “Free File Hosting” could be added to WebSentry –




4.8.1 Social Engineeing Taxonomies
Social engineering is an attack on the user not technology. The fundamental con-
cepts that are employed to exploit the user are rooted in modern psychology specif-
ically in the study of persuasion [43] and deception [127]. On the Internet these
techniques are applied across mediums such as email, instant messaging, social net-
works and websites. Several social engineering taxonomies have been proposed by
researchers [26, 66, 76, 77, 90, 91]. These taxonomies take a broad view of the entire
social engineering domain. Because of the large variance of techniques (e.g., phishing,
dumpster diving), tactics (e.g., fear, greed) and mediums (e.g, email, telephone) used
in social engineering attacks, these taxonomies are high level and place attacks in
large buckets. We created a categorization system for classifying social engineering
attacks on the web that result in a malware download. This is a much more restricted
domain and is at the level where most of the existing taxonomies end. By focusing
our categorization system on this subset, we are able to separate attacks into classes
specific enough to allow for the design of defenses that apply to all attacks within a
class, but are general enough so that different types of attacks (e.g., fake av, fake java
update, fake flash) that use similar methods are not separated.
4.8.2 Social Engineering Detection on the Web
Researchers have also examined specific types of social engineering attacks. Fake
AV has been a popular topic. The infrastructure and operations of fake AV were
studied in [123]. Mavrommatis et al [85] perform an empirical analysis of fake AV
to understand its prevalence, domain name characteristics and malware distribution.
In addition, researchers have developed systems to detect fake AV websites [49, 73].
In [73], they develop a web crawler that uses a classifier to detect fake AV websites.
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The features used by the system are primarily content based (e.g., image similarity,
content keyword) and take time to collect resulting in an average classification time of
36 seconds. Another system [52], trains a classifier to detect malicious trick banners
on a webpage using visual properties such as image size, color and placement. Our
work is different because it is a general approach to studying and developing defenses
for social engineering attacks on the web that result in a malicious download. It is not
limited to specific attack types such as fake AV and trick banners, but has broader
application and provides a higher level of attack abstraction.
MadTracer [81] uses features extracted from short segments of advertisement paths
collected through active crawling to detect malvertising including drive-by download,
scam and click-fraud. For its feature set it uses frequency of nodes, node roles, do-
main registration/expiration dates and URL similarity. Our work is different because
we study social engineering attacks on the web that result in a malicious download
not malvertising. Even though malvertising is commonly used in social engineering
attacks, that was not the focus of [81]. In fact, the only class of social engineering
download attack they detect and discuss is fake AV, which comprises less than 1% of
the attacks we discover.
4.9 Conclusion
We study SE attacks by collecting and labeling SE downloads on a live network.
From these labeled downloads, we created a categorization system that expresses
how attackers gain the user’s attention and trick them into downloading a malicious
executable. Also, by reconstructing the download path followed by SE victims, we
observe that a large fraction of SE attacks are delivered using malicious online ad-
vertisement served by low tier ad networks. Lastly, we construct WebSentry using
features inspired by our SE download path measurements. We show that WebSentry
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detects the vast majority of SE downloads and has a low false positive rate. Further-
more, the features are generic enough that it can detect new SE campaigns that are
not in its training set.
However, detecting and preventing malware downloads at the network level is
not a complete solution. Many hosts will already be infected at the time of the
defense deployment. Also, new infections should be expected because malware can
be delivered through other mediums, e.g., USB, and hosts will visit the network that
are not under the control of the organization, e.g., bring your own device. In the next
chapter, we develop a technique for detecting infected hosts on the network. Thus,
providing a more comprehensive solution for malware defense.
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CHAPTER V
EXECSCENT: MINING FOR NEW C&C DOMAINS IN
LIVE NETWORKS WITH ADAPTIVE CONTROL
PROTOCOL TEMPLATES
5.1 Introduction
Defense against the initial download is only a partial solution to the malware problem.
Hosts will continue to become infected either through other mediums or while visiting
insecure networks. Thus, a network malware defense system needs to both prevent
initial infections and detect hosts that are already infected. The previous chapters
focused on preventing infections that result from a malware download. This chapter
examines how to detect hosts already infected by learning the structure their C&C
protocol.
Code reuse is common practice in malware [69,75]. Often, new (polymorphic) mal-
ware releases are created by simply re-packaging previous samples, or by augmenting
previous versions with a few new functionalities. Moreover, it is not uncommon for
the source code of successful malware to be sold or leaked on underground forums,
and to be reused by other malware operators [55].
Most modern malware, especially botnets, consist of (at least) two fundamental
components: a client agent, which runs on victim machines, and a control server
application, which is administered by the malware owner. Because code reuse applies
to both components1, this naturally results in many different malware samples sharing
1For example, web-based malware control panels can be acquired in the Internet underground
markets and re-deployed essentially as is, while the client agents can be obtained using do-it-yourself
malware creation kits [47].
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a common command-and-control (C&C) protocol, even when control server instances
owned by different malware operators use different C&C domains and IPs.
In this chapter, we present ExecScent, a novel system that aims to mine new,
previously unknown C&C domain names from live enterprise network traffic (see
Figure 18). Starting from a seed list of known C&C communications and related
domain names found in malware-generated network traces, ExecScent aims to discover
new C&C domains by taking advantage of the commonalities in the C&C protocol
shared by different malware samples. More precisely, we refer to the C&C protocol
as the set of specifications implemented to enable the malware control application
logic, which is defined at a higher level of abstraction compared to the underlying
transport (e.g., TCP or UDP) or application (e.g., HTTP) protocols that facilitate
the C&C communications. ExecScent aims to automatically learn the unique traits
of a given C&C protocol from the seed of known C&C communications to derive
a control protocol template (CPT), which can in turn be deployed at the edge of a
network to detect traffic destined to new C&C domains.
ExecScent builds adaptive templates that also learn from the traffic profile of the
network where the templates are to be deployed. The goal is to generate hybrid
templates that can self-tune to each specific deployment scenario, thus yielding a
better trade-off between true and false positives for a given network environment.
The intuition is that different networks have different traffic profiles (e.g., the network
of a financial institution may generate very different traffic compared to a technology
company). It may therefore happen that a CPT could (by chance) raise a non-
negligible number of false positives in a given network, say NetA, while generating
true C&C domain detections and no false positives in other networks. We take a
pragmatic approach, aiming to automatically identify these cases and lowering the
“confidence” on that CPT only when it is deployed to NetA. This allows us to lower















Figure 18: ExecScent deployment overview. Adaptive control protocol templates
are learned from both malware-generated network traces and the live network traffic
observation. The obtained adaptive templates are matched against new network
traffic to discover new C&C domains.
other networks. We further motivate the use of adaptive templates in Section 5.3.
ExecScent focuses on HTTP-based C&C protocols, because studies have shown
that HTTP-based C&C communications are used by a large majority of malware
families [115] and almost all known mobile bots [133]. Moreover, many enterprise
networks employ strict egress filtering firewall rules that block all non-web traffic.
This forces malware that target enterprise networks to use HTTP (or HTTPS) as the
communication protocol of choice. It is also important to notice that many modern
enterprise networks deploy web proxies that enforce SSL man-in-the-middle2 (SSL-
MITM). Therefore, enterprise networks can apply ExecScent’s templates at the web
proxy level to discover new C&C domains even in cases of HTTPS-based C&C traffic.
In summary, we discuss the following in this chapter:
• We present ExecScent, a novel system for mining new malware C&C domains
from live networks. ExecScent automatically learns C&C traffic models that
can adapt to the deployment network’s traffic. This adaptive approach allows
us to greatly reduce the false positives while maintaining a high number of true
2See http://crypto.stanford.edu/ssl-mitm/, for example.
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positives. To the best of our knowledge, ExecScent is the first system to use
this type of adaptive C&C traffic models.
• We implemented a prototype version of ExecScent, and deployed it in three
different large networks for a period of two weeks. During the deployment,
we discovered many new, previously unknown C&C domains and hundreds of
new infected machines, compared to using a large up-to-date commercial C&C
domain blacklist.
• We deployed the new C&C domains mined by ExecScent to six large ISP net-
works, discovering more than 25,000 new infected machines.
5.2 System Overview
The primary goal of ExecScent is to generate control protocol templates (CPTs) from
a seed of known malware-generated HTTP-based C&C communications. We then use
these CPTs to identify new, previously unknown C&C domains.
ExecScent automatically finds common traits among the C&C protocol used by
different malware samples, and encodes these common traits into a set of CPTs.
Each template is labeled with the name of the malware family or (if known) criminal
operator associated with the C&C traffic from which the CPT is derived. Once a
CPT is deployed at the edge of a network (see Figure 18), any new HTTP(S) traffic
that matches the template is classified as C&C traffic. The domain names associated
with the matched traffic are then flagged as C&C domains, and attributed to the
malware family or operator with which the CPT was labeled.
Figure 19 presents an overview of the process used by ExecScent to generate and
label the CPTs. We briefly describe the role of the different system components in
this section, deferring the details to Section 5.4.
Given a large repository of malware-generated network traces, we first reconstruct























Figure 19: ExecScent system overview.
generalization process, in which (wherever possible) we replace some of the request
parameters (e.g., URL parameter values) with their data type and length, as shown
in the example in Figure 20. Notice that ExecScent considers the entire content of
the HTTP requests, not only the URLs (see Section 5.3.2), and the generalization
process is applied to different parts of the request header. The main motivation for
applying the generalization step is to improve the accuracy of the request clustering
process, in which we aim to group together malware-generated requests that follow a
similar C&C protocol.
Once the malware requests have been clustered, we apply a template learning
process in which we derive the CPTs. Essentially, a CPT summarizes the (generalized)
HTTP requests grouped in a cluster, and records a number of key properties such
as the structure of the URLs, the set of request headers, the IP addresses contacted
by the malware, etc. Furthermore, the templates associate a malware-family label to
each template (see Section 5.4.4 for details).
Before the templates are deployed in a network, we adapt the CPTs to the “back-
ground traffic” observed in that network. In particular, for each template component
(e.g., the generalized URL path, the user-agent string, the request header set, etc.),
we compute how frequently the component appeared in the deployment network.
CPT components that are “popular” in the background traffic will be assigned a
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lower “match confidence” for that network. On the other hand, components that
appear very infrequently (or not at all) in the traffic are assigned a higher confidence.
We refer to these “rare” components as having high specificity, with respect to the
deployment network’s traffic. The intuitions and motivations for this approach are
discussed in more detail in the next section.
After deployment, an HTTP request is labeled as C&C if it matches a CPT with
high similarity and specificity. That is, if the request closely matches a CPT and
the matching CPT components have high specificity (i.e., rarely appeared) in that
particular deployment network.
5.3 Approach Motivations and Intuitions
In this section, we discuss the intuitions that motivated us to build adaptive control
protocol templates. Furthermore, we discuss the advantages of considering the entire
content of C&C HTTP requests, rather than limiting ourselves to the URL strings,
as done in previous work [104,130].
5.3.1 Why Adaptive Templates?
As most other traffic models, ExecScent’s CPTs, which are derived from and therefore
can match C&C traffic, may be imperfect and could generate some false positives.
To minimize this risk, ExecScent builds adaptive control protocol templates that,
besides learning from known malware-generated C&C traffic, also learn from the
traffic observed in the network where the templates are being deployed. Our key
observation is that different enterprise networks have different traffic profiles. The
traffic generated by the computer network of a financial institute (e.g., a large bank)
may look quite different from traffic at a manufacturing company (e.g., a car producer)
or a technology company (e.g., a software-development company). It may therefore
happen that a CPT could (by chance) raise a non-negligible number of false positives
in a given network, say NetX , and several true detections with no or very few false
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positives in other networks. Intuitively, our objective is to automatically identify
these cases, and lower the “confidence” on that template when it matches traffic from
NetX , while keeping its confidence high when it is deployed elsewhere.
For example, assume NetB is a US bank whose hosts have rarely or never con-
tacted IPs located, say, in China. If an HTTP request towards an IP address in
China is found, this is by itself an anomalous event. Intuitively, if the request also
matches a CPT, our confidence on a correct match (true C&C communication) can
be fairly high. On the other hand, assume NetA is a car manufacturer with partners
in China, with which NetA’s hosts communicate frequently. If an HTTP request in
NetA matches a CPT but is directed towards an address within one of the IP ranges
of the manufacturer’s partners, our confidence on a correct match should be lowered.
More specifically, consider the following hypothetical scenario. Assume we have a
template τ that matches an HTTP request in both NetA and NetB with a similarity
score s. For simplicity, let us assume the score s is the same for both NetA’s traffic
and NetB’s traffic. Suppose also that the server’s IP (or it’s /24 prefix) associated
with the matching traffic is ipa for NetA and ipb for NetB. Also, suppose that ipa
is “popular” in network NetA, whereas ipb has very low popularity in NetB because
it has never been contacted by hosts in that network. Because ipa is very popular
in NetA, meaning that a large fraction (e.g., more than 50%) of the hosts in NetA
has contacted the domain in the past, it is likely that the template τ is fortuitously
matching benign traffic, thus potentially causing a large number of false positives
in NetA. On the other hand, because ipb has very low popularity in NetB, it is
more likely that the match is a true detection, or that in any case τ will generate
very few (potentially only one) false positives in NetB. Consequently, based on a
model of recent traffic observed in NetA and NetB, we should lower our confidence
in τ for the matches observed in NetA, but not for NetB. In other words, τ should
automatically adapt to NetA to “tune down” the false positives. At the same time,
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keeping the confidence in τ high for NetB means that we will still be able to detect
C&C communications that match τ , while keeping the risk of false positives low. We
generalize this approach to all other components of ExecScent’s templates (e.g, the
structure of the URLs, the user-agent strings, the other request headers, etc.), in
addition to the destination IPs.
Overall, our confidence on a match of template τ in a given network NetX will
depend on two factors:
• Similarity : a measure of how closely an HTTP request matches τ .
• Specificity : a measure of how specific (or rare) are the components of τ with
respect to NetX ’s traffic.
An HTTP request is labeled as C&C if it matches a CPT with both high similarity
and high specificity. We show in Section 5.5 that this approach outperforms C&C
models that do not take such specificity into account.
5.3.2 Why Consider All Request Content?
Malware C&C requests typically need to carry enough information for a malware
agent running on a victim to (loosely) authenticate itself with the C&C server. In-
tuitively, the C&C server wants to make sure that it is talking to one of its bots,
thus avoiding exposure of its true nature or functionalities to crawlers or security
researchers who may be probing the server as part of an investigation. This is often
achieved by using a specific set of parameter names and values that must be embed-
ded in the URL for the C&C requests to be successful. Previous work on automatic
URL signature generation has shown promising results in such cases [104,130]. How-
ever, some malware (e.g., TDL4 [27]) exchanges information with the C&C by first
encrypting it, encoding it (e.g., using base-64 encoding), and embedding it in the
URL path. Alternatively, identifier strings can also be embedded in fields such as
user-agent (e.g., some malware samples use their MD5 hash as user-agent name),
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encoded in other request headers (e.g., in the referrer), or in the body of POST
requests. Therefore, only considering URLs may not be enough to accurately model
C&C requests and detect new C&C domains, as supported by our experimental re-
sults (Section 5.5).
5.4 System Details
We now detail the internals of ExecScent. Please refer to Section 5.2 for a higher-level
overview of the entire system.
5.4.1 Input Network Traffic
As we mentioned in Section 5.1, ExecScent focuses on HTTP-based malware, namely
malware that leverage HTTP (or HTTPS) as a base network protocol on top of which
the malware control protocol is “transported”. To this end, ExecScent takes in as
input a feed of malware-generated HTTP traffic traces (in our evaluation, we use a
large set of malware traces provided to us by a well-known company that specializes
in malware defense).
It is worth remembering that while some malware may use HTTPS traffic as
a way to evade detection, this does not represent an insurmountable obstacle in
our deployment scenarios (see Figure 18). In fact, many enterprise networks, which
represent our target deployment environment, already deploy web proxy servers that
can perform SSL-MITM and can therefore forward the clear-text HTTP requests to
ExecScent’s template matching module, e.g., using the ICAP protocol (RFC 3507).
Also, malware samples that appear to be using HTTPS traffic may be re-analyzed
in a controlled environment that includes an SSL-MITM proxy interposed between
the (virtual) machine running the sample and the egress router. After all, HTTPS-
based malware that do not support or choose not to run when an SSL-MITM proxy
is present will also fail to run in enterprise networks that have a similar setting, and
are therefore of less interest.
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5.4.2 Request Generalization
As we discuss in the following sections, to obtain quality control protocol templates
we first need to group similar C&C requests. To this end, an appropriate similarity
metric needs to be defined before clustering algorithms can be applied. Previous
works that propose URL-centric clustering systems [104, 130] are mainly based on
string similarity measures. Essentially, two URLs are considered similar if they have
a small edit distance, or share a number of substrings (or tokens). However, these
systems do not take into account the fact that URLs often contain variables whose
similarity is better measured according to their data type rather than considering
specific sequences of characters. Consider the two hypothetical C&C requests in
Figure 20. Taken as they are (Figure 20a), their distance is relatively large, due to
the presence of several different characters in the strings. To avoid this, ExecScent
uses a set of heuristics to detect strings that represent data of a certain type, and
replaces them accordingly using a placeholder tag containing the data type and string
length (Figure 20b).
For example, we would identify “fa45e” as lowercase hexadecimal because it con-
tains numeric characters and the alphabetic characters are all valid lowercase hex-
adecimal digits. The data types we currently identify are integer, hexadecimal (upper,
lower and mixed case), base64 (standard and “URL safe”) and string (upper, lower
and mixed case). In addition, for integer, hexadecimal and string we can identify the
data type plus additional punctuation such as “:” or “.” (e.g., 192.168.1.1 would be
identified as a data type of integer+period of length 11). Furthermore, our heuristics
can easily be extended to support data types such as IP address, MAC address, MD5
hash and version number.
This generalization process allows us to define a better similarity metric (Sec-
tion 5.4.7), which is instrumental to obtaining higher quality C&C request clus-
























Figure 20: Example C&C requests: (a) original; (b) generalized.
strings, ExecScent takes the entire request into account. For example, in Figure 20
the user-agent strings are MD5s, and can be generalized by replacing the specific
MD5 strings with the appropriate data type and length information.
5.4.3 Request Clustering
Before extracting the templates, we group together similar C&C requests. This clus-
tering step simply aims to assist the automatic CPT generation algorithm, improving
efficiency and yielding templates that are at the same time generic enough to match
similar (but not identical) C&C communications in new traffic, and precise enough
to generate very few or no false positives.
We perform C&C request clustering in two phases. During the first phase, we
coarsely group C&C requests based on their destination IPs. Specifically, given two
C&C requests, we group them together if their destination IPs reside in /24 (or
class C) networks that share a DNS-based relationship. Namely, we consider two /24
networks as related if there exists at least one domain name that within the last 30
days resolved to different IP addresses residing in the two different networks. To find
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1) Median URL path: /<Base64;14>/cnc.php
2) URL query component: {v=<Int,3>, cc=<String;2>}
3) User Agent: {<Hex;32>}
4) Other headers: {(Host;13), (Accept-Encoding;8)}
5) Dst nets: {172.16.8.0/24, 10.10.4.0/24, 192.168.1.0/24}  
URL regex: GET /.*\?(cc|v)=
Background traffic profile:
specificity scores used to adapt the CPT 
to the deployment environment
Malware family: {Trojan-A, BotFamily-1} 
Figure 21: Example C&C requests: (a) original; (b) generalized.
such relationships, we rely on a large passive DNS database [53].
In the second phase, we consider one coarse-grained cluster at a time, and we
further group a cluster’s C&C requests according to a content similarity function.
We use an agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithm to group together C&C
requests within a coarse-grained cluster that carry similar generalized URLs, similar
user-agent strings, similar numbers of HTTP header fields and respective values,
etc. When measuring the similarity between two requests, we take into account both
the similarity and specificity of the requests’ content, where the specificity (or low
“popularity”) can be measured with respect to a dataset of traffic recently collected
from different networks (dashed arrow in Figure 19). For a more detailed definition of
the similarity function used in the clustering step, we refer the reader to Section 5.4.7.
5.4.4 Generating CPTs
Once C&C requests have been clustered, a control protocol template (CPT) is gener-
ated from each cluster. At this stage, we consider only clusters that contain at least
one HTTP request to a known C&C domain. Each template represents a summary of
all C&C requests in a cluster, and contains the following components, as also shown
in Figure 21:
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τ1) Median URL path: median path string that minimizes the sum of edit distances
from all URL paths in the requests (see [48] for a definition of median string).
Intuition: although the URL path may vary significantly from one malware
installation to another, we observed many cases in which there exist “stable”
path components that are unique to a specific malware family or operation.
τ2) URL query component : stores the set of parameter names, value types and
lengths observed in the query component [33] of each of the URLs. Intuition:
URL parameters are often used by malware to convey information about the
infected host, such as its OS version, a unique identifier for the infected machine,
etc.
τ3) User-agent : the set of all different (generalized) user-agent strings found in the
requests. Intuition: the user-agent is one of the most abused HTTP headers by
malware, and is sometimes used as a loose form of authentication.
τ4) Other headers : the set of other HTTP headers observed in the requests. For
each header, we also store the length of its value string. Intuition: the set of
header names, their order and values are sometimes unique to a malware family.
τ5) Dst. networks : the set of all destination /24 networks associated with the
C&C requests in the cluster. Intuition: in some cases, the C&C server may
be relocated to a new IP address within the same (possibly “bullet-proof”)
network.
• Malware family : the (set of) malware family name(s) associated to the known
C&C requests in the cluster.
In addition, each CPT includes the following deployment-related information:
• URL regex : to increase the efficiency of the template matching phase (Sec-
tion 5.4.6), each template includes a regular expression automatically generated
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from the set of URL strings in the requests. The URL regex is intentionally built
to be very generic and is used during deployment for the sole purpose of filtering
out traffic that is extremely unlikely to closely match the entire template, thus
reducing the cost of computing the similarity between HTTP requests in live
traffic and the template.
• Background traffic profile: information derived from the traffic observed in the
deployment environment within the past W days (where W is a system param-
eter). This is used for computing the specificity of the CPT components, thus
allowing us to adapt the CPT to the the deployment network, as explained in
detail in Section 5.4.5.
Notice that a CPT acts as the centroid for the cluster from which it was derived.
To determine if a new request is similar enough to a given cluster, we only need to
compare it with the CPT, rather than all of the clustered C&C requests. Therefore,
CPTs provide an efficient means of measuring the similarity of a new request to the
C&C protocol used by the clustered malware samples.
5.4.5 Adapting to a Deployment Network
As explained in Section 5.3.1, once the CPTs are deployed, an HTTP request is
labeled as C&C if it matches a CPT τ with both high similarity and specificity. To
this end, we first need to compute a specificity score for each element of the k-th
component τk of τ , which indicates how “unpopular” that element is with respect to
the traffic profile in the deployment network (notice that k = 1, . . . , 5, as shown in
Figure 21 and Section 5.4.4).
For example, to compute the specificity scores for τ3, we first compute a host-based
popularity score hpuai for each user-agent string uai in the set τ3. We consider the
number of hosts hnuai in the deployment network that generated an HTTP request
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containing uai during the last W days, where W is a configurable time-window pa-
rameter. We define hpuai =
hnuai
maxj{hnuaj }
, where the max is taken over all user-agent
strings uaj observed in the deployment network’s traffic. Similarly, we compute a
domain-based popularity score dpuai , based on the number of distinct destination do-




. The intuition is that a user-agent string can only be consid-
ered truly popular if it spans many hosts and domains. On the other hand, we do
not want to consider a uai as very popular if it has high host-based popularity (e.g.,
“Windows-Update-Agent”) but low domain-based popularity (e.g., because the only
domain on which it is used is microsoft.com). Finally, we define the specificity score
for uai as σ3,uai = 1 −min(hpuai , dpuai). In a similar way, we compute a specificity
score σ4,hdl for each header element hdl in τ4.
To compute the specificity scores for τ5, we simply compute the host-based pop-
ularity hpneti for each /24 network prefix neti ∈ τ5, and we define a separate score
σ5,neti = (1− hpneti) for each prefix.
5.4.5.1 URL Specificity
Computing the specificity of the components of a URL is more complex, due to the
large variety of unique URLs observed every day on a given network. To address
this problem, we rely on a supervised classification approach. First, given a dataset
of traffic collected from a large network, we extract all URLs, and learn a map of
URL word frequencies, where the “words” are extracted by tokenizing the URLs (e.g.,
extracting elements of the URL path, filename, query string, etc.). Then, given a new
URL, we translate it into a feature vector in which the statistical features measure
things such as the average frequency of single “words” in the tokenized URL, the
average frequency of word bigrams in the query parameters, the frequency of the file
name, etc. (to extract the frequency values for each word found in the URL we lookup
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the previously learned map of word frequencies).
After we translate a large set of “background traffic URLs” into feature vectors,
we train an SVM classifier [41] that can label new URLs as either popular or un-
popular. To prepare the training dataset we proceed as follows. We first rank the
“background URLs” according to their domain-based popularity (i.e., URLs that ap-
pear on requests to multiple sites on different domain names are considered as more
popular). Then, we take a sample of URLs from the top and from the bottom of this
ranking, which we label as popular and unpopular, respectively. We use this labeled
dataset to train the SVM classifier, and we rely on the max-margin approach used
by the SVM [45] to produce a model that can generalize to URLs not seen during
training.
During the operational phase (once the SVM classifier is trained and deployed),
given a URL ui, we can first translate ui into its corresponding feature vector vi, as
described above, and feed vi to the SVM classifier. The classifier can then label ui as
either popular or unpopular. In practice, though, rather than considering these class
labels, we only take into account the classification score (or confidence) associated
with the popular class3. Therefore, the SVM’s output can be interpreted as follows:
the higher the score, the more ui “looks like” a popular URL, when compared to the
large set of URLs observed in the background traffic. Finally, the specificity score for
the URL is computed as σui = 1− pui , where pui is the SVM output for URL ui.
Now, let us go back to consider the template τ and its URL-related components
τ1 and τ2 (see Figure 21). We first build a “median URL” um by concatenating the
median URL path (τ1) to the (sorted) set of generalized parameter names and values
(τ2). We then set the similarity scores σ1 = σ2 = σum , where σum is the specificity of
um.




Template matching happens in two phases. As mentioned above, each template con-
tains an URL regular expression automatically derived from the C&C requests in
a cluster. Given a new HTTP request r, to test whether this request matches a
template τ , we first match r’s URL to τ ’s URL regex. It is worth noting that, as
mentioned in Section 5.4.4, the URL regex is intentionally built to be very generic,
and is merely used to efficiently filter out traffic that is extremely unlikely to match
the entire template. Furthermore, we check if the destination IP of r resides within
any of the /24 prefixes in τ (specifically in component τ5). If neither the URL regex
nor the destination IP have a match, we assume r does not match τ . Otherwise,
we proceed by considering the entire content of request r, transforming r according
to the request generalization process (see Section 5.4.2), and measuring the overall
matching score S(r, τ) between the (generalized) request r and the template τ .
In summary, the score S is obtained by measuring the similarity between all the
components of the request r and the respective components of the template τ . These
similarity measures are then weighted according to their specificity, and the matching
score S(r, τ) is computed as the average of all weighted component similarities. A
detailed definition of the similarity functions and how specificity plays an explicit role
in computing S(r, τ) is given in Section 5.4.7.
If S(r, τ) exceeds a tunable detection threshold θ, then the request r will be deemed
a C&C request and the domain name associated with r (assuming r is not using a
hardcoded IP address) is classified as C&C domain and labeled with the malware
family associated to τ . Furthermore, the host from which the request r originated is
labeled as compromised with τ ’s malware family.
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5.4.7 Similarity Functions
5.4.7.1 CPT matching score
To determine if a new HTTP request r matches a CPT τ , we compute a matching
score S(r, τ) as follows:
S(r, τ) =
∑
k wk(sk, σk) · sk(rk, τk)∑
k wk(sk, σk)
· σd (1)
where sk is a similarity function that compares each element τk of τ (Section 5.4.4)
with its respective counterpart rk of r, and where wk is a dynamic weight (whose
definition is given below) that is a function of both the similarity sk and the specificity
σk of the k-th component of τ . The denominator scales S(r, τ) between zero and one.
The factor σd is the specificity of the destination domain d of request r, which is
computed as σd = 1− mdmaxi{mdi} , where md is the number of hosts in the deployment
network’s traffic that queried domain d, and maxi{mdi} is the number of hosts that
queried the most “popular” domain in the traffic. Accordingly, we use σd to decrease
the matching score S(r, τ) for low-specificity domains (i.e., domains queried by a large
number of hosts). The intuition is that infections of a specific malware family often
affect a relatively limited fraction of all hosts in an enterprise network, as most modern
malware propagate relatively “slowly” via drive-by downloads or social engineering
attacks. In turn, it is unlikely that a new C&C domain will be queried by a very
large fraction (e.g., > 50% ) of all hosts in the monitored network, within a limited
amount of time (e.g., one day).
In the following, we describe the details of the similarity functions sk(·) used in
Equation 1. In addition, we further detail how the specificity value of each component
is selected, once the value of sk(·) has been computed (for the definition of specificity,
we refer the reader to Section 5.4.5).
s1 - Given the path of the URL associated with r, we measure the normalized edit
distance between the path and the CPT’s median URL path τ1. The URL path
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specificity σ1 is computed as outlined in Section 5.4.5.
s2a - We measure the Jaccard similarity
4 between the set of parameter names in
the URL query-string of r and the set of names in τ2. The specificity of the
parameter names σ2a is equal to σ2 (see Section 5.4.5).
s2b - We compare the data types and lengths of the values in the generalized URL
query-string parameters (see Section 5.4.2). For each element of the query
string, we assign a score of one if its data type in r matches the data type
recorded in τ2. Furthermore, we compute the ratio between the value length in
r and in τ2. Finally, s2b is computed by averaging all these scores, whereby the
more data types and lengths that match, the higher the similarity score. As in
s2a, we set σ2b = σ2.
s3 - We compute the normalized edit distance between the (generalized) user-agent
string in r, and each of the strings in the set τ3. Let dm be the smallest of such
distances, where m is the closest of the template’s user-agent strings. We
define s3 = 1− dm, and set the specificity σ3 = σ3,m.
s4 - Given the remaining request header fields in r, we measure the similarity from
different perspectives. First, we compute the Jaccard similarity j between the
set of headers in r and the set τ4. Furthermore, we consider the order of the
headers as they appear in r and in the requests from which τ was derived. If
the order matches, we set a variable o = 1, otherwise we set o = 0. Finally, for
each header, we compare the ratio between the length of its value as it appears
in r and in τ5, respectively. The similarity s4 is defined as the average of all
these partial similarity scores (i.e., of j, o, and the length ratios). We set the
specificity score σ5 = minl{σ5,hdl}, where the hdl are the request headers.
4J = |A∩B||A∪B|
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s5 - Let ρ be the destination IP of request r. If ρ resides within any of the /24
network prefixes in τ5, we set s5 = 1, otherwise we assign s5 = 0. Assume ρ is
within prefix n ∈ τ5 (in which case s5 = 1). In this case, we set the specificity
σ5 = σ5,n.
The dynamic weights wk(·) are computed as follows:




(2− sk · σk)n
)
(2)
where ŵk is a static weight (i.e., it takes a fixed value), and n is a configuration
parameter. Notice that wk ∈ [ŵk(1 + 12n ), 2ŵk], and that these weights are effectively
normalized by the denominator of Equation 1, thus resulting in S(r, τ) ∈ [0, 1] (since
sk ∈ [0, 1],∀k, and σd ∈ [0, 1], by definition).
The intuition for the dynamic weights wk(·) is that we want to give higher weight
to components of a request r that match their respective counterpart in a CPT τ with
both high similarity and high specificity. In fact, the weight will be maximum when
both the similarity and specificity are equal to one, and will tend to the minimum
when either the similarity or specificity (or both) tend to zero.
In summary, similarity measures the likeness of two values, whereas specificity
measures their uniqueness in the underlying network traffic. The dynamic weights
allow us to highlight the rare structural elements that are common between a CPT
and a request, so that we can leverage them as the dominant features for detection.
Because rare structural elements differ in their importance across malware families,
by emphasizing these “unique features” we are able to detect and distinguish between
different malware families.
5.4.7.2 Similarity function for clustering phase
In Section 5.4.3, we have described the C&C request clustering process. In this
section we define the function used to compute the similarity between pairs of HTTP
requests, which is needed to perform the clustering.
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Given two HTTP requests r1 and r2, we compute their similarity using Equation 1.
At this point, the reader may notice that Equation 1 is defined to compare an HTTP
request to a CPT, rather than two requests. The reason why we can use Equation 1,
is that we can think of a request as a CPT derived from only one HTTP request.
Furthermore, if we want to include the specificity scores, which are used to make the
weights wk dynamic, we can use a dataset of traffic previously collected from one or
more networks (see dashed arrow in Figure 19).
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we describe the data used to evaluate ExecScent (Section 5.5.1), how
the system was setup to conduct the experiments (Section 5.5.2), and present the
experimental results in different live networks (Section 5.5.3). Furthermore, we quan-
tify the advantage of modeling entire HTTP requests, rather than only considering
URLs, and of using adaptive templates over “static” C&C models (Section 5.5.4). In
addition, we show the benefits obtained by deploying new C&C domains discovered
by ExecScent into large ISP networks (Section 5.5.5).
5.5.1 Evaluation Data
5.5.1.1 Malware Network Traces
We obtained access to a commercial feed of malware intelligence data (provided to us
by a well known security company), which we used to generate the control protocol
templates (CPTs). Through this feed, we collected about 8, 000 malware-generated
network traces per day that contained HTTP traffic. Each network trace was marked
with a hash of the malware executable that generated the network activity, and (if
known) by the related malware family name.
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5.5.1.2 Live Network Traffic
To evaluate ExecScent, we had access to the live traffic of three large production
networks, which we refer to as UNetA, UNetB, and FNet. Networks UNetA and
UNetB are two different academic networks based in the US, while FNet is the
computer network of a large North-American financial institution. Table 18 reports
statistics with respect to the network traffic observed in these three networks. For
example, in UNetA we observed an average of 7, 893 distinct active source IP addresses
per day. In average, these network hosts generated more than 34.8M HTTP requests
per day, destined to 149, 481 different domain names (in average, per day).
Table 18: Live network traffic statistics (avg. per day)
UNetA UNetB FNet
Distinct Src IPs 7, 893 27, 340 7, 091
HTTP Requests 34, 871, 003 66, 298, 395 58, 019, 718
Distinct Domains 149, 481 238, 014 113, 778
5.5.1.3 Ground Truth
To estimate true and false positives, we rely on the following data:
• CCBL: we obtained a large black-list containing hundreds of thousands of C&C
domains provided by a well known security company, which we refer to as
CCBL. It is worth noting that CCBL is different from most publicly available
domain black-lists for two reasons: 1) the C&C domains are carefully vetted
by professional threat analysts; 2) the domains are labeled with their respec-
tive malware families and, when available, a malware operator name (i.e., an
identifier for the cyber-criminal group that operates the C&C).
• ATWL: we derived a large white-list of benign domain names from Alexa’s top
1 million global domains list (alexa.com). From these 1M domains, we filtered
out domains that can be considered as effective top level domains5 (TLDs),
5http://publicsuffix.org
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such as domains related to dynamic DNS services (e.g., dyndns.org, no-ip.com,
etc.). Next, we discarded domains that have not been in the top 1M list for at
least 90% of the time during the entire past year. To this end, we collected an
updated top domains list every day for the past year, and only considered as
benign those domains that have consistently appeared in the top 1M domains
list. The purpose of this filtering process is to remove possible noise due to
malicious domains that may became popular for a limited amount of time.
After this pruning operations, we were left with about 450, 000 popular domain
names6.
• PKIP: we also maintain a list of parking IPs, PKIP. Namely, IP addresses
related to domain parking services (e.g., IPs pointed to by expired or unused
domains which have been temporarily taken over by a registrar). We use this
list to prune ExecScent’s templates. In fact, CPTs are automatically derived
from HTTP requests in malware-generated network traces that are labeled as
C&C communications due to their associated domain name being in the CCBL
list (Section 5.4). However, some of the domains in CCBL may be expired, and
could be currently pointing to a parking site. This may cause some of the HTTP
requests in the malware traces to be erroneously labeled as C&C requests, thus
introducing noise in ExecScent’s CPTs. We use the PKIP to filter out this
noise.
• Threat Analysis: clearly, it is not feasible to obtain complete ground truth about
all traffic crossing the perimeter of the live networks where we evaluated ExecS-
cent. To compensate for this and obtain a better estimate of the false and true
positives (compared to only using CCBL and ATWL), we performed an ex-
tensive manual analysis of our experimental results with the help of professional




To conduct our evaluation, we have implemented and deployed a Python-based proof-
of-concept version of ExecScent. In this section we discuss how we prepared the
system for live network deployment.
5.5.2.1 Clustering Parameters
As discussed in Section 5.4.3, to generate the CPTs, we first apply a request clustering
step. The main purpose of this step is to improve the efficiency of the CPT learning
process. The clustering phase relies on a hierarchical clustering algorithm that takes
in as input the height at which the dendrogram (i.e., the “distance tree” generated by
the clustering algorithm) needs to be cut to partition the HTTP requests into request
clusters.
To select the dendrogram cut height, we proceeded as follows. We considered
one day of malware traces collected from our malware intelligence feed (about 8,000
different malware traces). We then applied the clustering process to these traces, and
produced different clustering results by cutting the dendrogram at different hights.
For each of these different clustering results, we extracted the related set of CPTs, and
we tested these CPTs over the next day of malware traces from our feed with varying
matching thresholds. The obtained number of false positives, i.e., misclassified benign
domains (measured using ATWL), and true positives, i.e., new correctly classified
C&C domains (measured using CCBL), are summarized in Figure 22 and Figure 23,
respectively. Notice that although in this phase we tested the CPTs over malware-
generated network traces, we can still have false positives due to the fact that some
malware query numerous benign domain names, along with C&C domains.
As Figures 22 and 23 show, per each fixed CPT matching threshold, varying
the dendrogram cut height does not significantly change the false positives and true
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Figure 22: Effect of the dendrogram cut height (FPs).
positives. In other words, the CPT matching results are not very sensitive to the
specific value of the clustering parameter. We decided to finally set the value of
the cut hight to 0.38, which we use during all remaining experiments, because this
provided good efficiency during the CPT generation process, while maintaining high
CPT quality.
5.5.2.2 CPT Generation
To generate the CPTs used for the evaluation of ExecScent on live network traffic
(Section 5.5.3), we initially used two weeks of malware traces collected from our
malware intelligence feed. To label the seed of C&C HTTP requests in the malware
traces, we used the CCBL black-list. We also use the list of parking IPs PKIP to
prune CPTs related to parked C&C domains, as mentioned in Section 5.5.1.3. Once
this initial set of CPTs was deployed, we continued to collect new malware traces
from the feed, and updated the CPT set daily by adding new CPTs derived from the
additional malware traces. More precisely, let D1 be the day when the initial set of
CPTs was first deployed in a live network, and let C1 be this initial CPT set. C1 is
generated from the malware traces collected during a two-week period immediately
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Figure 23: Effect of the dendrogram cut height (TPs).
before day D1. The CPTs set C1 was then used to detect new C&C domains during
the entire day D1. At the same time, during D1 we generated additional CPTs from
the malware traces collected on that day, and added them to set C1. Therefore, at
the end of day D1 we had an expanded set C2 of CPTs, which we deployed on day
D2, and so on. At the end of the deployment period we had just over 4, 000 distinct
CPTs.
To adapt the CPTs to the traffic of each deployment network (see Section 5.4.5),
we proceeded in a similar way. We built a background traffic profile based on all
HTTP traffic observed at each deployment network during the two days immediately
before day D1, and used this profile to adapt the initial set of CPTs C1. Then, every
day we updated the traffic profile statistics based on the new live traffic observed on
that day, and used this information to further adapt all the CPTs. Notice that the
set of CPTs deployed to different networks are different, in that they adapt differently
to each deployment network (using that network’s background traffic profile).
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Table 19: Live network results over a two-week deployment period
UNetA UNetB FNet
Detection Threshold .62 .65 .73 .84 .62 .65 .73 .84 .62 .65 .73 .84
All C&C Domains 68 66 46 25 36 32 24 10 2 2 2 1
New C&C Domains 35 34 26 13 21 18 15 4 2 2 2 1
Distinct Malware Families 17 17 14 8 14 12 10 4 1 1 1 1
Number of Infected Hosts 114 105 98 37 185 150 147 21 7 7 7 7
Number of New Infected Hosts 91 90 86 25 145 135 133 11 7 7 7 7
FP Domains 133 118 114 0 152 117 105 0 109 63 49 0
FP Domains (reduced CPT set) 25 13 10 0 40 26 22 0 30 23 16 0
5.5.3 Live Network Deployment Results
To evaluate ExecScent, we deployed it in three different large networks, UNetA,
UNetB, and FNet, for a period of two weeks. We generated the set of adaptive
CPTs as explained above (Section 5.5.2.2), using a total of four weeks of malware-
generated network traces (two weeks before deployment, plus daily updates during
the two-week deployment period). The CPT matching engine was deployed at the
edge of each network.
The detection phase proceeded as follows. For each network, we logged all HTTP
requests that matched any of the adapted CPTs with a matching score S ≥ 0.5, along
with information such as the destination IP address of the request, the related domain
name, the source IP address of the host that generated the request, and the actual
value of the score S. This allowed us to compute the trade-off between the number of
true and false positives for varying values of the detection threshold θ. Specifically,
let h be a request whose matching score Sh is above the detection threshold θ, and
let d be the domain name related to h. Consequently, we label h as a C&C request,
and classify d as a C&C domain. We then rely on the CCBL and ATWL lists and
on manual analysis (with the help of professional threat analysis) to confirm whether
the detection of d represents a true positive, i.e., if d is in fact a C&C domain, or a
false positive, in which case d is not a C&C domain.
Figure 24 summarizes the overall number of true positives and false positives ob-
tained during the two-week deployment period over the three different live networks,
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Figure 24: CPT detection results for varying detection thresholds.
while Table 19 shows a breakdown of the results on the different networks for a set of
representative detection thresholds. For example, in Table 19, consider UNetA with
a detection threshold of 0.65. During the two-week deployment period, we detected
a total of 66 C&C domains, of which 34 are new, previously unknown C&C domains
that were not present in our commercial black-list, CCBL. The 66 C&C domains
were related to 17 distinct malware families. Overall, we detected 105 infected hosts,
90 of which were new infections related to the 34 previously unknown C&C domains.
This means that 90 (' 86%) of the infected hosts could not be detected by simply
relying on the CCBL black-list.
The CPTs generated 118 false positives, namely domain names that we misclas-
sified as C&C domains. We noticed that most of these false positives were generated
by only two CPTs (the same two CPTs generated most false positives in all net-
works). By subtracting the false positives due to these two “noisy” CPTs, we were
left with only 13 false positives, as shown in the last row of Table 19. The false posi-
tives marked with “reduced CPT set” in Figure 24 are also related to results without
these two CPTs. Overall, within the entire two-week test period ExecScent generated
a quite manageable number of false positives, in that a professional threat analyst
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could analyze and filter out the false C&C domains in a matter of hours.
Notice that the low number (only two) of new C&C domains found in the FNet
network was expected. In fact, FNet is a very sensitive financial institution, where
many layers of network security mechanisms are already in use to prevent malware
infections. However, our findings confirm that even well guarded networks remain
vulnerable.
5.5.3.1 Pushdo Downloader
It is worth clarifying that all results reported in Figure 24 and Table 19 have been ob-
tained after discounting the domains detected through a single CPT that was causing
hundreds of misclassifications. Through a manual investigation, we easily found that
ExecScent had correctly learned this CPT, which actually models the HTTP-based
C&C communications of a Pushdo downloader variant [122]. This particular variant
purposely replicates its C&C requests, and sends them to a large number of decoy
benign domain names. The malware does this to try to hide the true C&C domain
in plain sight, among a large set of benign domains. However, while this makes it
somewhat harder to find the true C&C among hundreds or even thousands of benign
domains (which requires some manual analysis effort), it makes it very easy to identify
the fact that the source hosts of these requests, which matched our Pushdo CPT,
are infected with that specific malware variant.
5.5.3.2 UNetB Deployment Results
The results we obtained for the UNetB deployment have been obtained in a slightly
different way, compared to UNetA and FNet. Because of the higher volume of
traffic in UNetB our proof-of-concept implementation of the CPT match engine
could not easily keep pace with the traffic. This was due especially to the fact that
our match engine software was sharing hardware resources with other production
software that have to be given a much higher priority. A few weeks after conducting
123
the experiments reported here, we implemented an optimized version (written in C,
rather than Python) that is almost 8x faster; thus, it can easily keep up with the
traffic on UNetB.
To compensate for the performance problems of our prototype implementation,
during the two-week deployment period we only considered the traffic for every other
day. That is, we only matched the CPTs over about seven days of traffic in UNetB,
effectively cutting in half the traffic volume processed by ExecScent.
5.5.4 “Static” and URL-Only Models
In this section we compare the results of ExecScent’s adaptive templates, to “static”
(i.e., non-adaptive) templates, which only learn from malware-generated traces and do
not take into account the traffic profile of the deployment network, and to URL-based
C&C request models, which only use information extracted from URLs.
To obtain the “static” models, we simply took ExecScent’s CPTs and “turned off”
the specificity parameters. In other words, we set the specificity scores in Equation 1
to zero (with the exception of σd, which is set to one), essentially turning the dynamic
waits wk into their static counterparts ŵk (see Section 5.4.7). In the following, we
refer to these static (non-adaptive) templates as “Specificitiy-Off” models.
To obtain the URL-based models, again we “turn-off” the specificity information,
and also ignore all components of ExecScent’s CPT apart from URL-related compo-
nents. Effectively, in Equation 1 we only use the similarity functions s1, s2a, and s2b
defined in Section 5.4.7. We refer to these templates as “URL-Only” models.
To perform a comparison, we deployed the ExecScent CPTs and their related
“Specificity-Off” and “URL-Only” models to UNetA, UNetB, and FNet for a
period of 4 days. Figure 25 and 26 summarize the overall true and false positives,
respectively, obtained by varying the detection threshold θ ∈ [0.6, 1]. As can be seen
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Figure 25: Comparing C&C models - true positives
from the figures, ExecScent’s adaptive templates outperform the two alternative mod-
els, for detection thresholds θ < 0.85. Unless we are willing to sacrifice a large fraction
of all true positives, compared to the numbers obtained at θ = 0.6, the “Specificity-
Off” and “URL-Only” models will generate a very large, likely unsustainable, number
of false positives (notice the log scale on the y axes of Figure 26).
5.5.5 Deployment in ISP Networks
We were also able to evaluate the results of ExecScent over six large ISP networks serv-
ing several million hosts. We proceeded as follows: given 65 new C&C domains dis-
covered by ExecScent during the live network deployment described in Section 5.5.3,
we deployed the domains to the six ISPs for an entire week, during which we moni-
tored all DNS traffic. Each day, we counted the number of distinct source IP addresses
that queried any of the 65 C&C domains. We found a maximum of 25,584 of distinct
source IPs that in any given day queried these C&C domains. In other words, the new
C&C domains discovered by ExecScent allowed us to identify 25,584 new potential
malware infections across the six ISP networks.
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Figure 26: Comparing C&C models - false positives
5.6 Limitations
An attacker who gains knowledge of how ExecScent works may try to avoid detection
by mutating her botnet’s C&C protocol every time the C&C server is relocated to
a new domain. One possible approach would be to implement a new protocol that
can be deployed on all the clients (i.e., malware agents) and servers (i.e., malware
controllers) before switching to the new domain. However, this would substantially
increase the complexity of managing the botnet and hurt its agility. Furthermore, for
moderate to large botnets the updates would take time to deploy and a mistake in
the update procedure could result in losing parts of or the entire botnet.
Another evasion approach may consist in injecting noise into the C&C protocol to
make it appear “different”. For example, an attacker may randomly generate the C&C
URL path or name-value pairs in the query-string, when making a request. However,
if a malware agent needs to convey enough information to (loosely) authenticate
itself to the C&C server, then at least one request component must have some form
of “structured” data. Since ExecScent measures similarity by protocol structure and
gives more weight to the shared unique components, it is non-trivial for an attacker
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to avoid detection on all deployment networks. In fact, several malware families we
detect during our evaluation of ExecScent use such types of techniques to try to avoid
detection via regular expressions.
An attacker may also try to “mislead” the detector by injecting noise into the
domain name matches. For instance, an attacker may send requests to many decoy
benign domains using the same malware C&C requests sent to the true C&C server.
This is the approach used by the Pushdo malware variant we discovered during our
evaluation. This type of noisy malware is actually easy to identify, because of the
number of unique destination domains contacted by a single host that match one
particular CPT within a short period of time. Thus, detecting the infected hosts is
easy. However, this makes it somewhat more difficult to determine the true C&C
domains among all other domains. In this case, a threat analyst must review the
domains, before they can be added to a blacklist; but at the same time, a security
administrator can be immediately alerted regarding the infected hosts, thus enabling
a prompt remediation.
Blending into the background traffic is another technique that may be used to
avoid detection. For example, an attacker may choose “common” data types and
values for their C&C protocol components. For some components such as the URL
path it may be easy to select a popular value (e.g., “index.html”). However for
many of the components, the “commonality” is relative to the deployment network’s
traffic profile. Therefore, an attacker would need to customize the protocol based on
the infected machine’s network. This may be difficult to do, because most network
hosts have limited or no visibility into the traffic produced by other hosts in the
same network. Therefore, although a C&C protocol may carry some “common”
components, ExecScent’s adaptive CPTs may still be able to use those components
that are specific (i.e., non-popular) in the deployment network to detect the C&C
requests.
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Finally, ExecScent’s CPTs depends on the malware traces and labeled C&C re-
quests from which they are derived. Thus, ExecScent requires at least one or a few
malware samples from a malware family, before its C&C protocol can be modeled and
detected. In this case, though, malware code reuse plays to our advantage. A few
samples of a malware family whose code has been reused elsewhere (because it was
sold or leaked) will in fact facilitate the detection of future malware strains. Note that
ExecScent in principle requires only a single sample to generate a CPT, thanks in
particular to the request generalization process (Section 5.4.2). That being said, the
quality of a CPT can be significantly improved when more than one sample sharing
the same C&C protocol are available.
5.7 Related Work
Grouping malware based on features extracted from HTTP requests has beed stud-
ied for example in [38, 102, 104, 109]. Specifically, Perdisci et al. [102, 104] proposed
a system for clustering malware samples that request similar sets of URLs. In addi-
tion, token-subsequences are extracted from the URLs, and used to detect infected
hosts on live networks. In [38], information about HTTP request methods and URL
parameters are used to cluster similar malware samples. The authors describe their
clustering technique as a manual process and mention replacing it with an automated
system in the future.
A recently proposed system FRIMA [109] clusters malware samples into families
based on protocol features (e.g., same URL path) and for each family creates a set of
network signatures. The network signatures are token-sets created from byte strings
that are common to a large percentage of the network traffic within a cluster. To
reduce false positives, network signatures are pruned by removing the ones that match
any communication in the authors’ benign traffic pool.
Automated network signature generation has also been studied for detecting worms
128
[74,98,119]. The generated signatures typically consist of fixed strings or token subse-
quences that can be deployed in an intrusion detection system. AutoRE [130] extends
the automated signature generation process to produce regular expressions that can
be used to match URLs in emails for the purpose of detecting spam emails and group
them into spam campaigns.
Our work focuses on automatic template generation for detecting C&C communi-
cations and attributing them to a known malware family. In particular, our main focus
is not on clustering malware samples per se. Rather, we apply clustering techniques
mainly as an optimization step to generate high quality control protocol templates.
Furthermore, we do not limit ourselves to only considering URLs or to extracting sets
of common tokens. More importantly, our C&C templates are adaptive, in that they
learn from the traffic of the network where they are to be deployed, thus self-tuning
and automatically yielding a better trade-off between true and false positives.
Jackstraws [67], executes malware in an instrumented sandbox [54] to generate
behavior graphs of the system calls related to network communications. These system-
level behavior graphs are then compared to C&C graph templates to find new C&C
communications. ExecScent is different because it relies only on network information,
and does not require malware to be executed in an instrumented sandbox (e.g., it
can use traces collected from “bare metal” execution or live networks) to learn the
templates. Furthermore, unlike Jackstraws [67], ExecScent learns adaptive templates,
which allow us to identify new C&C domains in live networks.
5.8 Conclusion
We presented ExecScent, a novel system that can discover new C&C domain names in
live enterprise network traffic. ExecScent learns adaptive control protocol templates
(CPTs) from both examples of known C&C communications and the “background
traffic” of the network where the templates are to be deployed, yielding a better
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trade-off between true and false positives for a given network environment.
We deployed a prototype version of ExecScent in three large networks for a period
of two weeks, discovering many new C&C domains and hundreds of new infected
machines, compared to using a large up-to-date commercial C&C domain blacklist.
We also compared ExecScent’s adaptive templates to “static” (non-adaptive) C&C
traffic models. Our results show that ExecScent outperforms models that do not take
the deployment network’s traffic into account. Furthermore, we deployed the new
C&C domains we discovered using ExecScent to six large ISP networks, finding over
25,000 new malware-infected machines.
In this and the previous two chapters we explored detection and defense solutions
for malware downloads and infections. All of the techniques we discussed rely on
deep packet inspection (DPI). The compute resources required by DPI grow with the
size of the network and exceed that of single CPU even on small enterprise networks.
To scale DPI it must be multithreaded and concurrently process traffic. However,
not all packets can be processed concurrently and the way they are scheduled can
significantly impact performance. In the next chapter we examine packet scheduling




PACKET SCHEDULING FOR DEEP PACKET
INSPECTION ON MULTI-CORE ARCHITECTURES
6.1 Introduction
Deep packet inspection (DPI) is the process of examining the non-header content
of a packet by a system that is not an endpoint in the communication. Most DPI
systems reconstruct communication streams and maintain state information for large
numbers of concurrent connections. When a packet arrives each layer is fully parsed
and inspected. State information associated with the communication stream at each
layer is updated and stored. All of this work requires many CPU cycles. Fortunately,
the work is highly parallelizable; therefore, multi-core architectures can be used to
increase the available CPU cycles. So, that raises the question of how packets should
be scheduled on a multi-core platform. In this chapter we explore this question us-
ing the Protocol Analysis Module (PAM) as our DPI system. The DPI processing
performed by PAM is a necessary component of WebWitness, WebSentry and Ex-
ecScent described in the previous chapters. Thus, a scheduler that maximizes PAM
performance will have a significant impact on the performance of these systems.
PAM [18,19,56,131] is a multithreaded DPI software application that fully parses
all protocol layers and emulates the state transitions of both the client and server at
each layer. A PAM thread can process the link, internet, and transport layers of any
packet in parallel with any other packet. However, at the application layer not all
packets can be processed in parallel. For TCP based protocols, packets on the same
flow must be processed serially. In fact, TCP segments on a flow must be processed in
sequence order because of the way PAM emulates the state transitions of client and
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server applications, which is necessary for reconstructing HTTP transactions required
by the systems described in this thesis. In addition, a small number of UDP based
protocols must be processed serially as well and in application layer sequence order
because they implement sessions at the application layer. However, the majority of
UDP packets and other protocols can be processed in parallel.
In this chapter we perform the following:
• Design and implement two new DPI packet scheduling algorithms. One is de-
signed to maximize work balance and the other cache affinity.
• Compare our two packet scheduling algorithms against a packet scheduling al-
gorithm commonly used in network applications.
• Demonstrate that scheduling packets for cache affinity is more important than
balancing the work load. In fact, for one of the network captures we used in our
evaluation, scheduling packets for cache affinity improved throughput by 38%.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents re-
lated work. In Section 6.3, we describe the packet scheduling algorithms we designed,
implemented, and evaluated. In Section 6.4, we explain our testing methodology and
present the results. In Section 6.5, the chapter is concluded.
6.2 Related Work
Packet distribution, load balancing, and scheduling are the terms typically used for the
process of assigning a packet to a resource that will perform work on it (in this chapter
these terms are used interchangeably). Packet scheduling occurs at many places on the
network. Packets are scheduled on physical links for multi-path routing [84], physical
links for link aggregation [17], distributed network processors for high-speed links [51],
forwarding engines for parallel forwarding [116–118], transactions for cluster-based
Internet services [79], and L7-filter threads for QoS [20, 61, 62]. Although the work
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being scheduled varies widely, many of the concepts and techniques can be applied
across the packet scheduling domain.
6.2.1 Packet Scheduling Overview
6.2.1.1 Packet Based Scheduling
In packet based scheduling, packets are assigned to resources on a packet-by-packet
basis. Round-robin is an example of a simple packet based scheduling algorithm.
More complex algorithms assign packets to the least loaded resource (e.g., the resource
with the smallest number of outstanding bytes to process). Packet based scheduling
does a good job of balancing the load across resources. However, packet reordering
can occur and impact network performance. In addition, packet based scheduling
in shared memory systems can be cache inefficient resulting in reduced performance.
Packet based scheduling algorithms are commonly found as a scheduling option in
network devices and processors.
6.2.1.2 Flow Based Scheduling
Flow based scheduling [62] maintains a table of active flows where each flow is asso-
ciated with a resource. Packets are mapped to flows and scheduled on the resource
associated with their flow. New flows are assigned to the least loaded resource. Since
all packets on the same flow are assigned to the same resource, per flow packet order is
maintained. Also, it is cache efficient for the same reason. There are a few drawbacks
to this method. First, a table of active flows must be maintained. This table can
require a large amount of memory when there are many active flows. In addition, it
can take a significant number of clock cycles to perform the lookup. Finally, flows
are not equal in the number of packets, bytes, and processing associated with them.
Thus, it is difficult to assign new flows to resources so that the work is balanced.
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6.2.1.3 Fixed Hash Scheduling
Direct hash and indirect hash [40] are the two most common fixed hash scheduling
algorithms. Direct hash applies a hash function to a subset of the 5-tuple and uses the
result modulo the number of resources to determine the resource assignment. Indirect
hash uses the result of the hash function modulo the size of the indirection table as
an index into it. Each bin in the indirection table is associated with a resource and
packets that map to a bin are processed by that resource. Indirect hash allows for
unequal resource weights and the indirection table can be tuned for adaptive hash
scheduling. For fixed hash scheduling, packets with the same 5-tuple hash to the
same value; so, they are assigned to the same resource. Therefore, per flow packet
ordering is maintained and it is cache efficient. In addition, it is stateless since there
is no table to maintain. The downside to this method is lack of control over resource
assignment and this can result in load imbalances. Fixed hash scheduling algorithms
are commonly found as a scheduling option in network devices and processors.
6.2.1.4 Adaptive Hash Scheduling
Adaptive hash scheduling [11,61,84,116] attempts to combine the simplicity of fixed
hash scheduling with the ability to change the resource assignment when the load is
imbalanced. Receive-side scaling (RSS) [11] is an adaptive hash scheduling algorithm
used to balance packets arriving on a network adapter to CPUs. RSS uses indirect
hashing to schedule packets. When a load imbalance is detected, the host protocol
stack tries to balance the traffic by calculating a new indirection table. The authors of
[84] describe and evaluate several adaptive indirect hashing algorithms for multi-path
routing. Adaptive hash scheduling can improve fixed hash scheduling load imbalances.
However, it adds overhead and the adjustments are reactive typically occurring after
the network has been impacted.
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6.2.1.5 Flow Burst Scheduling
Flow burst scheduling [51, 71, 118] tries to combine the workload balance of packet
based scheduling with the cache affinity and per flow packet ordering of flow based
scheduling. As in flow based scheduling, a flow table is maintained; however, it only
needs to contain flows that have packets in the system. A flow entry contains the
number of packets currently in the system or a timestamp of the last packet that
mapped to that flow. When a packet arrives it is mapped to a flow entry using a
subset of the 5-tuple. If flow entry exists and there are packets in the system on
that flow, the packet is assigned to the resource processing the other packets. On the
other hand, if the flow entry does not exist or there are no packets in the system on
that flow, the packet is assigned to the least loaded resource. Since all packets on the
same flow in the system at the same time are processed by the same resource, it is
cache efficient and per-flow packet ordering is maintained. Also, the balance of the
work is better than flow based scheduling because flows are not fixed to a resource
and can be reassigned between packet bursts. However, maintaining the flow entries
can be expensive and imbalances can still occur.
6.2.2 Packet Scheduling For DPI
Most of the packet schedulers in the literature are designed for applications that are
not as complex as DPI. The information used to make scheduling decisions for those
applications typically does not apply to DPI. For instance, the number of packets
or bytes enqueued to a thread. The applications in the literature essentially have a
fixed processing time per packet or byte. In contrast, the number of instructions PAM
needs to process a packet or byte varies dramatically depending on the protocol and its
attributes. For example, a packet with an application layer protocol that PAM does
not recognize may require 600 clock cycles to classify; whereas, an identically sized
HTTP packet with compressed content may require 30,000 clock cycles to inspect.
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Thus, it is difficult to determine the amount of work assigned to a PAM thread when
making a scheduling decision.
Maintaining per-flow packet order on egress is an important feature of most packet
schedulers. This is because they were designed for inline devices and packet reordering
within a flow can have a negative impact on the performance of the network. This
is due to the fact that reordering packets within a TCP flow can result in duplicate
data segment transmissions, a reduced data transmission rate, and burstiness [32,35].
Requiring per flow packet order on egress does not always mean that packets cannot
be processed out-of-order. There are systems that restore per flow packet order on
egress [57]. Also, per flow packet ordering at egress is only important for systems that
are inline and DPI systems are not always deployed inline. However, inline or not,
PAM requires that TCP segments be processed in sequence order. If PAM receives a
TCP segment out-of-order it saves a copy until the missing segments arrive. This can
impact performance when a large number of TCP segments are received out-of-order.
So, maintaining per flow packet ordering for packet processing can improve PAMs
performance by reducing the number of TCP segment that must be saved.
As for the multithreaded state of other DPI systems, Snort 3.0 [14, 114] is cur-
rently available in beta for download. It supports a multithreaded execution model
that allows multiple analysis engines to operate on the same traffic simultaneously.
Therefore, unlike PAM it does not utilize packet and connection level parallelism.
In the case of Bro [101], a multithreaded version is not currently available. How-
ever, in [100] the authors describe an architecture that could be used to create a
multithreaded Bro. The architecture uses a flow based scheduling algorithm to dis-
tribute packets for analysis. Thus, an improved packet scheduling algorithm could
significantly increase performance.
When deployed inline, the goals of a DPI packet scheduler are to maximize
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throughput, minimize average latency, bound maximum latency (e.g., one millisec-
ond), and minimize the number of packets that are reordered within a flow. When a
DPI system is not inline, most of those goals are no longer important. In fact, the
goals become maximize throughput and bound maximum latency at a much higher
value (e.g., one second).
6.3 DPI PACKET SCHEDULERS
The goal of packet scheduling for DPI is to maximize the amount of network traffic
that can be inspected without noticeably impacting it. The ideal packet scheduler
has the following properties:
• Load Balancing: Work is evenly distributed across all threads.
• Low Scheduling Overhead: The cost of scheduling packets (in terms of memory
and CPU cycles) is very small in comparison to the work performed on the
packet.
• Per-Flow Ordering: Packets on the same flow at egress are in their arrival order.
• Cache Affinity: Packets are scheduled on threads that have their associated
data structures already in cache.
• Minimal Packet Delay Variation: Minimal variation in the latency added to
packets on the same flow.
In this section we describe the design and implementation of the three packet
scheduling algorithms we evaluate with PAM. The first algorithm we describe is Direct
Hash (DH). It is an algorithm that is commonly used to schedule packets and we use
it in our evaluation for comparison purposes. The other two algorithms are of our
own design. We created Packet Handoff (PH) to maximize load balancing. However,
to maximize this property, tradeoffs were made such as per-flow ordering and cache
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affinity. The other algorithm we designed is Last Flow Bundle (LFB). Its goal is
to maximize cache affinity. But, like PH it sacrifices other properties (e.g., packet
delay variation). No single packet scheduler can have all of the properties of our ideal
packet scheduler; so, our goal is to determine the properties that are most important
for achieving maximum inspection with minimal network impact.
The DH and LFB packet schedulers only use the source and destination IP ad-
dresses instead of the entire 5-tuple for the flow identifier (FID). We chose not to
include the transport layer ports because that would require more parsing, they are
not included in fragmented packets (except for the first fragment), and it did not have
a significant impact on the distribution of packets with our network captures. As for
our hash function, we chose a 16-bit CRC because it is known to provide good load
distribution [40]. In addition, we always hash the smallest IP address first so that
packets in both directions on a connection go to the same thread.
6.3.1 Direct Hash (DH)
Direct Hash (DH) is a simple fixed hash scheduling algorithm that is widely used;
that is why we selected it for comparison. When a packet arrives, the packet scheduler
parses the data link and network layers to extract the FID. The FID is then hashed
and the result modulo the number of threads determines the PAM thread that will
process the packet. DH has several appealing properties:
• Stateless: There is no state to maintain. The information needed to distribute
the network traffic is contained in each packet. So, there is no additional mem-
ory overhead or table lookups.
• Per-Flow Ordering: By using a subset of the 5-tuple as input to the hash
function, packets on the same flow will hash to the same value so they will
be processed by the same thread. Thus, per-flow packet order is maintained.
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• Cache Affinity: Packets on a flow are always processed by the same thread.
So only memory associated with the flows assigned to a thread will be in the
processors cache. This increases the likelihood of a cache hit when processing
a packet. Furthermore, packets on a flow often arrive in bursts, referred to as
packet trains in [68], resulting in temporal locality that can be used to improve
the cache hit rate by assigning the packet train to the same processor.
The drawbacks of using DH are:
• Load Imbalance: There is no control over how packets are distributed. The
authors of [117] prove that a direct hash on FIDs cannot balance the workload
due to the Zipf-like [134] probability distribution of flows found in real-world
network traffic.
• Header Parsing: the packet scheduler must understand how to parse all of the
protocol headers that contain FID fields. In addition, it must be able to skip
over lower level headers to reach FID headers. Network traffic, even at the lower
levels, can be complicated (e.g., contain multiprotocol label switching (MPLS),
virtual LAN (VLAN), stacked VLANs, IPv6 extension headers). Therefore, the
packet scheduler must be complex enough to extract the FID fields on these
networks.
• High Distribution Overhead: The header parsing, hashing, and distribution are
in the data plane and executed on every packet. So it is important for them
to be efficient. However, esoteric network traffic and the complexity of a good
hash function can make the distribution of packets the bottleneck.
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6.3.2 Packet Handoff (PH)
Packet Handoff (PH) is a packet scheduling algorithm we designed with the goal of
maximizing the concurrency available in DPI. It is a packet based scheduling algo-
rithm, where the least loaded thread gets the next packet. Therefore, this algorithm
is the best at distributing the work evenly across threads. Two types of queues are
used to distribute packets. When a packet is received the packet scheduler places
the packet in the receive queue (RQ). Threads that are not busy (i.e. not currently
processing a packet) go to the RQ to get their next packet. If the RQ is empty they
wait (i.e. spin) for a packet to arrive.
After a thread dequeues a packet from the RQ it parses the link, internet, and
transport layers of the packet. If the packets transport protocol is TCP the 5-tuple
is extracted by the PAM thread and used as the FID. PAM tracks the transport and
application layer state associated with a TCP connection in a connection entry (CE).
All CEs are stored in a connection table and the FID is used to map a packet to a
CE in the table. The connection table is shared by all threads. If a CE mapping is
not found, a new entry is created and the thread sets itself as the owner (this is done
by setting a flag in the CE). If the thread finds the CE, it checks to see if another
thread owns it. If it is not owned, the thread sets itself as the owner. If the CE
is owned, this indicates that another PAM thread is currently processing a packet
associated with it. Packet on the same TCP flow must be processed in sequence
order. Therefore, instead of waiting for the owning thread to complete its processing
and release ownership, the thread enqueues the packet in the connection queue (CQ)
associated with the CE and returns to the RQ for its next packet.
Once a thread owns a CE, it processes the application layer of its current packet
and updates the CE as needed (no synchronization required). When the thread is
finished processing its current packet it checks to see if any packets have been placed
in the CQ associated with the CE it owns. If no packets are in the CQ it removes
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itself as the owner of the CE (by setting a flag in the CE) and proceeds to the RQ to
for its next packet. If there is a packet in the CQ, the thread retains CE ownership
and dequeues its next packet from the CQ instead of the RQ.
A PAM thread can only own one CE at a time. CE ownership occurs when a packet
maps to a CE that is not currently owned. A PAM thread releases CE ownership
when it finishes processing its current packet and the CQ associated with the CE is
empty. Any PAM thread can enqueue a packet in the CQ associated with a CE, but
only the current owner of the CE can dequeue packets. Packets that are enqueued
to a CQ receive the cache benefits of having their application layer processed by the
same thread. However, when CE ownership is released there may be packets in the
system (either being processed or in the RQ) that map to the CE. There is a high
probability that those packets will be processed by a different thread and interleaved
with packets on other connections; thus, they will not receive cache affinity benefits.
The advantages of PH are:
• Load Balancing: Threads pull packets from a queue (i.e. from the RQ) when
they are not busy. The link, internet, and transport layer of all packets are
processed in parallel. Packets are only enqueued to a PAM thread when it owns
a CE and there are other packets being processed by other threads that map to
the owned CE. If n PAM threads are processing packets and there are at least n
packets in the receive queue that map to different CEs, no threads will be idle.
• Low Distribution Overhead: The packet scheduler does not need to parse packet
headers or compute a hash. All it does is enqueue packets into the RQ. There-
fore, the scheduling overhead is low.
The disadvantages of PH are:
• Out-of-Order Packets: Per-flow packet ordering is not preserved. If two packets
on the same TCP flow are processed at the same time by different threads,
141
there is a race to acquire ownership of the CE. If the thread with the higher
packet number acquires ownership, then a copy of the packet will be saved. In
addition, if PAM is inline the packet will be transmitted out-of-order.
• Cache Affinity: There is no mapping of packets that are part of the same
flow to the same thread. Therefore, cache lines associated with CEs move
from processor to processor as they are looked up and updated. In addition
to the cache coherence overhead, the amount of cache lines available to store
connections is reduced, increasing memory accesses.
• Queue Overhead: All threads compete to dequeue packets from the RQ. In our
implementation, RQ contention was not an issue. This was due to the fact that
our average packet size was over 300 bytes for all network captures and there
were at most 14 threads pulling packets from the RQ. A smaller average packet
size or more threads could cause the RQ to become the bottleneck. In addition
to the RQ, CQ contention can limit performance when a large percentage of the
packets are handed off to a single thread.
6.3.3 Last Flow Bundle (LFB)
Last Flow Bundle (LFB) is a flow burst scheduling algorithm we designed with the
goal of maximizing cache affinity. It schedules packets similar to the way Last Proces-
sor (LP) schedules tasks [120]. The idea is to process all of the packets in the system
that map to the same flow on a single thread and not interleave the processing of
packets that map to other flows. LFB uses two types of queues, a single receive queue
(RQ) and a table of flow bundle queues (FBQ), to distribute packets.
As in the DH method, when a packet arrives it is processed by the packet scheduler
to extract the FID that will be used as the input to the hash function. However,
instead of using the result of the hash function to select the thread that will process
the packet, it is used to map the packet to a FBQ in the FBQ table. If the selected
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FBQ is empty, then the packet is enqueued in it and the RQ. On the other hand, if
the selected FBQ is not empty, the packet is only enqueued in it.
When the system is initialized, all PAM threads proceed to the RQ to get their
first packet. After a packet is processed by a PAM thread, it is dequeued from the
associated FBQ (i.e. the FBQ the packet scheduler mapped the packet to) by the
PAM thread. If the FBQ is not empty after the newly processed packet is dequeued,
the PAM thread selects the packet at the head of the FBQ to process next, but does
not dequeue it. This process repeats until the FBQ is empty. Once the FBQ is empty
the PAM thread returns to the RQ for its next packet.
By enqueuing the packet in both the RQ and the selected FBQ, when the selected
FBQ is empty, the packet scheduler permits any non busy PAM thread (i.e. a PAM
thread not currently associated with a FBQ) to process it. However, by enqueuing the
packet only in the selected FBQ when it is not empty, the packet scheduler ensures
that only the PAM thread that is currently associated with that FBQ will process
it. PAM threads dequeue packets from the RQ before they process them. Contrarily,
PAM threads dequeue packets from the FBQ after they have fully processed them.
Leaving a packet in the FBQ during processing informs the packet scheduler that
a PAM thread is currently associated with that FBQ. The FBQ association occurs
when a PAM thread dequeues a packet from the RQ. A PAM thread is associated
with a FBQ until it is empty. A packet is placed in the RQ only when there are no
other packets in the system mapping to the same FBQ. Therefore, at any given time,
there is at most one packet in the RQ that maps to a given FBQ.
The advantages of LFB are:
• Per-flow Ordering: Packets on the same flow hash to the same FBQ. One PAM
thread is assigned to a FBQ until all of the packets in the system that map to
it have been processed. Thus, packets on a flow cannot be reordered because
they are processed serially in the order they arrived in the system.
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• Cache Affinity: Packets that map to the same FBQ and are in the system
at the same time are processed by a single thread. So packet trains will be
processed on the same processor increasing the likelihood of a cache hit on
the data structures associated with the flow. In addition, a thread will choose
to process a packet that maps to the previous packets FBQ over packets that
arrived earlier, but did not map to the same FBQ. This increases the cache
hit rate by eliminating interleaved flow processing that could evict cache lines
associated with the previous packets flow.
• Load Balancing: The FBQ table is over two orders of magnitude larger than the
number of PAM threads. So, the number of flow collisions is small compared to
DH. FBQ assignments are dynamic. A PAM thread is only assigned to a FBQ
while there are packets that map to it in the system. When a thread finishes
processing the last packet in the system on a FBQ, it goes to the RQ to get its
next packet. If there are n threads processing packets and there are at least n
packets in the system that map to unique FBQ, no thread will be idle.
The disadvantages of LFB are:
• Header Parsing: Like direct hash, the packet scheduler must be complex enough
to skip over the preceding protocol layers and extract the FID.
• Increased Packet Delay Variation (PDV) [12]: Packets on the same flow are
intentionally processed together for improved efficiency. However, this causes
packets in a packet train to jump ahead of older packets in the queue resulting
in higher latency for those packets. If enough packets jump ahead the PDV will
increase.
• High Distribution Overhead: In addition to the overhead described in the DH
section, LFB requires the packet scheduler to enqueue a packet in two places if
it maps to an empty FBQ.
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6.4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section describes our testing methodology, the data used for the evaluation, and
the results. Our goal was to understand the impact each scheduling algorithm has on
throughput and latency. Therefore, for each packet scheduling algorithm we measured
the following:
• Maximum raw throughput: This measures how fast a packet scheduling algo-
rithm can process a network capture and ignores packet timing information.
• Maximum scaled throughput: This measures how fast a packet scheduling algo-
rithm can process a packet capture using the timing information in the capture.
• Average packet latency: The average amount of time a packet spends in the
system.
• Maximum packet latency: The maximum time that any packet spent in the
system.
6.4.1 Testing Methodology
We designed a test harness that takes a network capture as input and collects the
throughput and latency measurements described above. The test harness begins by
loading all of the packets from the capture into memory to eliminate disk I/O from
the measurements. The packets are parsed by the packet scheduler during load to
extract the FID and calculate the hash. All of the PAM threads wait on a barrier
during this phase. When all of the packets are in memory they proceed through the
barrier and record the value of the cycle counter. After the packet scheduler enqueues
the last packet in the capture, it enqueues sentinel packets to let the PAM threads
know they are done. When a PAM thread dequeues a sentinel packet it calculates
the difference between the value of the current cycle counter and the recorded start
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value. The largest cycle count recorded by a PAM thread is then used in the time
and bandwidth calculations.
6.4.1.1 Measuring Throughput
To measure the maximum raw throughput, the packet scheduler enqueues packets
as fast as it can and only pauses when a queue is full. The largest cycle count
recorded by a PAM thread is then used to calculate throughput. Measuring the
maximum scaled throughput is more complicated. After the packets have been loaded
into memory, the packet scheduler scans the timestamps recorded for each packet
during capture to calculate the average and maximum bandwidth (we define the
maximum bandwidth to be the maximum bit rate sustained for a minimum of one
millisecond). Then the packet scheduler scales the timestamp of each packet so that
the new average bandwidth matches a program argument provided to the test harness.
When processing begins, the packet scheduler uses the cycle counter and the adjusted
timestamp of each packet to enqueue them at their new specified time. Periodically,
the packet scheduler will check on the number of outstanding packets. If that number
exceeds a specified maximum value it considers those packets dropped. In an actual
DPI appliance, there are a fixed number of packet buffers. Once that value is exceeded,
incoming packets are dropped. We consider PAM to be oversubscribed if it drops a
packet; thus, unable to perform at that bandwidth. We chose 4096 as the maximum
number of outstanding packets because latency starts to increase significantly when
it is exceeded.
6.4.1.2 Measuring Latency
Packet latency is measured by recording the value of the cycle counter when a packet
is enqueued and calculating the difference in the cycle counter after a PAM thread
processes it. The latency associated with receiving and forwarding of packets that
would be present in a DPI appliance is not measured by our test harness. However,
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our goal is to measure the latency relative to each scheduling algorithm so we believe
our measurement to be sufficient. Our latency measurements were taken at 80% of
maximum scaled throughput.
6.4.1.3 Evaluation Platform
We evaluated the packet scheduling algorithms on a system running a Linux 2.6 kernel
with two 2.53 GHz Intel Quad-Core Xeon E5540 processors [21] with 4 gigabytes of
RAM. Hyper-threading was enabled and processor affinity was set so that each PAM
thread and the packet scheduler executed on different hardware threads. In addition,
software threads were assigned so that no two executed on the same core unless there
were more software threads than cores. Furthermore, the priority of all software
threads was set to real-time.
The Xeon E5540 processors are based on Intels Nehalem microarchitecture. They
have a memory controller per processor and are connected via the Quick Path In-
terconnect (QPI) to create a ccNUMA architecture. Each processor has 4 cores and
each core has its own L1 (32 KB instruction/32 KB data) and L2 (256 KB) cache.
All of the cores on a processor share an inclusive L3 (8 MB) cache. The cache line
size is 64 bytes. Cache coherency between processors is maintained by the MESIF
protocol.
6.4.2 Network Captures
We used three network captures to evaluate the performance of the packet scheduling
algorithms. They consist of real network traffic from locations in networks where a
DPI appliance is deployed. They contain the entire payload of every packet so that
we can determine the number of clock cycles PAM requires to process each packet.
The clock cycle measurements in this section were taken by recording the clock cycle
counter just before entering PAMs packet processing function and then recording the
difference when PAM returned. Table 20 shows the following information for each
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capture:
• Packets: The total number of packets.
• Connections (Conns): The total number of unique TCP and UDP connections.
• Average Mb/s: The average bandwidth of the network traffic during capture.
• Maximum Mb/s: The maximum bandwidth of the network traffic that was
sustained for a minimum of one millisecond during capture.
• Average Cycles Per-Packet (CPP): The average number of clock cycles PAM
expends processing a packet.
• Connection Density (CD): The average number of unique connections per one
hundred packets.
Table 20: Network capture attributes.
Packets Conns. Avg. Mb/s Max Mb/s Avg. CPP CP
Dominant 454, 988 2, 224 13 38 4, 814 7
Many 1, 567, 397 105, 691 27 74 5, 658 50
Balanced 1, 236, 710 43, 357 57 75 5, 203 29
=
We chose these three captures because we wanted to evaluate the packet scheduling
algorithms under varying network conditions using real network traffic. Figure 27
shows the clock cycle distribution of the top ten connections from each capture. The
top ten connections in the Dominant capture are responsible for over 50% of the total
clock cycles. The traffic in the capture is dominated by a single TCP connection. It
is responsible for over 50% of the packets and 27% of the clock cycles. The top ten
connections in the Many capture are responsible for less than 0.4%. This means there
is a much lower variance in clock cycles spent on each flow than in the other captures.
In addition, packets on the different connections are spread throughout the capture
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Figure 27: Top ten connections by clock cycle.
top ten connections contribute about 15% of the total clock cycles. The dominant
connection in the Balanced capture is responsible for 8%. This places the Balanced
capture between the other two in terms of connection clock cycle distribution.
6.4.3 Throughput Results
6.4.3.1 Dominant Capture Raw Throughput
Figure 28 shows the maximum raw throughput results for the Dominant capture. The
LFB algorithm has the highest throughput at every thread count tested. It shows
near linear scalability from 1 to 4 threads. After that, as more threads are added, the
throughput increases cease. This is because of the dominating TCP connection that
is responsible for the majority of the packets. At 5 threads and above, a single thread
processes all of the packets on that connection and nothing else. So, 3.8 gigabits per
second is how fast a single thread can process that connection. Adding additional
threads only decreases the average latency of the packets on the other connections.
At 14 threads the performance decreases. This is due to the fact that the hardware
thread on the core that inspected the dominating TCP connection shared cycles with
another hardware thread that processed 11,803 packets on other connections.
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Figure 28: Dominant Capture - raw throughput.
work was optimally balanced in the sense that a single thread only processed packets
on the dominating TCP connection. The work balance cannot be improved because
PAM requires that packets on the same TCP connection be processed sequentially.
Second the work was optimally scheduled for performance. Every packet on the
dominating TCP connection was processed on the same core and no packets from
other connections were processed on the core. Therefore, the data associated with
the dominating TCP connection stayed in cache, improving the cache hit percentage,
resulting in fewer cycles per instruction.
The DH algorithm also received the cache benefit of processing the dominating
TCP connection on the same core. However, the thread that processed it also had
to process packets on other connections. The dips and peaks in the graph show the
thread numbers that resulted in more or less packets mapping to the thread that
processed the dominating TCP connection. At 14 threads, no other packets mapped
to the thread processing the dominating TCP connection. However, the hardware
thread sharing the core ultimately limited the throughput to approximately 12%
lower than LFB.
The PH algorithm had the worst performance. This is because at 14 threads over
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67% of packets were enqueued (i.e. handed off) to other threads. As the number of
threads increased so did the number of handoffs. Handing off a packet to another
thread is expensive because the data link, internet, and transport layer information
is copied and enqueued with the packet to avoid processing those layers again. Also,
enqueuing a packet to another thread requires an atomic operation since there could
be multiple producers (i.e. multiple packets on the same connection being enqueued
by different PAM threads). For these reasons the performance decreased with more
than 4 threads.
6.4.3.2 Many Capture Raw Throughput
The Many capture does not contain a single TCP connection that dominates the
bandwidth or the packet processing cycles. In fact, the fastest TCP connection is
responsible for less than 0.4% of the total packets. Figure 29 shows the maximum
raw throughput results for the Many capture. LFB has the highest throughput at
every thread count tested. This is because of the cache benefits each thread gets from
preferring to process a packet on the flow bundle it just processed over packets that
may have arrived earlier. Even when there is just 1 thread, LFB performs better than
the other algorithms because of this. At 14 threads LFB is around 25% faster than
DH.
DH performs better than PH because the workload is almost perfectly balanced
and it, like LFB, gets the cache benefits of having the same thread process every packet
on a flow. Nevertheless, because there are more interleaving packets on different flows,
it does not perform as well as LFB. PH is about 15% slower than DH even with less
than 10% of the packets being handed off to other threads. The slower performance
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Figure 29: Many Capture - raw throughput.
6.4.3.3 Balanced Capture Raw Throughput
The throughput results for the Balanced capture are presented in Figure 30. Again,
LFB has the highest throughput at every thread count tested because of the cache
benefits of the scheduling algorithm. At 14 threads it is 38% faster than DH. DH
performs well at 5 threads, but does not do as well at 4, 6, 7, and 14 due to load
imbalances. In fact, PH outperforms DH at 4 threads. This shows that a load
imbalance can outweigh the cache benefits if it is large enough. However, cache
misses limit PHs scalability above 4 threads.
6.4.3.4 Scaled Throughput
The maximum scaled throughput results for all captures and algorithms are shown
in Figure 31. The throughput for all algorithms decreased in comparison to the
maximum raw throughput because of bandwidth spikes that are from 1.5 to 3 times
the average and last for several milliseconds.
Notice that the throughput decline of the LFB algorithm for the Dominant cap-
ture is significantly less than the others. We suspect this is due to the fact that it
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Figure 32: Average latency.
three millisecond burst of packets. If the packets that are least expensive, in terms
of clock cycles, are processed first then more packet buffers will be available for ar-
riving packets than if they were processed in their original order; thus, increasing the
maximum scaled bandwidth. Another interesting observation is that PH performed
better than DH on the Dominant capture and the Balanced capture. This is due to
load imbalances during packet bursts resulting in dropped packets; therefore, reduced
throughput.
6.4.4 Latency Results
Figure 32 shows the average latency of all three packet scheduling algorithms for each
capture. These numbers represent the mean time taken to process a packet at 80%
of the maximum scaled throughput for the packet scheduling algorithm. The latency
numbers are all below 100 microseconds. DH has the highest average latency for all
three captures. This is because of work imbalances causing packets to wait in queues
even when the system is lightly loaded.
The maximum latency results are presented in Figure 33. LFB has the highest
maximum latency for the Dominant and Balanced captures. This is due to the order
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Figure 33: Maximum latency.
while packets on an index in the FBQ are processed. This causes the packets sitting
in the RQ to accumulate latency while waiting to be processed. This does not happen
with the Many capture because of the high connection density and the large number
of connections that prevent RQ starvation.
6.4.5 Cache Measurements
Figure 34 shows the average number of L1, L2, and L3 cache misses per packet with
seven PAM threads for the three packet scheduling algorithms and network captures.
For the Dominant capture we see the considerable number of cache misses for PH
resulting from the large number of packet handoffs. As for DH and LFB, the average
number of cache misses per packet is almost identical for the Dominant capture;
yet, LFB had 29% higher throughput. This is because DH processed around 8%
more packets on the core that processed the dominant connection. These additional
packets were more expensive to process due to their associated state not being in
cache causing the average cache misses per packet to be higher on the dominant core
for DH (see Figure 35). So, more packets plus a higher average number of cache
misses per packet caused DH to be slower.
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Figure 36: Dominant Capture with half L3 Cache.
and LFB. This is due to the large number of concurrent connections (i.e. connection
density) in the capture that results in more interleaved connection processing. As
for the Balance capture, LFB had the fewest cache misses, as it did for all of the
network captures. DH, in general, had more cache misses than LFB because of load
imbalances and more connection interleaving.
In order to determine how the systems cache size impacted the performance of the
three scheduling algorithms, we measured their throughput with half of the L3 cache
available. Since there is no way to disable half of the L3 cache on the processor, we
created a cache clobbering thread to run on one core of each processor. The cache
clobbering thread allocates 4MB of cache aligned memory and reads the first byte of
each cache line in a loop; thus, half of the L3 is invalidated with each pass. Figure 36,
37 and 38 show the results of these experiments.
For the Dominant capture, LFB performance only declined by around 7%. L3
cache misses did increase, but only by a small amount on the core processing the
dominant connection. This is because the state for the dominant connection easily
fits in the smaller L3 cache and it is accessed enough to keep it in cache. As for DH, it
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Figure 38: Balanced Capture with half L3 Cache.
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on other connections that were being processed on the same core as the dominant
connection.
The results for the Many capture show a similar percentage throughput decrease
for all three packet scheduling algorithms. This is because of the large number of
connections (i.e. many connections) that are processed concurrently resulting in the
need of a larger L3 to cache all of the state. In the case of the Balanced capture, DH
had the lowest decrease in throughput. This is the result of the uneven distribution
of work across the cores. The core assigned the most work by DH did not increase
its number of L3 cache misses by the same proportion as the other cores. Thus, even
though its increase in L3 cache misses is slightly higher than LFB, it did not have as
much of an impact on its performance.
6.4.6 Discussion
The LFB algorithm is the best performer in terms of throughput. This is because of
the temporal locality cache benefit gained by preferring to process packets that map to
the FBQ of the last packet over packets that may have arrived earlier. But, reordering
packets for optimal temporal locality can have a negative impact on latency. In fact,
we observed this effect on the Balanced capture. The DH algorithm also benefits from
temporal locality because packets on the same flow bundle are always processed by
the same thread. In addition, the DH algorithm does not reorder packets so a high
maximum latency is less of an issue. However, interleaving packets on different flows
and load imbalances reduce its maximum throughput. The PH algorithm produces
the most balanced load in terms of packets processed by threads; yet, its throughput
is typically lower than the other algorithms. This is because it does not exploit the
cache benefits of temporal locality in the network traffic.
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6.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we discussed the design and implementation of two packet scheduling
algorithms we invented. Each one was designed to maximize a different attribute
of our ideal scheduler. We compared our two packet schedulers against DH, an al-
gorithm commonly used to schedule packets in network applications. The results
show the importance of cache affinity in packet scheduling. In fact, LFB, our packet
scheduler that maximizes cache affinity, outperformed the other two schedulers in
terms of throughput for all network captures. For the Balanced network capture,
LFBs throughput was 38% faster than the next best scheduler. Our results show that
scheduling packets for cache affinity is more important for throughput than balancing
the workload evenly. All in all, by utilizing multithreaded DPI and scheduling pack-
ets based on cache affinity, we can protect large enterprise networks from malware




7.1 Summary of Contributions
The research presented in the previous chapters confirms our thesis statement that
analyzing and modeling the network behavior of malware using DPI improves our
understanding of malware downloads and infections. Furthermore, we demonstrated
how to leverage this knowledge to create more effective network defenses by developing
WebWitness, WebSentry and ExecScent. Specifically we examined the web browsing
activities before a malicious download to study both drive-by and social engineering
attacks. Then using insights gained from these studies we developed defenses for
both. In addition, we examined the C&C communication of malware to engineer
a set of features that we used to learn a malware’s families protocol, adapt to a
deployment network and identify infected hosts based on their communication. Lastly,
we showed how these systems can be scaled to large enterprise networks by optimizing
multithreaded DPI using cache affinity packet scheduling. Our malware studies and
defense systems were the result of addressing the following eight research problems:
• Identify the sequence of web pages visited by a user that led to a malicious
download with only network visibility; i.e., reconstruct the download path from
observed HTTP transactions.
• Determine the reason for a malicious download by using features that can be
extracted from the download path.
• Leverage the download paths to better understand current attack trends and
develop more effective defenses.
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• Learn the structure of malware communication from packet captures of malware
executed in a sandbox or from an infected host.
• Detect infected hosts and new C&C domains by comparing the observed pro-
tocol structure to learned malicious communication.
• Adapt to the deployment network’s communication profile to provide a better
tradeoff between true and false positive.
• Determine if maximizing workload balance or cache affinity provides the best
performance.
• Identify the packet scheduling performance tradeoffs in regards to throughput
and latency.
To provide context to attacks we propose WebWitness, a malicious download
investigation system. It automatically identifies the web path taken by the user to
download a malicious executable. Also, it labels important nodes on path such as the
landing, exploit and infector web pages as well as classifies the cause of the download
as drive-by, social engineering or update. Using these paths we study attacks that
result in malware downloads and propose a new more effective defense against drive-
bys. We show that on average WebWitness can decrease the infection rate of drive-
by downloads based on malicious content injection by almost 6 times compared to
existing URL blacklisting approaches.
Leveraging WebWitness, we perform a comprehensive study of SE malicious down-
loads. We collect hundreds of in-the-wild web based SE malware attacks and analyze
them in detail. From our analysis we develop a categorization system that classi-
fies an SE download based on how the attacker gains the user’s attention and the
deception/persuasion techniques employed to trick the user. We find that over 80%
of SE downloads use advertisements to get the user’s attention and that most are
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served from “low tier” ad networks. Furthermore, we discover a number of features
that can be used to identify SE downloads and implement a detection system called
WebSentry.
To discover infected hosts and new C&C domains, we develop ExecScent a system
that learns the protocol structure of malware families. ExecScent creates adaptive
control protocol templates (CPTs) that are based on examples of known C&C com-
munications and the background traffic of the network where the templates are to be
deployed. Learning from both provides a better trade-off of true and false positive for
a given network environment. Our results show that ExecScent outperforms blacklist-
ing (even large commercial up-to-date blacklist) by identifying new C&C domains and
infected hosts even when the attackers change domains and hosting infrastructure.
Scheduling packets for multithreaded DPI to maximize throughput is challenging
and has tradeoffs. We designed and implemented two packet scheduling algorithms
to compare maximizing workload balance and cache affinity. Also, we compared
both algorithms to direct hash an industry standard algorithm. Our results show
that scheduling for cache affinity maximizes DPI throughput across all of the traffic
mixes we tested. In fact, for some traffic mixes it outperformed the other schedulers
by almost 40%. Scheduling using only cache affinity maximizes system throughput,
but can starve some flows resulting in their packets having high latency. Thus for
inline DPI, a hybrid approach is recommended to prevent flow starvation where cache
affinity scheduling is primary and workload balance scheduling is secondary.
7.2 Discussion and Limitations
The defense systems described in this thesis focused exclusively on malware infections
and communications over the HTTP protocol. While it is true that attackers use other
protocols (IRC) and mediums (USB sticks), HTTP remains at the top in popularity
for both infecting hosts [8] and C&C communications [13]. The browser (HTTP)
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is a common infection vector because it is widely used to communicate with other
hosts, it provides the resources required for social engineering and vulnerabilities
are plentiful. As for C&C communication, HTTP is popular because it is allowed
out of most networks, even those with strict egress filtering, and it blends into the
background traffic (users browsing the web). We targeted our systems at HTTP
because of its popularity, but many of the ideas (e.g., learning the structure of malware
communication) can be directly applied to other protocols.
One may think that attackers could avoid our defense systems by simply perform-
ing their malicious activities over encrypted web traffic, using HTTPS. However, it is
worth noting that in sensitive networks (e.g., enterprise and government networks) it
is now common practice to deploy SSL Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) proxies, which
allow for inspecting and recording the content of both HTTP and HTTPS traffic
(perhaps excluding the traffic towards some whitelisted sides, such as banking appli-
cations, etc.). Therefore, our systems could simply work alongside such SSL MITM
proxies.
Gaining the necessary visibility for DPI on some networks can be challenging.
For instance, in a proxy environment, our systems need to be deployed between the
internal network and proxy instead of at egress. Otherwise, they would be unable to
associate HTTP transactions with hosts. Load balanced network links can also be
an issue when multiple HTTP transactions from the same host need to be correlated
(WebWitness) or when there is asymmetric routing. Also there are networks where
the bandwidth is too high to inspect all egress traffic (e.g., ISPs). On these networks,
we must rely on triggers from DNS (suspicious domain lookup) and netflow (suspicious
behavior) to partition the network traffic and only direct network communication of
suspicious hosts through DPI. While these systems are faced with these deployment




The ideas and systems developed in thesis can be applied and extended to new re-
search. This sections describes severals avenues of research that build on the work
presented in this thesis to study and solve interesting problems.
Phishing Study. Phishing continues to be a major threat to users despite over a
decade of defense development by the security community. We propose a phishing
study that explores how people reach phishing websites and examines the phishing
tactics that are most successful. WebWitness can be used to capture the web paths
followed by users to phishing websites by replacing its executable trigger with that
of a known phishing domain list. Also, we can use WebWitness to follow the next n
minutes of traffic from the user after they land on the phishing website to determine
if the attack is successful.
Protocol Clustering on Live Networks. The structure of a protocol defines
how information is exchanged between a client and server, or between peers. By
protocol we are not referring to TCP, UDP, HTTP; but to the way data is structured
on top of these transport and application layer protocols for information exchange.
As discussed in Chapter 5, related malware can be clustered and identified by their
protocol structure. By grouping related protocols on a live network, clients and servers
using the same protocol structure can be identified. Protocols that are rare in terms
of clients or new to the network may be suspicious as well as protocols that move
domains. Furthermore, grouping network communication by protocol structure would
aid network security investigators by allowing them to examine groups of related
suspicious traffic instead of single communications in isolation.
Infector to C&C Domain. The vast majority of infector domains that host exploit
kits are only active for a single day as discussed in Chapter 3. This is because there are
many detection tools that identify exploits and malware downloads. When discovered
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the infector domains and URLs are quickly blacklisted thus the attackers change them
frequently. When observed from passive DNS (pDNS), the infector domains have a
very unique signature. On the day prior to hosting the exploit kit the domain has
zero to a small number of clients that resolve the domain. On the day it hosts the
exploit kit there are often hundreds or even thousands of clients that resolve it. Then
in the following days the number of clients resolving the domain on any given day is
very few (often one or two).
This unique signature of infector domains makes them relatively easy to identify
in pDNS. Since they are no longer in use, they themselves are not that interesting.
However, by following the clients and the domains they resolve after visiting an infec-
tor domain often leads to the C&C domain. The idea is that clients that get infected
with the same malware from the same infector will visit the same C&C domain. Ob-
serving overlapping unpopular domains in a subset of these clients in the minutes or
hours following their visit to the same infector domain may provide a candidate list
of C&C domains. Also, clients can be followed in the other direction (domains prior
to infection) to find compromised websites directing users to exploit kits.
Automated Social Engineering Training. The most popular social engineering
attacks are detected and labeled by WebSentry. In most cases, the trick page is also
easily identified. Since the content of the trick page is captured by WebSentry, it
can be used to recreate the social engineering attack without the potential harm of
downloading a malicious executable. The latest attacks can be simulated and period-
ically shown to users in their browser as they surf the web as part of an organization’s
ongoing security training. If they fall for the social engineering tactic, they can be
informed of their mistake and directed to training materials for recognizing social
engineering attacks.
Network Directed Host Analysis. Detecting malware at the network level has
166
several advantages over host detection. For instance, network monitoring has no im-
pact on the performance of the host and cannot be disabled by malware. However, the
host context and process information at the network level is very limited. Having host
level information would improve detection. It could be obtained by the network di-
recting a host agent to monitor the process generating the suspicious communication.
Thus, the analysis overhead on the host would be limited to a single process and only
run when a host is identified as suspicious by the network. This additional context
gained from the host agent would aid in determining if the host is compromised.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
This thesis explored analyzing and modeling the network behavior of malware using
DPI to improve our understanding of malware downloads and infections. We used
insights gained from this process to improve detection, annotation and network de-
fenses. There are four important contributions. First is WebWitness, a system that
provides context to malware downloads by identifying the web path, annotating nodes
of interest and determining the cause. Next we performed a systematic study of SE
downloads on the web. From this study, we created a categorization system for clas-
sifying attacks and developed a defense that is effective against the most common SE
attacks. Third, we designed and implemented ExecScent a novel system that adapts
its detection to identify infected hosts and new C&C domains. Lastly we explored
packet scheduling for DPI and discovered that scheduling packets for cache affinity
maximizes throughput allowing DPI to be deployed on networks with speeds exceed-
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